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THE TRENT AFFAIR 



INCLUDING A 



REVIEW OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN RELATIONS 
AT THE BEGINNING OF THE CIVIL WAR 

By THOMAS L. HARRIS, A. M. 



WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 

James A. Woodburn, Ph. D. 

Professor of American History In the Indiana Univer6it)r. 



INDIANAPOLIS 

THE BOBBS-MERRILL COMPANY 

PUBLISHERS 






Copyright 1896 

BY 

THE BOWEN-MERRILL COMPANY. 

535t.C( 

30 M ^V5 ^ 



C^y 



CONTENTS. 



Introduction 7 

Chapter, 

I. Relations with England it 

II. English Sympathy for the Confederacy 21 

III. The Question of Confederate Independence 31 

IV. The Queen's Neutrality Proclamation 37 

V. English Negotiations with the Insurgents 53 

VI. Mr. Seward's Circular to the Governors of the 

Northern States 61 

VII. The First Efforts of the Confederates for Recogni- 
tion Abroad 69 

VIII. James Murray Mason and John Slidell. The Na- 
ture and Merits of Their Mission 79 

IX. The Departure of the Commissioners for Europe... 91 

X. The Seizure 97 

XI. The Effect in America 117 

XII. The Effectin England 137 

XIII. The British Demand 163 

XIV. Consideration of the British Demand in America... 175 
XV. Views of Other European Nations Concerning the 

Trent Case 195 

XVI. The Answer of the Federal Government 2H 

XVII. The Surrender of Mason and Slidell 225 

XVIII. Earl Russell's View of the American Position 239 

XIX. International Law in the Trent Case 247 

XX. Reflections on the Course of the British Govern- 
ment 269 

(5) 



INTRODUCTION. 



The history of the diplomatic relations between Great 
Britain and the United States suggests an interesting and 
valuable field to the student of Anglo-American history 
and international law. It is a fertile field, still largely 
unworked. No one, so far as I know, has yet ventured 
upon an exhaustive and connected discussion of the im- 
portant subjects which this theme involves. One of the 
most interesting and unwritten chapters in this history is 
to be found in the relations between Great Britain and 
the United States during our civil war, as illustrated in 
the case of the Trent and the discussion to which this 
case gave rise. Much has been written on this cele- 
brated case. Mr. Harris has set for himself the task of 
examining the literature of the subject, of reviewing the 
original material, and placing in brief and accessible 
shape the important and essential features of the dis- 
cussion. All who wish a ready access to a faithful re- 
view and complete resume of this notable chapter in our 
foreign relations will appreciate his service. 

The right of search is historically a very interesting 
subject. On two notable occasions it brought us into 
serious collision with Great Britain. One of these occa- 
sions was in the war of 1812, the other in the affair of 

(7) 



8 INTR OD UC TION. 

the Trent in 1861. The war of 18121s to be studied 
chiefly as a part of the history of international law. The 
reader who turns his attention to this war will, there- 
fore, desire to bring within his viev/ the history of the 
affair of the Trent. The merits of the two discussions, 
in 1806-1812 and 1861, are inseparable. Mr. Madison 
and Mr. Seward, the American contributors to the diplo- 
matic literature of this discussion, are to be considered 
together. It will thus be seen that a competent account 
of the case of the Trent and the principles of public 
law which it involves brings within the view a pretty 
wide range of historical discussion. 

One of the prominent causes of the war 1812 was the 
right, then claimed by Great Britain, of searching the 
vessels of the United States upon the high seas for 
British subjects, with the purpose of impressing them 
into the service of the British navy. The way in which 
Great Britain exercised this power of search did more 
than all other causes combined to arouse irritation and 
antagonism in America. Mr. Webster, in his corre- 
spondence with Lord Ashburton, in 1842, gave an 
American definition of this assumed right. "England 
asserts the right," says Mr. Webster, *'of impressing 
British subjects in time of war out of neutral ships and 
of deciding by her visiting officers who among the crew 
of such merchant ships are British subjects. She asserts 
this as a legal prerogative of the crown, which preroga- 
tive is alleged to be founded on the English law of per- 
petual and indissoluble allegiance of the subject and his 
obligation, under all circumstances, and for his whole 
life, to render military service to the crown whenever re- 
quired." 



INTR ODUC TION. g 

Great Britain did not renounce this right at Ghent in 
1814, nor has she at any time since specifically surren- 
dered it. But the right of search, for such a purpose as 
England then asserted it, is now obsolete. It is safe to 
say that it will never again be attempted in time of war 
against any vessel flying a neutral flag. American 
diplomacy has contributed not a little to this desirable 
result. 

In 1 86 1 a public armed vessel of the United States 
forcibly searched an English mail steamer for the pur- 
pose of recovering certain gentlemen who were claimed 
as citizen subjects of the United States. The act was 
not one of hostility toward England, nor as an act of 
search was it nearly so provoking as many which had 
been previously committed by Great Britain against 
us. The case arising out of this seizure is a subject of 
the first importance in our national history, and the re- 
sult of the case, with the diplomatic discussion between 
Mr. Seward and Lord Lyons, may be said to have 
finally established, as permanent public law, the princi- 
ple underlying the preceding historic American conten- 
tion on this subject. The history of the case, its politi- 
cal aspects, the diplomatic discussions to which it gave 
rise, the principles of law which it has helped to estab- 
lish, the opinions of eminent publicists, the conclusions 
of international law, and the relation of the case to pre- 
ceding discussions, — these themes indicate the scope of 
Mr. Harris's essay. 

James A. Woodburn. 

Indiana University. 



CHAPTER I. 

RELATIONS WITH ENGLAND. 

Undisturbed relations have not always existed be- 
tween the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race on 
opposite sides of the Atlantic. The English colonies in 
the New World quarreled continually with their mother 
country. Finally revolution and war enabled the colo- 
nists to free themselves from English rule, although 
causes of dispute have ever continued to exist. A con- 
tinuous record of the international difficulties between 
the United States and England would form no incon- 
siderable part of American history. 

An almost unbroken succession of disputes has occu- 
pied the attention of statesmen in both countries for 
more than a century. The Federal government had 
scarcely been organized when the first serious cause of 
trouble arose. England claimed the right forcibly to 
visit and search American merchant vessels on the high 
seas in time of peace. Thousands of American citizens 
having been impressed into the British naval service, 
the arbitrament of war was resorted to. This did not 
decide the matter. The abstract right of search and 
seizure was steadily maintained by England for almost 
half a century after the close of the war of 1812. An 



12 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

attempt to put it into practice again off the coast of 
Cuba in the spring of 1858 caused an outburst of pop- 
ular indignation in every part of the United States, and 
American war vessels in Cuban waters were immedi- 
ately ordered to resent such outrages at all hazards. 
This looked like war, and, without further delay. Great 
Britain abandoned the claim for which she had so long 
contended. 1 Boundary disputes were a cause of much 
agitation for many years. Long and tedious negotiation 
was required to adjust the northwestern boundary of the 
United States between Maine and New Brunswick. 
Although the American claims in this region were ably 
presented and fairly established, British writers have 
repeatedly asserted that the United States government, 
in this instance, accomplished its purposes by means 
which were unfair, unjust, and entirely unworthy of 
modern diplomacy. ^ 

Scarcely had a treaty been concluded by which this 
boundary was settled when the Oregon question became 
one of great prominence, and in 1844, the alliterative 
campaign cry of " fifty- four forty or fight" testified to 
the serious character of the dispute. A settlement was 
finally effected by conceding most of the English claims, 
although ex-President John Quincy Adams and other 
equally noted Americans protested against what seemed 
to them a disgraceful surrender. The details of the 
various controversies caused by English conduct during 

* See Schuyler's American Diplomacy, pp. 262-3. 

* London Quarterly Review, No. 221, p. 261; Westminster 
Review, Vol. xxi, pp. 222-3. For a full discussion of the north- 
western boundary question, see Winsor's Narrative and Crit- 
ical History of America, Vol. vn, p. 180. 



DISPUTES WITH GREAT BRITAIN. 13 

the American civil war are fresh in the memory of a 
generation still living. In our own time fishery disputes 
have tested the skill of diplomatists in both countries. 

There has probably never been a time, however brief , 
in the history of the United States when absolutely no 
cause of difference existed between the two nations. At 
the present date (1895) one hundred seven presidential 
messages reviewing the state of the country have been 
submitted to the American congress at the opening of 
its regular sessions. It is a significant fact that seventy- 
eight of these messages — almost three-fourths of them 
— have called the attention of congress to difficulties of 
more or less importance with Great Britain. To the 
seventy-eight messages of the latter class every presi- 
dent has contributed except Garfield, Taylor, and Will- 
iam Henry Harrison. 

Toward the close of the year i860, however, British 
and American international affairs had assumed a much 
more favorable aspect than usual. All of the most 
perplexing and dangerous questions which had so long 
disturbed the relations of the two countries had been 
peaceably and finally settled. This result gave the 
greatest satisfaction to the people and government of 
the United States. In his message to congress at the 
opening of the session in December, i860. President 
Buchanan said: "Our relations with Great Britain are 
of the most friendly character. Since the commence- 
ment of my administration the two dangerous questions 
arising from the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and from the 
right of search claimed by the British government have 
been amicably and honorably adjusted. The discordant 



H 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



constructions of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty, which at 
different periods of the discussion bore a threatening 
aspect, have resulted in a final settlement entirely satis- 
factory to this government. 

"It must be a source of sincere satisfaction to all 
classes of our fellow-citizens and especially to those en- 
gaged in foreign commerce that the claim on the part of 
Great Britain forcibly to visit and search American 
merchant vessels on the high seas in time of peace has 
been abandoned. This was by far the most dangerous 
question to the peace of the two nations which has ex- 
isted since the war of iSi3. While it remained open 
they might at any moment have been precipitated into a 
war. 

"The only question of any importance which still 
remains open is the disputed title between the two 
governments to the Island of San Juan in the vicinity 
of Washington territory." It was evident that both 
countries were expecting this question to be settled with- 
out any trouble. 

The president also said in the same message: "The 
recent visit of the Prince of Wales in a private charac- 
ter to the people of this country has proved to be a most 
auspicious event. In its consequences it can not fail to 
increase the kindred and kindly feelings which I trust 
may ever actuate the government and people of both 
countries in their political and social intercourse with 
each other." 

Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, truly 
said of this message that its language was the most cor- 
dial in character of any which had ever appeared in 



VISIT OF THE PRINCE OF WALES. 



15 



such a communication. The British government and 
people appeared to appreciate the friendship and good 
feeling for them which prevailed in the United States at 
that time. As an evidence of this fact Queen Victoria 
sent her son, the Prince of Wales, on a visit to the 
United States in the latter part of the year i860 — the 
event referred to in President Buchanan's message. The 
Prince was received everywhere with the hearty and 
enthusiastic welcome which was due to such a distin- 
guished personage. After the visit had terminated, the 
British minister at Washington was directed to express 
the thanks of her majesty and to say to the president 
and citizens of the United States that one of the main 
objects which she had in view in sanctioning the visit of 
her son to America was to prove "the sincerity of those 
sentiments of esteem and regard which her majesty and 
all classes of her subjects entertain for the kindred race 
which occupies so distinguished a position in the com- 
munity of nations." "Her majesty trusts," continued 
the British minister, "that the feeling of confidence and 
affection, of which late events have proved beyond all 
question the existence, will long continue to prevail be- 
tween the two countries to their mutual advantage and 
to the general interests of civilization and humanity. I 
am commanded to state to the president that the queen 
would be gratified by his making known generally to 
the citizens of the United States her grateful sense of 
the kindness with which they received her son, who has 
returned to England deeply impressed with all he saw 
during his progress through the states, and more espe- 
cially so with the friendly and cordial good-will mani- 



l6 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

fested towards him on every occasion and by all classes 
of the community." * 

This message was promptly answered by the Ameri- 
can assistant secretary of state, who said among other 
things: "I am instructed by the president to express 
the gratification with which he has learned how cor- 
rectly her majesty has appreciated the spirit in which 
his royal highness was received throughout the republic, 
and the cordial manifestation of that spirit by the people 
of the United States which accompanied him in every 
step of his progress. Her majesty has justly recognized 
that the visit of her son aroused the kind and generous 
sympathies of our citizens, and, if I may so speak, has 
created an almost personal interest in the fortunes of the 
royalty which he so well represents. The president 
trusts that this sympathy and interest towards the future 
representative of the sovereignty of Great Britain are 
at once an evidence and a guaranty of that conscious- 
ness of common interest and mutual regard which have 
bound in the past, and will in the future bind together 
more strongly than treaties, the feelings and the for- 
tunes of the two nations which represent the enterprise, 
the civilization, and the constitutional liberty of the same 
great race."^ 

While the Prince of Wales was in the United States 
the London Times described his visit to the tomb of 
Washington at Mount Vernon and his planting a chest- 
nut while there. The closing paragraph read as fol- 
lows: "It seemed, when the royal youth closed the 

* Lord Lyons to Gen. Cass, U. S. secretary of state, Dec. 8, 
i860. 

• Mr. Trescott to Lord Lyons, Dec. 11, i860. 



ENGLISH FRIENDSHIP FOR AMERICA. 17 

earth around the little germ, that he was burying the 
last faint trace of discord between us and our great breth- 
ren in the west." Other English newspapers, in com- 
menting upon the prince's welcome in America, gave 
utterance to sentiments which were extremely cordial in 
character. Two extracts from leading London papers 
may be noticed. "Thus we believe an alliance has 
been consolidated which will endure for the mutual bene- 
fit, not only of the two nations, but of the civilized 
world." 1 "At no time could we desire more earnestly 
than we do now the close alliance of the great Anglo- 
Saxon family." 2 

Opportunities were soon to be offered for testing the 
sincerity of those recently expressed "sentiments of 
esteem and regard which her majesty and all classes of 
her subjects entertain for the kindred race which occu- 
pies so distinguished a position in the community of 
nations." South Carolina seceded December 17, i860. 
Other states followed her example. A hostile govern- 
ment was organized within the territory of the United 
States. A war cloud was rapidly gathering upon the 
American political horizon. Lord Lyons duly reported 
all of these occurrences to his government. On Febru- 
ary 4, 1 86 1, in a communication addressed to Lord 
John Russell, the British minister for foreign affairs, 
Lord Lyons gave a detailed account of Mr. Seward's 
views concerning the state of the country and of his 
plans for securing the peaceable return of the seceding 
states to "the confederation." In this dispatch the 
American union is characterized as a "confederation." 

, * London Post, Nov. 16, i860. 

• London News, Nov. 16, i860. 
2 



l8 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

Since the adoption of the constitution no such use of the 
word "confederation" had ever been made in any 
diplomatic communication. It was indicative of the 
English view of the nature of the American union. 

Lord John Russell replied to the above communica- 
tion just two weeks before Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated. 
After saying that the success or failure of Mr. Seward's 
plans were matters of deep interest to her majesty's 
government and that it was not their duty to offer ad- 
vice, Lord Russell said: "Supposing, however, that 
Mr. Lincoln, acting under bad advice, should endeavor 
to provide excitement for the public mind by raising 
questions with Great Britain, her majesty's government 
feel no hesitation as to the policy they would pursue. 
They would in the first place be very forbearing. They 
would show by their acts how highly they value the re- 
lations of peace and amity with the United States. But 
they would take care to let the government which mul- 
tiplied provocations and sought quarrels understand that 
their forbearance sprung from the consciousness of 
strength and not from the timidity of weakness. They 
would warn a government which was making political 
capital out of blustering demonstrations that our patience 
might be tried too far."i 

It is not easy to understand why Lord Russell should 
make use of such language at this time. Only seventy- 
two days before this dispatch was written, the most cor- 
dial feelings of "confidence and affection" for the 
American people had been professed in the communica- 
tion concerning the visit of the Prince of Wales, and in 

* Earl Russell to Lord Lyons, Feb. 20, 1861. 



LORD RUSSELL'S THREATS. 19 

the meantime not an unkind word had been used in the 
correspondence of either government. His lordship 
may have seen in a settlement of the American domestic 
difficulties something which was unfavorable to British 
interests. The occasion certainly was not one which 
called for an offensive and unprovoked threat from the 
British minister for foreign affairs. He did not lose the 
opportunity, however, to utter an official warning to the 
American government that British patience "might be 
tried too far." 

From many similar instances in the official career of 
that statesman, it is certain that Lord Russell himself 
never lost a favorable opportunity to "make political 
capital out of blustering demonstrations." 

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. Annual messages of the presidents of the United States, 
I 789-1894. 

2. Blaine, James G.: Twenty Years of Congress. 

3. Diplomatic correspondence with Great Britain, 1860-1861. 

4. London newspapers: The Times, News and Post, Novem- 
ber, i860. 

5. London Quarterly Review, No. 221. 

6. Schuyler, Eugene: American Diplomacy. 

7. Westminster Review, Vol. xxi. 

8. Winsor: Narrative and Critical History of America. 



CHAPTER II. 

ENGLISH SYMPATHY FOR THE CONFEDERACY. 

From the beginning of the secession movement the 
central aim of the Federal government and of the loyal 
people of the United States was to preserve the Union. 
It was the principle of union which had brought the 
American colonies together and enabled them to estab- 
lish their independence. It was only after a "more 
perfect union" had been formed that prosperity and 
power at home and influence abroad had come to the 
United States as a nation. It was clearly seen that, if 
the principle of secession were once established, there 
would be nothing to prevent the great American com- 
monwealth from crumbling into fragments. The hon- 
orable position of the United States among the nations 
of the world, as well as all of the good results at home 
which had been gained by more than three-quarters of a 
century of union, would be irretrievably lost. But these 
were not the only bad effects likely to follow successful 
secession. It was the avowed intention of the leaders 
of this movement to establish in the southern states a 
republic whose very corner-stone was slavery. With 
an immense slave population, with almost absolute con- 
trol of the cotton supply of the world, with a people 

(21) 



22 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

that took pride in the military art, with able and expe- 
rienced leaders, the founding and future success of such 
a republic would have been attended by evil conse- 
quences which no one could foretell. 

For these reasons the government and loyal people of 
the United States earnestly hoped that the secession 
movement would not receive any support or encourage- 
ment from foreign nations, especially from England. 
The members of the English cabinet at that time were 
all bitterly opposed to slavery and had been in full sym- 
pathy with the great movements which had utterly de- 
stroyed it within the limits of the empire. 

The existence of slavery in the South had caused 
much annoyance to the English government and people. 
Negro subjects of the queen were being constantly kid- 
napped in southern ports and sold into slavery. To 
obtain redress in such cases was impossible. The 
escape of fugitive slaves into British territory was an- 
other cause of much trouble. Only a short time before 
the secession movement began all England had been 
shocked by the report that a British captain had been 
tarred and feathered at Charleston for allowing a negro 
to sit down at the table with him in his own vessel. 
All of these matters, however, were quickly forgotten. 
From the very beginning it was evident that English 
sympathy was with the South. It was apparently for- 
gotten that such a course meant support and encourage- 
ment for human slavery — that institution which was so 
abhorred by the people and statesmen of England. Con- 
sistency in this matter alone would seem to indicate that 
the British government and people could not afford to 
sympathize with any sort of movement which had for its 



ENGLISH STMPATHT FOR CONFEDERATES. 23 

principal object the founding of a new republic espe- 
cially to perpetuate and extend slavery. None of these 
considerations, however, seemed to exert any influence. 
With rare exceptions, the press, the people, and the 
government were heart and soul with the South in its 
efforts for the dismemberment of the American com- 
monwealth. Mr. Justin McCarthy says: "The vast 
majority of what are called the governing classes were 
on the side of the South. London club life was vir- 
tually all southern. The most powerful papers in Lon- 
don, and the most popular papers as well, were open 
partisans of the southern confederation." ^ A writer in 
the Atlantic Monthly for November, i86i,says: "We 
have read at least three English newspapers for each 
week that has passed since our troubles began ; we have 
been a reader of these papers for a series of years. In 
not one of them have we met the sentence or the line 
which pronounces hopefully, with bold assurance for the 
renewed life of our Union. In by far the most of them 
there is reiterated the most positive and dogged aver- 
ment that there is no future for us." 

Even the great and conservative English quarterlies 
aided the newspapers in their efforts to encourage and 
justify the secession movement. A writer in the Edin- 
burgh Review discussed the situation in the United 
States. His ability to do this may be readily inferred 
from his assertion that, "under the existing constitution 
of the United States which the freemen of the North are 
in arms now to defend, slavery must be considered to 
form a part and parcel of the law of the Union." To 
establish this proposition he then quoted from an amend- 

* History of Our Own Times, Vol. n, pp. 224-225. 



24 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

ment to the constitution which, he said, provided that 
that instrument could never in future be so amended as 
to give congress pov^er to abolish or interfere with slavery 
in any state. This, the writer said, was "the very last 
amendment or addition to the constitution passed on the 
3d March of this year, that is, on the eve of President 
Lincoln's inauguration." In reviewing the condition of 
the people of the North he said : "They are fighting for 
territorial dominion." In defining for his readers just 
what was meant by "territorial dominion," he pro- 
ceeded to tell them that it was "the power to enforce 
the will of the North over the South by superior force — 
to compel the minority, which is a local majority, to sub- 
mit, in a word, to command the country and to subdue 
the people. If this be not the object for which the 
Americans of the Union are contending against the dis- 
unionists, we confess our inability to apprehend it, for 
no lesser object could justify a war conducted on such 
a scale." ' 

A writer in the Quarterly Review said: "We believe 
the conquest of the South to be a hopeless dream, and 
the reunion of the states in one all-powerful republic an 
impossibility. 

"There is verge and room enough on the vast conti- 
nent of America for two or three, or even more, power- 
ful republics, and each may flourish undisturbed, if so 
inclined, without being a source of disquiet to its neigh- 
bors. There will be no loss of anythingwhich conduces 
to the general happiness of mankind. For the contest 
on the part of the North now is undisguisedly for empire. 

"As to the attempt to subjugate the Confederate 

* Edinburgh Review, Oct., 1861. 



POSITION OF ENGLISH ^UAR TBRLIES 25 

States, supposing it succeeded, what then? Is the North 
prepared to hold the South by the same tenure that Aus- 
tria holds Venetia ? And is there a statesman in the 
Union who believes that in future it could be held in any 
other way ? 

"But the idea of a federal republic of which the one- 
half is in deadly hostility to the other, and coerced into 
a hateful partnership, involves a practical contradiction. 
It would no longer be the union of free states but a 
tyranny." 1 The same writer confidently predicted se- 
cession among the northern states on account of exces- 
sive taxation and the hardships incident to war. 

A writer in the Westminster Review said: "The 
North is fighting to defend an abstraction — the constitu- 
tion — the South to defend his home, his wife and his 
children. 

"Without nicely balancing the virtues of the contend- 
ing parties, they (Englishmen) can not help believing 
that moderation, justice and national honor will find 
ampler development in a divided republic." 2 

Early in 186 1 a prominent Englishman of Liverpool 
published a book designed to inform the British public 
concerning the American situation. This book was ex- 
tensively circulated and did much to influence public 
opinion in England. The most extreme views of the 
secessionists were upheld and defended. The attempt 
to restore the Union was denounced as a lamentable de- 
lusion which had been undertaken as a result of excite- 
ment in the North. The author's position is well stated 
in the following quotation: "Secession is a just and 

* London Quarterly Review, No. 221. 
'Westminster Review, Vol. xxi, p.212. 



26 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

clear constitutional right of the states, and no violation 
of any enactment of the Federal compact." ^ 

The queen in her speech from the throne, February 
5, 1 86 1, referred to American affairs and expressed a 
conventional wish that the "differences might be sus- 
ceptible of a satisfactory adjustment," Concerning this 
expression Mr. Toumlin Smith soon afterward said : 
"Those last loose words are characteristic of the very 
loose notions that are common in England on the sub- 
ject of what used to be the United States of North 
America. It is, from the very nature of the facts, no 
other than impossible that the 'differences' can be 'sus- 
ceptible' (whatever that means) of satisfactory adjust- 
ment." 2 

Such expressions of opinion from these various 
sources, advanced so early in the great struggle and 
uttered with such confidence, were on many accounts 
most unwarranted and mischievous. The press was a 
most powerful factor In molding and directing English 
public opinion in favor of the Confederacy. Its course 
also tended to prejudice the Union cause in the eyes of 
the world and, at the same time, to establish the insur- 
gent cause as a just one. This produced a correspond- 
ing degree of discouragement among the friends of the 
Union. 

A very large majority of the most prominent public 
men of England never lost an opportunity to express 
unfavorable opinions concerning the northern cause. 
The following quotations are indicative of the senti- 
ment which prevailed among them : 

* Spence's "The American Union," p. 246. 

* Parliamentary Remembrancer, Vol. iv, p. 3. 



VIEWS OF PROMINENT ENGLISHMEN. 



27 



Sir Edward Bulwer Lytton: "I venture to predict 
that the younger men here present will live to see not 
two, but at least four, separate and sovereign common- 
wealths arising out of those populations which a year 
ago united their legislation under one president and car- 
ried their merchandise under one flag. I believe that 
such separation will be attended with happy results to 
the safety of Europe and the development of American 
civilization. If it could have been possible that as pop- 
ulation and wealth increased all the vast continent of 
America, with her mighty sea-board and the fleets 
which her increasing ambition as well as her extending 
commerce would have formed and armed, could have 
remained under one form of government, in which the 
executive has little or no control over a populace ex- 
ceedingly adventurous and excitable, why, then America 
would have hung over Europe like a gathering and de- 
structive thunder cloud. No single kingdom in Europe 
could have been strong enough to maintain itself against 
a nation that had consolidated the gigantic resources of 
a quarter of the globe." 1 

Lord John Russell: "The struggle is on the one 
side for empire, and on the other for power."' On an- 
other occasion he said: "On the one hand, President 
Lincoln, in behalf of the northern portion of the late 
United States, has issued a proclamation declaratory of 
an intention to subject the ports of the southern portion 
of the late Union to a vigorous blockade," ^ etc. 

* From an address before the Agricultural Society of Hertford 
County, September 25, 1861. 

* Speech at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1861. 

' Extract from dispatch of Lord J. Russell to Lord Cowley, 
British minister at Paris, dated Foreign Office, May 6, 1861, See 
Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Vol. Lxvii, p. 531. The italics are 
the author'8. 



>^ 



a8 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

The Earl of Shrewsbury: "I see in America the 
trial of democracy and its failure. I believe that the 
dissolution of the Union is inevitable, and that men now 
before me will live to see an aristocracy established in 
America."' 

Sir John Pakington, M. P.: "From President Lin- 
coln downward there is not a man in America who will 
venture to tell us that he really thinks it possible that by 
the force of circumstances the North can hope to compel 
the South to again join them in constituting the United 
States."^ 

Right Honorable William E. Gladstone, chancellor of 
the exchequer : ' 'The Federal government can never suc- 
ceed in putting down the rebellion. If it should, it 
would only be the preface and introduction of political 
difficulties far greater than the war itself. "2 On an- 
other and later occasion he said that the president of the 
Southern Confederacy. Mr. Jefferson Davis, "had made 
an army, had made a navy and, more than that, had 
made a nation."' 

In a speech delivered at Dover, in the autumn of 
1861, Lord Palmerston, the English premier, spoke in 
a taunting manner of the "fast running which signalized 
the battle of Bull Run."* 

Soon after the beginning of the American civil war, 

* Speech at Worcester, 1861. 

* Speech at Edinburgh, January, 1862. 

* Speech at Newcastle, October 9, 1862. See Russell's Life of 
Gladstone, p. 155; also Justin McCarthy's History of Our Own 
Times, Vol. 11, p. 225. 

* See De Gasparin's account of this matter in his "L'Amerique 
devant I'Europe," chapter on the conduct of England in the be- 
ginning of the American civil war. 



VIEWS OF PROMINENT ENGLISHMEN. 



29 



Edward A. Freeman, the distinguished English his- 
torian, published a noted work, the title page of which 
reads as follows: "History of federal government from 
the foundation of the Achaian League to the disruption 
of the United States." A list of examples of federal 
government is given. One of them is, "The United 
States, A. D. 1778-1862." 

These expressions from the leading public men of 
England leave no doubt as to the sentiments of the in- 
fluential classes in that country. They hoped for the 
triumph of slavery, the success of the secession prin- 
ciple, and the division and ruin of the great American 
commonwealth. Such sentiments were, doubtless, in- 
spired by jealousy and hatred of America, and by the 
thought that English commercial and other interests 
would be greatly advanced by the success of the Con- 
federacy. 



AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. Atlantic Monthly, November, 1861. 

2. Blaine, James G.: Twenty Years of Congress. 

3. DeGasparin: L'Amerique devant I'Europe. 

4. Edinburgh Review, October, 1861, 

5. Freeman, E. A.: History of Federal Government. 

6. London Quarterly Review, No. 221. 

7. Lossing, B. J.: Civil War in America. 

8. McCarthy, Justin: Historj' of Our Own Times. 

9. Parliamentary Papers, 1862, Vol. Ixvii. 
ID. Russell's Life of Gladstone. 

11. Spence, Jas.: The American Union. 

12. Westminster Review, Vol. xxi. 



CHAPTER III. 

THE QUESTION OF CONFEDERATE INDEPENDENCE. 

When the southern states began to secede, the attitude 
of foreign governments toward them was a matter of 
much concern to the Federal government. At that time 
any acts of foreign powers looking toward a recognition 
of the seceding states would have increased the embar- 
rassment of the United States government and tended 
to give encouragement to the rebellion. 

A few days prior to the close of President Buchan- 
an's administration, his secretary of state, Jeremiah S. 
Black, sent a circular letter to all United States min- 
isters at foreign courts, requesting them to do all that 
was necessary and proper to prevent the independence 
of the seceding states from being recognized by the gov- 
ernments to which they were respectively accredited. 
Among other things Mr. Black said: "This govern- 
ment has not relinquished its constitutional jurisdiction 
within the territory of those states, nor does it desire to 
do so. It must be very evident that it is the right of 
this government to ask of all foreign powers that the 
latter should take no steps which may tend to encourage 
the revolutionary movements of the seceding states or 
increase the danger of disaffection in those which still 
remain loyal." ^ 
*Mr. Black to U. S. ministers abroad, February 28, 1861. 
(31) 



32 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

When this matter was brought to the attention of 
Lord Russell by Mr. Dallas, the American minister at 
London, his lordship said that while he regretted the 
secession, he was not in a position to bind the British 
government to any particular course of action. 

Immediately upon becoming secretary of state, Mr. 
Seward sent a second circular to the United States min- 
isters abroad, repeating with renewed emphasis the in- 
structions of his predecessor, and urging them to "the 
exercise of the greatest possible diligence and fidelity 
on your part to counteract and prevent the designs of 
those who would invoke foreign intervention to em- 
barrass or overthrow the republic." He also suggested 
that it would be greatly to the advantage of foreign na- 
tions for the Union to be preserved, and that the revolt, 
should it break up the Union, "might tend by its in- 
fluence to disturb and unsettle the existing systems of 
government in other parts of the world and arrest that 
progress of improvement and civilization which marks 
the era in which we live." Mr. Seward also expressed 
his confidence that these with other considerations would 
prevent foreign governments "from yielding to solicita- 
tions to intervene in any unfriendly way in the domestic 
concerns of our country." "You will be prompt," 
continued Mr. Seward, "in transmitting to this depart- 
ment any information you may receive on the subject of 
the attempts which have suggested this communica- 
tion."! 

When this dispatch was communicated to Lord Rus- 
sell, he replied that the government was in no hurry to 

* Mr. Seward to the U. S. ministers abroad, March 9, 1861. 



JiESPONSES TO MR. SEWARD'S CIRCULAR. 



33 



recognize the secession as final, but that he thought the 
matter not ripe for decision one way or the other. * 

His lordship also declined to discuss the subject 
further at that time. No words of sympathy were 
uttered, no good wishes for the preservation of the 
Union were extended, but only an answer which said 
in substance that England was ready to acknowledge 
Confederate independence whenever it was expedient to 
do so. Lord Russell's answer did not even assure the 
United States that England meant to observe that abso- 
lute neutrality which international obligation would 
impose. 

Most answers from other countries in response to Mr. 
Seward's circular were quite different from that which 
England gave. It will be sufficient to notice three of 
them. Prussia "from the principle of unrelenting oppo- 
sition to all revolutionary movements would be the last 
to recognize any de facto government of the disaffected 
states of the American Union. "2 Austria "was not in- 
clined to recognize de facto governments anywhere."* 
Spain "would have nothing to do with the rebel party in 
the United States, in any sense."* Very favorable re- 
sponses were received also from most other countries. 
Russia, Italy and Switzerland sent assurances of the 
warmest sympathy for the cause of the Union. Individ- 
ual expressions from great men outside England were 
not wanting in the beginning of the struggle. On Sep- 
tember lo, 1861, Garibaldi, the Italian patriot, ad- 

• Mr. Dallas to Mr. Seward, April 9, 1861. 
*Mr. Wright to Mr. Seward, May 8, 1861, 

• Mr. Jones to Mr. Seward, April 15, 1861. 

• Mr. Perry to Mr. Seward, June 13, 1861. 

3 



34 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

dressed a letter to the United States consul at Antwerp, 
in which he expressed an intention to come to America 
and enlist in the Federal army, if circumstances would 
permit him to do so. 

When Charles Francis Adams became the American 
minister to England, he was instructed to take a still 
more decided stand against the recognition of the in- 
dependence of the Confederate States. Said Mr. Seward 
in his letter of instructions to Mr. Adams: "You will 
in no case listen to any suggestions of compromise by 
this government under foreign auspices, with its discon- 
tented citizens. If, as the president does not at all ap- 
prehend, you shall unhappily find her majesty's govern- 
ment tolerating the application of the so-called seced- 
ing states, or wavering about it, you will not leave them 
to suppose for a moment that they can grant that appli- 
cation and remain the friends of the United States. You 
may even assure them promptly in that case that if they 
determine to recognize, they may at the same time pre- 
pare to enter into an alliance with the enemies of this 
republic. You alone will represent your country at 
London, and you will represent the whole of it there. 
When you are asked to divide that duty with others, 
diplomatic relations between the government of Great 
Britain and this government will be suspended, and will 
remain so until it shall be seen which of the two is most 
strongly intrenched in the confidence of their respective 
nations and of mankind. "'^ 

At another time when referring to the matter of recog- 
nizing Confederate independence, Mr. Seward said: 
"I have never for a moment believed that such a recog- 

* Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, April, 1861. 



RECOGNITION PROPOSED. _ 35 

nition could take place without producing immediately 
a war between the United States and all of the recog- 
nizing powers. I have not supposed it possible that the 
British government could fail to see this, and at the same 
time I have sincerely believed the British government 
must, in its inmost heart, be as averse from such a con- 
flict as I know this government to be."^ 

English sympathy for the South was manifested at 
first not only by expressions of opinion from the press 
and public men of that country, but also by efforts to 
have the independence of the Confederacy immediately 
recognized. 

On March 4, 1861, while the ceremonies of Mr. Lin- 
coln's inauguration were being conducted at Washing- 
ton, Mr. Gregory, member of parliament for Galway, 
arose in his place in the House of Commons and gave 
notice of a motion to recognize the independence of the 
Confederate States of America. 2 At that date the or- 
ganization of the Confederate government had been 
perfected only three weeks, and Mr. Gregory's knowl- 
edge of the matter had been received certainly not more 
than ten days before the notice of his motion was given. 
The notice was renewed on April 16, 1861. The matter 
was brought before the house several times during the 
session, but it was finally postponed indefinitely because 
the Commons thought it inexpedient to act upon it at 
that time. 

While the matter was before the house, Mr. Gregory 
published a letter in the London Times in which he stated 
the reasons for immediate recognition of the Confed- 

* Seward's Works, Vol. v, p. 294. 

* See Notice Book, House of Commons, 1861. 



36 THE TRENT AFFAIR. , 

eracy. He thought it would do much toward breaking 
up the slave trade which he asserted was "mainly car- 
ried on by ships sailing from northern ports, and floated 
by northern capital, that it would ameliorate the condi- 
tion of slavery, secure peace and freedom of trade. He 
also regarded it as a just retaliation against the North for 
having enacted the Morrill tariff, and as a vindication of 
the right of a people to assert their independence. Mr. 
Gregory concluded his letter with the strong conviction 
that the recognition of the Confederacy by both England 
and France just then "would cause the war party in the 
North to pause before plunging their countrymen deeper 
into the sad struggle." ^ 

It is evident from the facts already presented, and the 
opinions referred to, that it was neither the righteous- 
ness of the northern cause nor lack of sympathy for the 
South that prevented an early recognition of the Con- 
federacy by England. It was thought to be inexpedient, 
and perhaps not quite safe to recognize the independ- 
ence of the Confederate States, otherwise there would 
have been no hesitation in doing it. 



AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. Diplomatic correspondence with Great Britain, 1861. 

2. Notice Book House of Commons, 1861. 

3. Pollard, E. A.: The Lost Cause. 

4. Senate Ex. Doc: 2d Session 37th Congress, Vol. I. 

5. Seward's Works, Vol. v. 



' Pollard's Lost Cause, pp. I26>7. 



CHAPTER IV. 

THE queen's neutrality PROCLAMATION. 

Before the lapse of sixty days after the beginning of 
Mr. Lincoln's administration, Fort Sumter had surren- 
dered after a severe bombardment ; seventy-five thousand 
troops had been called for ; and a blockade of the south- 
ern ports had been proclaimed. The insurrection was 
constantly assuming greater proportions and a more 
threatening attitude. Of actual war there had been 
none which resulted in bloodshed, except a street fight 
between Federal soldiers and a Baltimore mob. These 
events, however, tended to make the relation of foreign 
powers toward the two governments in America much 
more delicate and hazardous. 

Upon assuming the duties of the presidency, Mr. 
Lincoln had appointed Charles Francis Adams minister 
to England. Mr. Adams was carefully instructed to 
explain to the British government the position of the 
new administration toward the seceded states and the 
relation which they sustained to the Union. He was 
also instructed to say that there was yet hope of a peace- 
able reconciliation and that, if it was desired to promote 
the best interests of the United States, foreign powers 
should be careful to commit no act of so-called neu- 

(37) 



38 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

trality, a move which would only extend aid and sym- 
pathy to the secession cause. 

It was expected that Mr. Adams would arrive in 
London early in May and promptly present the views 
and policy of Mr. Lincoln to the Bi-itish government. 
In his report of an official interview with Lord Russell 
concerning this matter, Mr. Dallas, Mr. Adams's prede- 
cessor in office at London, says: "I informed him that 
Mr. Adams had apprised me of his intention to be on his 
way hither in the steamship 'Niagara,' which left Boston 
on the 1st May, and that he would probably arrive in 
less than two weeks, by the 12th or 15th inst. His 
lordship acquiesced in the expediency of disregarding 
mere rumor and waiting the full knowledge to be 
brought by my successor." ^ 

Notwithstanding this official assurance from Lord 
Russell that nothing would be done prior to the arrival 
of Mr. Adams, a course of action was immediately de- 
termined upon which seemed designed to give the greatest 
possible offense to the United States. 

On May 6, in answer to a question put to him in the 
House of Commons concerning the proposed policy of 
Great Britain toward the Confederacy, his lordship said : 
"The attorney and solicitor-general, and the queen's 
advocate, and the government have come to the opinion 
that the Southern Confederacy of America, according to 
those principles which seem to be just, must be treated 
as a belligerent." ^ On May 13, the very day that Mr. 
Adams landed at Liverpool and only a few hours before 
he arrived in London, as if to exhibit the greatest possi- 

*Mr. Dallas to Mr. Seward, May 2, 1861. 

•Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CLXiz, p. 1566. 



BELLIGERENT RECOGNITION EXPLAINED. 39 

ble lack of courtesy toward him and the government 
which he represented, the queen's neutrality proclama- 
tion was issued. It forbade the enlistment of all 
British subjects on land or sea in the service of either of 
the contending parties and also warned her majesty's 
subjects not to carry officers, soldiers, dispatches, or any 
article of the nature of contraband of war for the use or 
service of either the Federals or Confederates. This con- 
stituted a complete recognition of the Confederacy as a 
belligerent power, that is, as entitled, so far as England 
was concerned, to all those exceptional rights and priv- 
ileges that international law assigns to sovereign states 
which are at war with each other. 

Perhaps a brief explanation of this matter would not 
be inappropriate here. All sovereign, or independent, 
states are governed in their relations toward each other 
by a collection of rules called international law. These 
rules or laws are only precedents, maxims and opinions 
which have acquired all the force of law from having 
been generally accepted and acted upon and from a sense 
that it is a matter of great and universal convenience to 
have some fixed standards for adjusting the disputes of 
sovereign nations and regulating their conduct toward 
each other. International law assigns to all sovereign 
states certain rights, privileges and obligations which 
are not extended to unrecognized communities or na- 
tions. In the beginning of its career an insurgent state 
can not possess any of the privileges which international 
law assigns to independent states. To recognize the 
belligerency of such a state is to accord to it, by the recog- 
nizing power, all of those exceptional war privileges 
and rights which international law would give to it, if 



40 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

it were sovereign. Such recognition carries with it no 
rights, privileges or conditions except those necessary 
for conducting hostilities. Insurgents carrying on war 
without being recognized as belligerents may be treated 
as rebels, traitors and pirates. When such recognition 
has been extended to them, they are no longer so re- 
garded, and when captured are treated as prisoners of 
war. When a foreign power recognizes the belliger- 
ency of an insurgent government it thereby places that 
government and the one with which the insurgents are 
at war upon an equality so far as war privileges and 
duties are concerned. A case will serve to illustrate. 
There was recently a civil war in Brazil. The insur- 
gents were never recognized as belligerents and hence 
were not entitled to any more rights and privileges than 
traitors and pirates have. If the Brazilian government 
had conceded belligerent rights to them, captured insur- 
gents would then have been entitled to all of the rights 
of prisoners of war. Indeed such recognition would 
have clothed the insurgents, so far as the Brazilian gov- 
ernment was concerned, with all of the war powers, 
privileges and duties that belong to a sovereign and inde- 
pendent state, but it would have done nothing more. 

The same advantages would have been secured to the 
insurgents, so far as the United States was concerned, 
if the Federal government at Washington had recognized 
them as belligerents. In all of their future relations 
with the United States they would have been placed 
upon an equal footing with the Brazilian government as 
regards all war rights, privileges and duties. No other 
rights would have been conferred, for a recognition of 
belligerency is only partial in character. No treaty with 



WHr BELLIGERENCr IS RECOGNIZED. 



41 



the United States could have been concluded, neither 
could any ambassador have been sent to this country, or 
one received from it. 

A hasty recognition of this character by the United 
States or any other foreign country would have been an 
act very unfriendly to the Brazilian government. 

The right of a foreign state to recognize the belliger- 
ency, or even the independence, of an insurgent govern- 
ment, under certain conditions, can not be questioned. 
The ends and purposes of such recognition, however, 
may be quite different in character. They may be ar- 
ranged under two separate heads. 

First. The recognition of a mere fact as it actually 
exists. Where a state of war or of independence exists 
beyond doubt or question, it may be recognized as a 
fact. It is not only the privilege but also the duty of foreign 
states to recognize a state of war, or belligerency, after 
such state exists in fact. It is not easy to define a state 
of war, that is, to say precisely how much of force is 
required and how perfect the organization must be in 
order to distinguish such a state from that of mere in- 
surrection. Language can not express the idea with 
exactness. No one will say that a state of war existed 
during the Dorr rebellion in Rhode Island in 1842, 
neither will it be pretended that such a state did not 
exist while the American civil war was in progress. 
Recognition should be accorded also to a government of 
whatever origin, after its independence has been fully 
established. An insurgent government rarely succeeds 
in achieving its independence at a blow. There is 
usually a period of struggle and uncertainty during 
which it is very uncertain whether the new order of 



43 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

things will prevail or not. While such a state of uncer- 
tainty exists, it is neither prudent nor wise for neutral 
nations to acknowledge the independence of an insur- 
gent government, since a fact should not be acknowl- 
edged in advance of its actual existence. 

Second. The recognition of belligerency or even of 
independence by a foreign government maybe accorded 
not simply to acknowledge an existing fact but as a 
means to an end. Such an act would be very unfriendly 
or even hostile tow^ard the government against which the 
insurgent power was opposed. France acknowledged 
the independence of the United States as a means to 
achieve that result, not as an existing fact. 

In view of the foregoing principles and of the circum- 
stances under which the British neutrality proclamation 
was issued, it becomes very evident that it was delib- 
erately designed to aid and encourage the insurgent 
cause in the United States, and, at the same time, to 
discourage and depress the friends of the Union. The 
proofs are manifest from an examination of the case. 

I. Only seventy days before her majesty's neutrality 
proclamation was issued, Mr. Lincoln's administration 
had assumed the responsibilities of government at Wash- 
ington. During the preceding administration all de- 
partments of government there had become greatly de- 
moralized, and it was necessary to reorganize and purify 
them before any steps could be taken to offer active re- 
sistance to the insurrection. Time enough had not 
elapsed for the new administration to formulate its 
views and develop its policy toward the impending dif- 
ficulties. Although these thing were understood at 
London and Mr. Adams was hourly expected there, 



NE UTRALITT PR O CLA MA TION UN J US T. 43 

yet the British government refused to grant the brief 
time necessary for him to arrive and present the case of 
the new administration, before determining upon its 
course of action. The neutrality proclamation was 
issued with a haste which was "precipitate and unprec- 
edented," as Mr. Adams afterward said. The friends 
of the Union could not but regard it, in the language of 
Mr. Justin McCarthy, "as an act of unseemly and even 
indecent haste, as evidence of an overstrained anxiety 
to assist and encourage the southern rebels." 1 

2. A state of war did not exist in the United States 
on May 13, 1861, hence there was no occasion for a 
neutrality proclamation. From the very nature of the 
case it would not be easy to say precisely when such a 
state of war or belligerency did begin to exist, but the 
United States itself, and not a foreign nation, was the 
proper authority to pronounce judgment concerning this 
matter. At the time mentioned above, belligerent 
rights had not been conceded to the insurgents by the 
Federal government. The "Savannah," a Confederate 
armed steamer, was captured June 3, 1861. Her crew, 
together with the crews of other such vessels that had 
been captured, were tried for piracy in a United States 
court, and, in at least one case, a conviction was ob- 
tained. 2 If the belligerency of the South had been rec- 
ognized by the United States government at that time, 
such prosecutions and conviction in a Federal court 
would have been impossible. 

3. The action taken by Great Britain did not conform 
to the usages of friendship in such cases. Mr. Seward 

*The History of Our Own Times, Vol. 11, p. 193. 

* American Annual Cyclopedia for 1861, pp. 150 and 151. 



44 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

has said concerning this matter: "It will be found, we 
think, that all nations which have desired to practice 
justice and friendship towards a state temporarily dis- 
turbed by insurrection have foreborne from conceding 
belligerent privileges to the insurgents in anticipation of 
their concession by the disturbed state itself. A nation 
which departs from this duty always practically com- 
mits itself as an ally to the insurgents." ^ It was not 
long after the neutrality proclamation had been issued 
until the insurrection assumed the character of a great 
civil war, and belligerent rights were then duly extended 
to the Confederates by all of the Federal authorities. 

In the beginning it was only a personal war, an effort 
of the Federal government to suppress rebellion on the 
part of individuals. United States courts have repeat- 
edly held that a state of civil war, that is, a war be- 
tween governments, one which entitled the Confederates 
to belligerent recognition, did not exist until after Presi- 
dent Lincoln's proclamation to that effect issued August 
i6, 1861, in pursuance of the act of congress of July 13, 
1861. Belligerent recognition afterward extended by 
foreign powers would have been entirely in accordance 
with the principles of strict fairness and neutrality. ^ 

4. The Confederacy was composed of states which 
had withdrawn from the Union in so far as they were 
able to do so. This had been done by an unconstitu- 
tional act known as secession — one whose validity was 

^ Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, Jan. 12, 1867. 

* See decisions of U. S. circuit court, state of Maryland, 6 
Am. Law Reg., N. S., 732; U. S. dist. court eastern dist. of Mis- 
souri, 3 Am. Law Reg., N. S., 735; U. S. supreme court, 10 Wal- 
lace, 158. 



NEUTRALITT PROCLAMATION UNJUST. 45 

never at any time admitted by the people of the United 
States. Their foundation for a government was not 
solid enough to command any degree of respect or con- 
fidence from foreign powers, and therefore at that time 
not worthy even of recognition as belligerents. 

The principle of secession without restraint or opposi- 
tion of any kind had been established by them when 
they withdrew from the Federal Union. Their own or- 
ganization was not a union but a confederation with 
each state acting in its own "sovereign and independent 
capacity." ^ With a government based upon a confed- 
eration of states each of which had the privilege of 
seceding at pleasure, what assurance could be given that 
treaty obligations would be met, or that debts contracted 
would be paid, or that any sort of act guaranteed by the 
common authority would be executed in good faith? 
Could it have been motives friendly to the United States 
which induced England to extend belligerent recogni- 
tion to such a government at that time ? 

5. It was very well understood in England that the 
Confederates had no navy worthy of the name, and that 
their facilities for building ships and manufacturing 
munitions of war in their own country were very lim- 
ited. It was doubtless with a view of supplying the 
Confederates with these things that the neutrality proc- 
lamation was issued so early. This is evident from a 
speech made by Lord Chelmsford in the British parlia- 
ment in which he said: "If, he might add, the South- 
ern Confederacy had not been recognized by us as a bel- 
ligerent power, he agreed with his noble and learned 
friend (Brougham) that any Englishman aiding them by 

* See Preamble of the Constitution of the Confederate States. 



46 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

fitting out a privateer against the Federal government 
would be guilty of piracy."^ 

6. The neutrality proclamation created the condition 
of belligerency on the part of the Confederates instead 
of acknowledging an existing fact. Mr. Adams said 
concerning this matter: "The British government took 
the initiative and decided practically that it was a strug- 
gle of two sides. And furthermore it pronounced the 
insurgents to be a belligerent state before they had ever 
shown their capacity to maintain any kind of warfare 
whatever except within their own harbors, and under 
every possible advantage. It considered them a marine 
power before they had ever exhibited a single privateer 
upon the ocean. Not a single armed vessel had yet 
been issued from any port under the control of these 
people. They were not a navigating people. They had 
made no prizes, so far as I knew, excepting such as 
they had caught by surprises. Even now I could not 
learn that they had fitted out anything more than a few 
old steamboats utterly unable to make any cruise on the 
ocean, and scarcely strong enough to bear a cannon of 
any caliber. "2 

As has already been stated any organized form of 
society may be recognized when it has advanced far 
enough to defend itself against the assaults of enemies, 
and has exhibited sufficient capacity to maintain bind- 
ing relations with other powers. But the case is entirely 
different when a measure of recognition brings about 
a result which is due to such recognition only. 

* Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CLXii, p. 2084. 

* Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward, report of statements made to 
Lord Russell, May 21, 1861, 



THE BRITISH POSITION EXAMINED. 47 

Mr. Hamilton Fish, President Grant's secretary of 
state, has well said of this matter: "The assumed bel- 
ligerency of the insurgents was a fiction — a war on 
paper only, not in the field — like a paper blockade, the 
anticipation of supposed belligerency to come, but which 
might never have come, if not thus anticipated and en- 
couraged by her majesty's government."^ 

Many attempts have been made to defend the course 
of the British government in this matter. A singularly 
fair-minded writer in his treatment of other subjects 
says: "If there was no bellurn going on the commerce 
of the world could not be expected to recognize Presi- 
dent Lincoln's blockade of Charleston and Savannah 
and New Orleans. International law on the subject is 
quite clear. A state can not blockade its own ports. 
It can indeed order a closure of its own ports. But a 
closure of the ports would not have been so effective 
for the purposes of the federal government as a block- 
ade. A closure would have been a matter of munic- 
ipal law only. An offender against the ordinance of 
closure could be only dealt with lawfully in American 
waters ; an offender against the decree of blockade could 
be pursued into the open sea. "2 Lord Stanley once 
said : "Her majesty's government had but two courses 
open to them on receiving the intelligence of the presi- 
dent's proclamation, namely, either that of acknowledg- 
ing the blockade and proclaiming the neutrality of her 
majesty, or that of refusing to acknowledge the block- 
ade, and insisting upon the right of her majesty's sub- 
jects to trade with the ports of the South where the gov- 

* Mr. Fish to Mr. Motley, September 25, 1869. 

•Justin McCarthy, History of Our Own Times, Vol. 11, p. 193. 



48 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

ernment of the United States could exercise no fiscal 
control at that time." 

The ablest, perhaps, of English writers upon inter- 
national law has said in defense of the course of his 
government: "In many of the southern ports there 
was a large amount of British property ; the cargoes in 
the Mississippi alone at the end of May were computed 
to be worth a million sterling, and the greater part of 
these had been shipped for Liverpool. A blockade had 
been proclaimed extending over a coast line of some 
three thousand miles. Letters of marque had been 
publicly offered, an invitation very tempting to the ad- 
venturous and reckless men who are always to be found 
in every maritime nation. Both the government of the 
United States and the de facto government of the con- 
federacy had assumed and were actually exercising on 
the high seas the rights of war ; and the neutral who re- 
sists the enforcement of those rights does so under the 
penalty of capture. Branches of trade perfectly lawful 
before might now be treated as unlawful, and punished 
by seizure and confiscation. This was the state of facts 
existing during the first week of May so far as they 
were known to the English public ; and on these facts 
the government was called upon both by the mercantile 
community and by some of the warmest partisans of 
the northern cause to define its position, to recognize or 
repudiate the blockade, to accept or reject the char- 
acter of a neutral power, and to publish its decision as 
widely and as speedily as possible."^ 

The foregoing arguments may be summed up in two 

* Montague Bernard's Neutrality of Great Britain During the 
American War, pp. 12S-130. 



THE BRITISH POSITION EXAMINED. 49 

propositions, viz. : that President Lincoln's proclama- 
tion of blockade constituted a prior recognition of the 
existence of civil war in the United States, and con- 
sequent belligerency on the part of the South, and that 
it was necessary for the British government to do some- 
thing to protect its citizens and their interests against 
losses in or near the seat of war. 

In answer to the latter proposition it may be said that 
it was not at all necessary for British subjects to be in 
any of the places of danger or to remain there, and if 
they persisted in doing so, they and their interests had 
as much protection as did the citizens of the United 
States who were similarly situated, and that they cer- 
tainly did not require any more. 

Was Confederate belligerency recognized by Presi- 
dent Lincoln's proclamation declaring a blockade of the 
southern ports .'' 

At the time of her majesty's neutrality proclamation, 
May 13, 1 86 1, whatever of war that may have existed 
was not a war of governments, but only of individuals 
owing allegiance to the federal government. If the 
authority of the United States was for the time being 
suspended in some of the states, those states were still 
component parts of the union. The disturbance was 
legally and officially held by all of the federal author- 
ities civil as well as military, to be strictly local in char- 
acter, and as such the government at Washington had 
an undoubted right to close the ports within the states 
in insurrection by a blockade, and to forbid all inter- 
course between strangers and the people of the blockaded 
cities. The federal authorities also had the right to use 
the armed and naval forces of the United States to en- 



50 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



force a blockade after that course had been determined 
upon. The form of closure best adapted to the ends 
in view was a blockade which was legally declared and 
executed as a means for subduing a local insurrection, 
and, until such local trouble actually developed into a 
state of civil war, the mere fact that certain ports were 
blockaded did not confer any belligerent rights what- 
ever upon the insurgents. If a mere expedient be 
adopted by the federal government as a remedy for local 
insurrection, it does not follow as a consequence that the 
insurgents are invested with belligerent rights which 
foreign nations must immediately recognize. 

The position that a nation can not blockade its own 
ports, but can only order a closure of them when they 
are held by a hostile force, can not be defended, al- 
though Mr. Justin McCarthy holds the contrary view of 
the matter. If the right of blockade be denied under 
such circumstances, the right of the government to the 
port is denied ; but if the government have no right, 
then the port becomes free, and would remain so unless 
it be destroyed by the government that originally held 
and yet claimed it, because a mere decree of closure 
without a blockade superadded could not avail anything 
against a foreign nation that might choose to confer 
belligerent rights upon the insurgents. 

As an example of this, an illustrative case may be 
cited. During a period of five years succeeding the 
year 1831, Russia blockaded her own ports on the east- 
ern shore of the Black sea because they were in the 
possession of Circassian rebels. This blockade was 
recognized by England without conferring belligerent 



THE BRITISH POSITION EXAMINED. 51 

rights on the Circassians. English claims for losses 
occasioned by this blockade were surrendered. ^ 

In this instance, if the United States chose the block- 
ade as the best form of remedy for the insurrection, 
and, if the rights and interests of foreigners were threat- 
ened thereby, it became the duty of the federal author- 
ities to extend to all such aliens the fullest measure of 
protection, and to see that their rights were in all cases 
inviolably respected. 

If these views of the case be correct, there can be no 
defense whatever for the action of the British govern- 
ment with regard to the neutrality proclamation. In the 
opinion of every unprejudiced mind, it must ever be 
classed with the long catalogue of unjust acts and in- 
ternational wrongs for which England has been noted in 
her relations with weaker nations or with stronger 
countries in distress. 

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. American Annual Cyclopedia, 1861. 

2. Bemis, George: Pamphlet, "Hasty Recognition." 

3. Blaine, J. G.: Twenty Years of Congress. 

4. Bernard, Montague: The Neutrality of Great Britain 
During the American Civil War. 

5. British and Foreign State Papers. Vol. xxvi. 

6. Constitution of the Confederate states. 

7. Claims against Great Britain, Vol. iv. Public Document, 
1st Session 41st Congress. 

8. Diplomatic correspondence with Great Britain, 1861, 1867 
and 1869 

9. DeGasparin, Ag^nor: L'Amirique devant I'Europe. 

10. Hall, W. E.: International Law. 

11. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates. 

12. McCarthy, Justin: History of Our Own Times. 

13. North American Review, January, 1862. 

14. Senate Ex. Doc: 2d Session 37th Congress, Vol. i. 

15. Sumner, Charles: The Works of, Vol. vii. 

16. Text of the Queen's Neutrality Proclamation. See British 
Blue Book containing official documents for 1861. 

* Sec British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. xxvi, p. 2. 



CHAPTER V. 

ENGLISH NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE INSURGENTS. 

In April, 1856, ambassadors from all of the principal 
European countries met at Paris and adopted as articles 
of maritime law the following propositions: 

"i. Privateering is and remains abolished. 

"2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods with the 
exception of contraband of war. 

"3. Neutral goods, with the exception of contraband 
of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag. 

"4. Blockades in order to be binding must be effec- 
tive, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient 
really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy." 

By its own terms the declaration of Paris, as these 
principles were afterward known, was not to bind any 
country which did not accede to its terms. The fourth 
point was already a well-settled principle of inter- 
national law. The third was looked upon as having 
almost the force of a maxim of law. The proposition 
that a neutral flag protects goods of an enemy save con- 
traband of war was one over which there had been 
much controversy. The employment of privateers had 
always been regarded as a right which every nation 
possessed. The United States had never become a 

(53) 



54 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



party to this declaration, judging it not to be expedient 
to relinquish the right of using privateers. To do this 
would have placed the United States at a great dis- 
advantage in a contest with a nation like England which 
possessed a greatly superior navy. Privateers are a 
most effective weapon against the commerce of a power- 
ful enemy. 

A large navy might easily hold the small navy of an 
enemy in check, destroy his commerce, and blockade 
his ports, all at the same time. A small navy aided by 
many privateers to prey on the commerce of an enemy 
can easily engage the attention of a very large navy. 

The United States had offered to accept the declara- 
tion of Paris on condition that it be so amended as to 
exempt all private property from capture at sea by the 
public armed ships of an enemy, as well as by pri- 
vateers. This proposition was refused. If it had been 
accepted future naval operations would have been 
limited strictly to the public armed ships of belliger- 
ents. * 

Sir Henry Sumner Maine, a noted English authority 
on international law, after considering the amount of 
injury that might be done to his country in case her food 
supply should be cut off in time of war by the numer- 
ous and active privateers of an enemy, says: "It seems, 
then, that the proposal of the American government to 
give up privateers, on condition of exempting all private 
property from capture, might well be made by some 
very strong friend of Great Britain. If universally 
adopted, it would save our food, and it would save the 

^ See discussion by Hon. W, L. Marcy, U. S. secretary of 
state, Ex, Doc, 3d Session 24th Cong., Vol. i, part i, pp. 33-34. 



CONFEDERA TE GOVERNMENT ADDRESSED. 55 

commodities which are the price of our food, from their 
most formidable enemies, and would disarm the most 
formidable class of those enemies. "* 

Only five days after the neutrality proclamation was 
issued. Lord Russell addressed a communication to Lord 
Lyons at Washington asking the latter to take such steps 
as he might deem necessary in order to secure the assent 
of the Confederate government to the last three articles 
of the declaration of Paris. 

On July 5, 1 86 1, Lord Lyons addressed a communi- 
cation to Robert Bunch, the British consul at Charles- 
ton, in which he said: "The course of events having 
invested the states assuming the title of the Confederate 
States of America with the character of belligerents, it 
has become necessary for her majesty's government to 
obtain from the existing government in those states 
securities concerning the proper treatment of neutrals. I 
am authorized by Lord John Russell to confide the nego- 
tiation of this matter to you and I have great satisfaction 
in doing so. In order to make you acquainted with the 
views of her majesty's government, I transmit to you 
a duplicate of a dispatch to me in which they are fully 
stated. It is essential, under present circumstances, 
that you should act with great caution, in order to avoid 
raising the question of the recognition of the new con- 
federacy by Great Britain. On this account I think it 
inadvisable that you should go to Richmond or place 
yourself in direct communication with the central 
authority which is established there. 

"The most convenient course will probably be for 
you to take advantage of the intercourse which you 

^Maine's International Law, pp. 121-122. 



56 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

naturally hold with Mr. Pickens, the governor of the 
state of South Carolina. I can not doubt that if you 
explain verbally to Mr. Pickens the views of her 
majesty's government, he will have no difficulty in in- 
ducing the government at Richmond to recognize, by an 
official act, the rights secured to neutrals by the second 
and third articles of the declaration of Paris, and to ad- 
mit its own responsibility for the acts of privateers sail- 
ing under its letters of marque." 

Consul Bunch was unable to see Governor Pickens, 
who was at that time in the interior of the state looking 
after his plantation. Mr. Bunch, however, immediately 
secured the services of an agent in the person of a Mr. 
Trescot who was very well known to Lord Lyons. Mr. 
Trescot went at once to Richmond and laid the matter 
before Jefferson Davis, president of the Confederate 
States. Mr. Davis expressed regret that the application 
had not been made in a more formal manner, but he 
at once called a cabinet meeting for consideration of the 
matter, after which it was immediately submitted to the 
Confederate congress. Without delay that body passed 
the following resolutions : 

^^ Resolved, By the congress of the Confederate States 
of America: 

"ist. That we maintain the right of privateering as 
it has been long established by the practice, and recog- 
nized by the law of nations. 

"2d. That the neutral flag covers enemy's goods with 
the exception of contraband of war. 

"3d. That neutral goods, with the exception of con- 
traband of war, are not liable to capture under the 
enemy's flag. 



NEGOTIATIONS AT RICHMOND. 



57 



"4th. Blockades in order to be binding must be effec- 
tive, that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient 
really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy." 

These resolutions v^^ere approved August 13, 1861, 
and returned at once by Mr. Trescot to Consul Bunch 
who forwarded a copy of them to Lord Lyons at Wash- 
ington. His lordship was greatly pleased at Mr. Bunch's 
success in this undertaking, and so expressed himself in 
a communication enclosing a copy of the resolutions 
and dispatch of the consul to Lord John Russell. 

When this matter was brought to the attention of Mr. 
Seward, he at once demanded the removal of Mr. 
Bunch. This was peremptorily refused by Lord Rus- 
sell who replied that "Mr. Bunch was instructed" to 
conduct the negotiation with the Confederate States, and 
that "Mr. Bunch therefore, in what he has done in this 
matter, has acted in obedience to the instructions of his 
government, who accept the responsibility of his pro- 
ceedings so far as they are known to the foreign depart- 
ment, and who can not remove him from his office for 
having obeyed instructions." 

Mr. Bunch's exequatur was then formally revoked by 
President Lincoln. Mr. Bunch's act was a violation of 
a federal statute which made it an offense for any person 
not appointed or authorized by the president, to advise 
or assist in any political correspondence with a foreign 
government for the purpose of influencing its measures 
in relation to the United States. ^ 

It has been affirmed by an able British writer that 
this was an "unofficial application made to the Con- 
federate States" since the "channel of communication 

*See Mr. Seward's letter to Mr, Adams, October 25, 1861. 



58 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



was a private person. "i This position is not tenable, 
because every communication was strictly official in 
character, and the mere means of conveying them could 
not change the character of the communications them- 
selves. The fact that the British government assumed 
the responsibility for the act is of itself sufficient to estab- 
lish its official character. The whole proceeding was an 
official invitation to the Confederacy to exercise those 
powers which belong only to a sovereign state, to do 
that which only an independent government can do, 
namely, to accept and become a party to an international 
agreement that differed in no sense from a treaty. 

While this negotiation was being conducted with the 
Confederate government, another of similar purport was 
in progress with the United States government, which 
was not only willing but anxious to accept the declara- 
tion of Paris as a whole. At this point in the proceed- 
ings the British government refused to permit the United 
States to accept the Paris declaration pure and simple, 
except with the distinct understanding that England 
was not to interfere in any way whatever with priva- 
teering on the part of the Confederate States. What 
was equivalent to a treaty had been concluded between 
England and the Confederates, by which the latter were 
to be allowed the use of privateers. 

In explanation of this matter Mr. Blaine says: "The 
right of privateering was not left untouched except with 
deep design. By securing the assent of the Confed- 
eracy to the other three articles of the Paris convention, 
safety was assured to British and French cargoes under 
the American flag, while every American cargo was at 

* Bernard's Neutrality of Great Britain, p. 191. 



MR. BLAINE'S COMMENTS. 59 

risk unless protected by a foreign flag — generally the 
flag of England. It would have been impossible to in- 
vent a process more gainful to British commerce, and 
more harmful to American commerce." l 



AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. Bernard, Montague: The Neutrality of Great Britain Dur- 
ing the American Civil War. 

2. Blaine, James G.: Twenty Years of Congress. 

3. Diplomatic correspondence with Great Britain, 1861. 

4. Maine, Sir Henry Sumner: International Law. 

5. Senate Ex. Documents: 2d Session 37th Congress, Vol. i, 
and 3d Session 37th Congress, Vol. i. 

* Twenty Years of Congress, Vol. i, p. 579, 



CHAPTER VI. 
MR. Seward's circular to the governors of the 

NORTHERN STATES. 

During the first half year of the American civil war, 
the policy of the English government toward that of the 
United States appeared to be one of studied unfriend- 
liness. The numerous semi-hostile acts which have 
already been narrated followed each other in rapid suc- 
cession. In the summer of 1861 troops were contin- 
ually pushed into Canada by the British government. 
When asked for an explanation Lord John Russell said 
that he regarded It as necessary "in the present dis- 
turbed condition of things in the United States," as he 
did not know but that the Americans "might do some- 
thing." 1 In September of that year twenty-five thou- 
sand fresh troops were ordered to be sent to Canada for 
distribution along the southern frontier of that province. 
At the North these continued acts of unfriendliness 
seemed to indicate a strong desire for recognition of the 
Confederacy and early intervention in American affairs 
by the British government. To the friends of the Union 
this was a source of great fear and uneasiness; to the 
disloyal it was the cause of much hope ; to the Confed- 

* Adams to Seward, June 14, 1861. 
(61) 



6a THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

a 

erates it was an inspiration to greater efforts and re- 
newed enthusiasm for their slave republic. 

The popular anxiety of the loyal people concerning 
this matter was also shared in no small degree by the 
president and the various members of his cabinet. After 
due consideration of the matter it was decided to do 
something to provide against foreign interference. Ac- 
cordingly a circular was addressed by Mr. Seward to 
each of the governors of the loyal states bordering on 
the ocean or the great lakes. The circular was as follows : 

"Department of State, 

"Washington, Oct. 14, 1861. 
"To His Excellency^ the Governor^ etc.: 

"Sir — The present insurrection had not even revealed 
itself in arms when disloyal citizens hastened to foreign 
countries to invoke their intervention for the overthrow 
of the government and the destruction of the Federal 
Union. These agents are known to have made theif 
appeals to some of the more important states without 
success. It is not likely, however, that they will re- 
main content with such refusals. Indeed it is under- 
stood that they are industriously endeavoring to accom- 
plish their disloyal purposes by degrees and by indirec- 
tion. Taking advantage of the embarrassments of 
agriculture, manufactures and commerce in foreign 
countries, resulting from the insurrection they have in- 
augurated at home, they seek to involve our common 
country in controversies with states with which every 
public interest and every interest of mankind require 
that it shall remain in relations of peace, amity and 
friendship. I am able to state for your satisfaction that 
the prospect for any such disturbance is now less serious 



CIRCULAR TO THE GOVERNORS. 63 

than it has been at any previous period during the course 
of the insurrection. It is, nevertheless, necessary now, 
as it has hitherto been, to take every precaution that is 
possible to avoid the evils of foreign war, to be superin- 
duced upon those of civil commotion which we are en- 
deavoring to cure. 

"One of the most obvious of such precautions is that 
our ports and harbors on the seas and lakes should be 
put in a condition of complete defense, for any nation 
may be said to voluntarily incur danger in tempestuous 
seasons when it fails to show that it has sheltered itself 
on every side from which the storm might possibly 
come. 

"The measures which the executive can adopt in the 
emergency are such only as congress has sanctioned, 
and for which it has provided. 

"The president is putting forth the most diligent 
efforts to execute those measures, and we have the great 
satisfaction of seeing that those efforts are seconded by 
the favor, aid, and support of a loyal, patriotic and 
self-sacrificing people, who are rapidly bringing the 
military and naval force of the United States into the 
highest state of efficiency. But congress was chiefly 
absorbed, during its extra session, with those measures, 
and did not provide as amply as could be wished for 
the fortification of our sea and lake coasts. In previous 
wars the loyal states have applied themselves, by in- 
dependent and separate activity, to the support and aid 
of the Federal government in its arduous responsibilities. 
The same disposition has been manifested in a degree 
eminently honorable by all the loyal states -during the 
present insurrection. 



64 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

"In view of this fact, and relying upon the increase 
and continuance of the same disposition on the part of 
the loyal states, the president has directed me to invite 
your consideration to the subject of the improvement 
and perfection of the defenses of the state over which 
you preside, and to ask you to submit the subject to the 
consideration of the legislature when it shall have as- 
sembled. Such proceedings by the state would require 
only a temporary use of its means. 

"The expenditures ought to be made the subject of 
conference with the Federal government. Being thus 
made, with the concurrence of the government, for gen- 
eral defense, there is every reason to believe that congress 
would sanction what the states should do and would 
provide for its reimbursement. 

"Should these suggestions be accepted, the president 
will direct the proper agents of the Federal govern- 
ment to confer with you, and to superintend, direct and 
conduct the prosecution of the system of defense of 
your state. I have the honor to be, sir, 
"Your obedient servant, 

"W. H. Seward." 

This circular at once caused great comment both in 
Canada and England. The Canadian press declared 
that fortifications along the northern frontier of the 
United States were a menace to their dominions, and 
would be immediately equaled by defenses which they 
proposed to erect just opposite. The press and author- 
ities of England pretended to regard it as a menace and 
pronounced it "ill-timed," and "a foolish confession of 
fear." The London Post was the ministerial organ at 
that time. The following extracts from an editorial in 



COMMENTS OF THE LONDON POST. ' 65 

that journal probably best represent the current English 
view of the circular. It was entitled, "Is Mr. Seward seek- 
ing a quarrel ?' ' Comments were made as follows : "Mr. 
Seward, the secretary of state, is a distinguished dis- 
ciple of the American school, and during the present 
unhappy contest he has had abundant opportunity of 
writing those long-winded and pretentious state papers 
which appear to console the American people for the 
absence of liberty and the ordinary administration of 
the law. Three documents have recently emanated 
from the pen of this gentleman, in all of which English 
interests are deeply concerned." The documents were 
then enumerated, and among them was "the circular 
addressed to the governors of the northern states recom- 
mending the immediate construction of coast and lake 
defenses extending over the frontiers several thousand 
miles in length." 

It was said of the circular that "it may fairly be sup- 
posed to be a revival of the Monroe doctrine, which, 
originally was a protest against the European Holy Al- 
liance of some forty years back, has, notwithstanding 
the bluster of the United States government on various 
occasions, never received the countenance or sanction 
of any foreign country. In fact the doctrine was 
founded upon an erroneous assumption, because it 
ignored the authority of Great Britain, which, in right 
of its American provinces, has as much to do with the 
balance of power upon the North American continent 
as the United States themselves. As it is understood 
that the Federal government has been invited to take 
part in the joint expedition which England, France and 

5 



66 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

Spain are about to dispatch to Mexico, it scarcely can 
be believed that Mr. Seward has answered this invita- 
tion by a circular, the object of which is to place the 
whole coast of the republic in a state of defense against 
some threatened invasion. 

"Does Mr. Seward imagine that the Canadians are 
about to ally themselves with the South, or that any 
foreign power is disposed to take advantage of the 
present condition of American affairs to threaten or in- 
sult the United States government? We doubt very 
much whether the conventions which make the great 
lakes neutral, and prohibit the employment of armed 
vessels in their waters, would justify either England or 
the United States in constructing fortresses along their 
coasts, which, in reality, could only be constructed as 
standing menaces, because they could not answer the 
end desired, that of protecting a frontier which, not at 
a hundred, but at a thousand points must always be 
accessible to an enemy. It suits Mr. Seward's present 
purpose to arouse the American mind with one of those 
periodical and offensive exhibitions toward England 
which the statesmen of the republic have on former oc- 
casions found useful. As no foreign power, in all 
probability, has the slightest desire to hold permanently 
a foot of Mexican soil or to invade the Unites States, 
either from the lakes or the Atlantic, Mr. Seward's 
circular may be regarded, if successful, as another 
illustration of the maxim, '■Populusvult decipi, decipia- 
tur.' 1 "2 

English journals found nothing to criticise in the con- 

* The people like to be deceived, let them be deceived. 
*The London Morning Post, November 6, i86i. 



INCONSISTENCr OF THE BRITISH PRESS. C'j 

duct of their own government as long as troops were 
being pushed into Canada to menace the United States. 
When the Federal government decided to resent this 
action in some degree by preparing for a foreign inva- 
sion, the British press immediately gave vent to its 
hatred for the northern cause and abused Mr. Seward 
for what it termed an act of menace and an exhibition 
of inconsistency. 

It will be noticed that Mr. Seward's circular was 
issued within three days after the escape from Charles- 
ton of Messrs. Mason and Slidell, the Confederate com- 
missioners extraordinary to England and France. The 
objects of their mission had been well understood 
at Washington for some time, and this probably had 
something to do with the issuing of the circular. 

The Federal government at all times pursued a 
policy of the most determined and unyielding opposi- 
tion to any foreign intervention in behalf of the insur- 
gents, and it may safely be presumed that this firm and 
confident course exerted a much more powerful in- 
fluence abroad than even the English government would 
care to admit. 

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. Diplomatic correspondence with Great Britain, 1861. 

2. London Post, November 6, 1861. 

3. Senate Ex. Doc: 2d Session 37th Congress, Vol. i. 

4. Text of the circular itself. See Indianapolis Sentinel and 
other northern newspapers of October 19, 1861. 

5. Victor, O.J. : History of the Southern Rebellion. 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE FIRST EFFORTS OF THE CONFEDERATES FOR 
RECOGNITION ABROAD. 

From the very moment when secession began to be 
contemplated by the southern leaders, it was evident 
that they confidently expected foreign aid, both moral 
and material, in their efforts to establish their independ- 
ence. A comparatively large and mutually profitable 
commerce had been carried on for many years between 
the South and the nations of western Europe. An ex- 
aggerated idea of the importance of this trade had im- 
pressed itself upon the minds of the secession leaders. 
They evidently believed that England would aid them 
in a war for independence rather than sustain the loss 
and inconvenience which would be caused by a destruc- 
tion of the cotton trade. 

While secession was under consideration, Mr. Judah 
P. Benjamin, United States senator from Louisiana and 
afterward Confederate secretary of state, addressed a 
letter to the British consul at New York in which very 
strong bids were made for English aid and sympathy. 
Mr. Benjamin gave it as his opinion that, under certain 
conditions, the southern states might be induced to 

(69) 



70 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



secede and resume their former allegiance to the British 
crown as a dependent province, i 

South Carolina was the first state to summon a seces- 
sion convention, and in the discussion which took place 
while that body was in session, one of the delegates 
said: "We have it on high authority that the repre- 
sentative of one of the imperial powers of Europe, in 
view of this prospective separation from the Union, has 
made propositions in advance for the establishment of 
such relations between it and the government about to 
be established in this state as will insure to that power 
such a supply of cotton for the future as an increasing 
demand for that article will require. "2 

After the secession of Georgia, Mr. Iverson, a United 
States senator from that state, said in his farewell 
speech to the senate: "You may have ships of war and 
we may have none. You may blockade our ports and 
lock up our commerce. We can live, if need be, with- 
out commerce. But when you shut out our cotton from 
the looms of Europe, we shall see whether other nations 
will not have something to say and something to do on 
that subject. Cotton is king, and it will find means to 
raise your blockade and disperse your ships."* 

Senator John Slidell, of Louisiana, after the secession 
of his state, made a speech in the senate before his with- 
drawal, in which he said: "How long, think you, will 
the great powers of Europe permit you to impede their 
free intercourse with their best customers for their 
various fabrics and to stop the supplies of the great 

* See Life of Thurlow Weed, Vol.'ii, pp. 313-314. 

* Draper's Civil War in America, Vol. Ii, p. 501. 
•Congressional Globe, Jan. 28, 1861. 



CONFEDERATE AGENTS SENT ABROAD. 71 

staple which is the most important basis of their man- 
ufacturing industry, by a mere paper blockade?" 1 

One of the first things done by the Confederate con- 
gress after its organization at Montgomery in February, 
1 86 1, was to adopt resolutions that steps be immediately 
taken to send agents abroad for the purpose of present- 
ing the cause of the new Confederacy to the gov- 
ernments of Europe. Very soon, therefore, after Jeffer- 
son Davis was installed in office, he appointed as foreign 
agents Messrs. William L. Yancey, of Alabama ; Dud- 
ley Mann, of Virginia ; P. A. Rost, of Louisiana, and 
T. Butler King, of Georgia. Early in March these gen- 
tlemen proceeded to their destination by way of New 
Orleans and Havana. They were empowered to secure 
the recognition of Confederate independence by Euro- 
pean nations and to conclude treaties of amity and com- 
merce with them. Yancey and Mann were to operate 
chiefly in England ; Rost and King in France, although 
other countries were to be visited. 

None of these men appear to have possessed any 
ability as diplomatists. Mr. Yancey was the leading 
spirit among them. He was a brilliant and polished 
speaker, ready and dextrous in controversy, sarcastic 
beyond expression, and extremely Unscrupulous. He 
wrote a letter for publication in June, 1859, in which he 
declared that the will of the slave-holding states them- 
selves and not the Federal government should deter- 
mine whether the African slave trade should be carried 
on or not. He also added that the matter ought to be 
submitted to that kind of a tribunal only and by its de- 

^ Congressional Globe, Feb. 4, 1861. 



73 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

cision alone should the southern people abide. He was 
one of the first men in the South to counsel secession. 
At a speech made early in January, i860, he said: 
*'But in the presidential contest a black Republican may 
be elected. If this dire event should happen, in my 
opinion, the only hope for safety for the South is a 
withdrawal from the Union before he shall be inaugu- 
rated — before the sword and the treasury of the Fed- 
eral government shall be placed in the keeping of that 
party." Mr. Mann was only a dull statistician whose 
ability was very limited. Mr. King was a typical 
southern planter, the owner of a large number of slaves. 
Mr. Rost was a French adventurer who had drifted to 
Louisiana in early life, married a wealthy woman, 
studied law and was elected to a place on the bench of 
the supreme court of his state. All of these men had 
been noted for craft and duplicity in the management 
of affairs in their own limited spheres at home, but 
none of them possessed any of the requisites of a real 
diplomat. They failed to obtain any official recognition 
either for themselves or for their government. 

Early in May, 1861, Mr. Dallas, the American' min- 
ister at London, said in a communication to Mr. Seward : 
"He (Lord Russell) told me that the three represen- 
tatives of the Southern Confederacy were here, that he 
had not seen them, but was not unwilling to do so un- 
officially, "i 

Two days later his lordship received Messrs. Yancey, 
Rost and Mann in an unofficial way and listened to 
their appeal for recognition. They entered into an ex- 
haustive discussion of the causes which led the South 

* Mr. Dallas to Mr. Seward, May 2, 1861. 



THE CONFBDBRA TB A GBNTS RE CEI VED. 73 

to secede and presented the advantages for commerce 
which a recognition of their independence would secure 
to England. They called special attention to the fact 
that the Federal government levied a high tariff on all 
imports, while the constitution of the Confederate 
States entirely prohibited all protective duties. They 
said that about three-fourths of the annual imports from 
England were bought by the South. They also empha- 
sized the fact that their constitution prohibited the 
African slave trade. 

Lord Russell replied that he did not then deem it ex- 
pedient to consider the question of recognition, that the 
Confederacy must first demonstrate its ability to main- 
tain its position as an independent state, and that it 
must be shown in what manner relations were to be 
maintained with foreign nations. 

On August 14, i86i, the same commissioners ad- 
dressed a long communication to Lord Russell, in 
which extended reasons were given for the immediate 
recognition of the Confederacy by her majesty's gov- 
ernment. To this communication his lordship returned 
a reply that was unsatisfactory to the Confederate 
agents. 

When Mr. Seward learned, through Mr. Dallas's 
communication, of Lord Russell's proposed unofficial 
reception of the commissioners, he took very strong 
grounds against it. In a letter to Mr. Adams, who had 
in the meantime succeeded Mr. Dallas as minister to 
England, Mr. Seward said: "The president regrets 
that Mr. Dallas did not protest against the proposed un- 
official intercourse between the British government and 
the missionaries of the insurgents. Intercourse of any 



74 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



kind with the so-called commissioners is liable to be 
construed as a recognition of the authority which ap- 
pointed them. Such intercourse would be none the less 
hurtful to us for being called unofficial, and it might be 
even more injurious, because we should have no means 
of knowing what points might be resolved by it. More- 
over, unofficial intercourse is useless and meaningless, 
if it is not expected to ripen into official intercourse, 
and direct recognition. It is left doubtful here whether 
the proposed unofficial intercourse has as yet actually 
begun. Your antecedent instructions are deemed ex- 
plicit enough, and it is hoped that you have not misunder- 
stood them. You will in any event desist from all in- 
tercourse whatever, unofficial as well as official, with the 
British government so long as it shall continue inter- 
course of either kind with the domestic enemies of this 
country. When intercourse shall have been arrested 
for this cause, you will communicate with this depart- 
ment and receive further instructions. "l 

In response to a complimentary toast offered at a dinner 
of the Fishmonger's Society in London early in Novem- 
ber, 1861, Mr. Yancey, acting as spokesman for the 
Confederate agents, said: "In defense of their liber- 
ties and sovereign independence, the Confederate States 
and people are united and resolute. They are invaded 
by a power numbering twenty millions, yet for eight 
months has the Confederate government successfully 
resisted, aye, repelled invasion along a military frontier 
of a thousand miles. Though cut off by blockade from 
all foreign trade, their internal resources have been ade- 
quate to the equipment and maintenance in the field of 

^ Mr. Seward to Mr. Adams, May 21, 1861. 



EFFORTS FOR FOREIGN AID. 



75 



an army of over 250,000 troops. Can all this be and 
yet these six millions of whites be divided ? The idea 
is preposterous. 

"They can maintain their independence intact by their 
own strength. As to their recognition by the powers of 
the world, that of course they desire. They are a peo- 
ple, a nation, exhibiting elements of power which few 
states of the world possess. But they have no reason to 
complain, nor do they feel aggrieved because these great 
powers see fit to defer their formal recognition and re- 
ception into the great family of nations. However 
they may differ from them as to the period when their 
recognition shall take place, they fully understand that 
such action is purely a question to be determined by 
those countries each for itself and with reference to its 
own interests and views of public policy." ^ 

Strenuous efforts were made to secure recognition in 
other European countries, especially in France. Mr. 
King's operations were confined chiefly to that country. 
In June, 1861, he addressed a long communication to 
the French minister of commerce in which the commer- 
cial claims of the Confederacy to direct relations with 
Europe were set forth. It was in the form of a pam- 
phlet printed in French and addressed to the minister of 
commerce. The real intent, however, was to prepare a 
document for universal circulation in Europe in order to 
gain friendship and sympathy for the southern cause, 
especially among the wealthier classes of manufacturers 
and merchants. Neither sound logic nor honest argu- 
ment were exhibited in this address. Facts and figures 
were woven together in such a way as to appear like a 

* London Globe, Nov. 12, 1861. 



ij6 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

complete argument of justification, and it doubtless 
made many friends for the South among those whose in- 
formation was not broad enough to enable them to see 
its fallacies and ingenious falsehoods. Mr. King prac- 
ticed whatever of duplicity he thought would be of ad- 
vantage to himself and his cause. Thus, he acted while 
in Europe as a commissioner from the state of Georgia, 
yet it has been proved conclusively from captured cor- 
respondence of his that he was a sort of general assist- 
ant to the whole band of Confederate agents abroad. 

Concerning the labors of these representatives, Jeffer- 
son Davis has said: "Our efforts for the recognition of 
the Confederate States by the European powers, in 
1 86 1, served to make us better known abroad, to awaken 
a kindly feeling in our favor, and cause a respectful re- 
gard for the effort we were making to maintain the in- 
dependence of the states which Gi'eat Britain had recog- 
nized, and her people knew to be our birthright. " ^ 

It was well, perhaps, for the peace of Europe in 1861, 
and certainly most fortunate for the interests of the 
northern states, that the sophistries of the southerners 
did not induce any European nation to recognize the in- 
dependence of the Confederate States, and open a direct 
communication with them. This would have been an 
interference in American domestic affairs which the 
Federal government would not have tolerated even 
though it had led to a war between the United States 
and the recognizing power. Mr. Seward meant as much 
when he said that if England determined to recognize, 
she might as well prepare to enter into an alliance with 
the insurgents. Indeed, it is highly probable that one 

* Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government, Vol. i, p. 469. 



war THE SOUTH SOUGHT FOREIGN AID. 77 

of the chief motives which induced the Confederate 
government to seek recognition abroad with such per- 
sistance and determination was a hope that the United 
States would become involved in a foreign war as a 
consequence. It was doubtless thought that such a re- 
sult would enable them to form a foreign alliance — a 
measure which would have greatly improved their 
prospects for independence. 

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES, 

I. American Annual Cyclopedia, 1861. 
2. Congressional Globe: Part I, 2d Session 36th Congress. 

3. Davis, Jefferson: The Rise and Fall of the Confederate 
Government. 

4. Diplomatic Correspondence with Great Britain, 1861. 

5. Draper, J. W.: History of the American Civil War. 
6.^^Foote's War of the Rebellion. 

7. London Globe, Nov. 12, 1861. 

8. Lossing, B. J.: The Civil War in America. 

9. McPherson, Edward: Political History of the Rebellion. 
ID. Senate Ex. Doc: 2d Session 37th Congress, Vol. i. 

II. Victor, O.J. : History of the Southern Rebellion. 






CHAPTER VIII. 

JAMES MURRAY MASON AND JOHN SLIDELL THE NATURE 

AND MERITS OF THEIR MISSION. 

The first agents of the South had spent seven months 
in Europe without accomplishing anything. It became 
painfully evident to the Confederacy that those who 
were then representing its interests abroad would never 
be able to secure for it the much desired recognition of 
its independence. Although disappointed at this fail- 
-•re, Mr. Davis was not disheartened, but determined to 
xry the effect of a second and much more formal mission, 
in which the interests of the Confederate government 
would be represented by men of much more ability and 
force of character than those who had been sent in the 
first instance. The new representatives were to be duly 
commissioned as "ambassadors" for the Confederate 
States. Their proposed work abroad was thought to be 
of vital importance to the interests of the Confederacy. 
After due consideration of the matter, therefore, Messrs. 
James Murray Mason, of Virginia, and John SHdell, of 
Louisiana, were selected for this employment and cre- 
dentials duly furnished them by which the former was 
to represent the Confederate States in England, and the 
latter in France. 

(79) 



8o THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

Mr. James M. Mason was a Virginian whose name 
was historic. His family had been distinguished in the 
history of his state from the earliest colonial times, and 
Mr. Mason himself was a man of great personal mark, 
possessing ability of the highest order. He had repre- 
sented Virginia in the United States senate for years 
prior to the secession of that state. He had been chair- 
man of the senate committee on foreign affairs and was 
the author of the fugitive slave law. Indeed an exam- 
ination of his senatorial record shows that he never lost 
an opportunity to dilate upon the fugitive slave ques- 
tion. The failure or refusal of citizens of the free states 
to apprehend and return to their masters runaway slaves 
that were constantly escaping from Virginia was to Mr. 
Mason a grievance of unexampled proportions. On 
the first day that congress convened again after the 
John Brown raid, Senator Mason introduced a resolu- 
tion of inquiry into the facts attending the invasion and 
seizure of Harper's Ferry, Virginia: "whether such 
invasion and seizure was made under color of any or- 
ganization intended to subvert the government of any of 
the states of the Union ; what was the character and ex- 
tent of such organization ; and whether any citizens of 
the United States not present were implicated therein or 
accessory thereto by contributions of money, arms, 
munitions or otherwise ; what was the character and ex- 
tent of the military equipment in the hands or under the 
control of said armed band and where and how and 
when the same was obtained and transported to the 
place so invaded." ^ This resolution was evidently in- 
tended to fix the responsibility for the John Brown raid 

i * Congressional Globe, Dec, 1859. 



SKETCH OF MR. MASON. 8 1 

where it did not belong, viz., upon the Republican party 
in the northern states. 

Mr. Mason was one of the first to advocate the seces- 
sion of Virginia. A powerful minority in that state 
opposed the movement, and it was not without con- 
siderable opposition that the secessionists triumphed. 
The convention called to consider the question of seced- 
ing passed an ordinance withdrawing the state from the 
Union, provided the measure be approved by the people 
of Virginia at a special election called to decide the 
matter. Some ten days before the election Mr. Mason 
published a letter which was widely circulated giving 
his views with regard to the act of secession, which, he 
declared, "withdrew the state of Virginia from the 
Union with all the consequences resulting from the sep- 
aration," and nullified "all the constitution and laws 
of the United States within its limits." He thought 
Virginia could not afford to reject the secession ordi- 
nance at the coming election, and said : "If it be asked 
what those shall do who can not in conscience vote to 
separate Virginia from the United States, the answer is 
simple and plain. Honor and duty alike require that 
they should not vote on the question, and if they retain 
such opinions they must leave the state." * This was 
meant to encourage intimidation of the loyal people 
throughout the state, and the history of the time shows 
that such advice was not given in vain. 

Mr. John Slidell, of Louisiana, had also been known 
in public life previous to the civil war. A native of 
New York, he had in early life become a citizen of 

* Letter to the Winchester Virginian, May i6, 1861. 

6 



82 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

Louisiana, where he had married an accomplished 
French Creole lady. He entered public life in 1842, 
being elected to the house of representatives. 

Mr. Slidell represented Louisiana in the United States 
senate when his state seceded from the Union. His 
withdrawal speech was bitter in the extreme. The fol- 
lowing is an extract from it: "We have no idea that 
you will even attempt to invade our soil with your 
armies ; but we acknowledge your superiority on the 
sea, at present, in some degree accidental, but in the 
main, natural and permanent, until we shall have ac- 
quired better ports for our marine. You may, if you 
will it, persist in considering us bound to you during 
your good pleasure ; you may deny the sacred and inde- 
feasible right, we will not say of secession, but of revo- 
lution — aye, of rebellion, if you choose so to call our 
action — the right of every people to establish for itself 
that form of government which it may, even in its folly, 
if such you deem it, consider best calculated to secure 
its safety and promote its welfare. You may ignore 
the principles of our immortal Declaration of Independ- 
ence ; you may attempt to reduce us to subjection, or 
you may, under color of enforcing your laws or collect- 
ing your revenue, blockade our ports. This will be 
war and we shall meet it with different but equally 
efficient weapons. We will not permit the consump- 
tion or introduction of any of your manufactures ; every sea 
will swarm with our volunteer militia of the ocean, with 
the striped bunting floating over their heads, for we do 
not mean to give up that flag without a bloody struggle ; 
it is ours as much as yours ; and although for a time 



CAREER OF MR. SLIDELL. 83 

more stars may shine on your banner, our children, if 
not we, will rally under a constellation more numerous 
and more resplendent than yours. You may smile at 
this as an impotent boast, at least for the present, if not 
for the future, but, if we need ships and men for pri- 
vateering, we shall be amply supplied from the same 
sources as now almost exclusively furnish the means for 
carrying on, with such unexampled vigor, the African 
slave trade — New York and New England. Your 
mercantile marine must either sail under foreign flags 
or rot at your whai-ves." 

"You were," continued Mr. Slidell, "with all the 
wealth and resources of this great Confederacy, but a 
fourth or fifth rate naval power, with capacities, it is 
true, for large, and in a just quarrel almost indefinite 
expansion. What will you do when not merely emas- 
culated by the withdrawal of fifteen states, but warred 
upon by them with active and inveterate hostility?" ^ 

Perhaps enough has been said of these men to convey 
an adequate idea of the character and motives of each 
of them. Both were ultra secessionists, active, talented 
and with suflScient ability to do all that could be done 
for their cause in Europe. 

The object of the mission of Mason and Slidell to 
Europe was to secure, if possible, the recognition of the 
independence of the Confederate government by the 
respective states to which they were accredited ; to effect 
alliances or to conclude treaties of commerce or amity; 
to procure the intervention of France and England, if 
their government so desired ; to neutralize and defeat 

* Congressional Globe, Feb. 4, 1861. 



84 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

any diplomatic measures of the United States in Europe ; 
to serve the financial and military needs of the insurgent 
government by procuring foreign loans, securing muni- 
tions of war, granting commissions, and, in short, to aid 
the Confederacy by every means in their power. 

The United States was most fortunate at this time in 
having all of her foreign affairs in the hands of men who 
possessed more than ordinary ability as diplomats. Mr. 
Seward had early anticipated the work of all Confed- 
erate agents abroad and sent to each United States min- 
ister, accredited to any country which he thought would 
be applied to by insurgent missionaries, a carefully pre- 
pared letter of instructions containing an outline of the 
arguments to be used in thwarting the efforts of the 
southern representatives. The instructions given to Mr. 
Adams were, perhaps, the most careful and extended of 
any. 

Mr. Seward thought the agents of the Confederates 
would not appeal to the magnanimity or justice of 
Great Britain, but rather to her cupidity and caprice; 
that they would ask recognition as a measure of retalia- 
tion against the Morrill tariff. 

In response he thought it would be well to argue that 
every state has a right to regard its own convenience 
only in framing its revenue laws ; that a recognition of 
the Confederacy would be equivalent to a deliberate re- 
solve on the part of her majesty's government that the 
American Union which had so long constituted a single 
prosperous nation should be permanently dissolved and 
forever cease to exist ; that the excuse for so doing 
would be only a change in the American revenue laws 
— a change that in its very nature could be only tem- 



INSTRUCTIONS TO MR. ADAMS. 85 

porary and ephemeral because of public sentiment in 
the United States which in a brief time would probably 
demand a change ; that as a retaliatory measure recogni- 
tion would be out of all proportion to the temporary 
disadvantage created by the revenue law ; that a mag- 
nanimous nation which desired to retaliate could find 
other and more friendly remedies for foreign legislation 
that was injurious without deliberately seeking to destroy 
the offending nation. Mr. Seward thought that England 
should not be in haste to assume that the Confederate 
States would offer more liberal facilities for trade than 
the United States would be disposed to concede ; that it 
might be well to wait and see whether the best terms of 
the South would be any more desirable than those which 
the North could offer. Attention was also to be called 
to the fact that absolute free trade had always existed 
among the several states of the Union, which was in 
effect free trade throughout the largest habitable part of 
North America ; that during the entire national period of 
American history, except brief intervals that did not affect 
the result, constantly increasing liberality in commercial 
relations with foreign nations had been the policy of the 
United States; that these advances had been made 
necessarily, because with an increasing liberality the 
Federal government had, at the same time, owing to 
controlling causes, continually augmented its revenues 
and the whole country had increased its productions ; 
and finally that it was quite evident that no different 
course would be followed in the future. It was also to 
be noted that the Confederate States might not be able 
to continue for any length of time the proposed com- 



86 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

mercial liberality which they proffered as an equivalent 
for recognition, since such liberality implied that peace 
must continuously exist and that trade relations would 
not be disturbed. If war rather than peace should 
mark the existence of the new government, there would 
be very strong temptations to levy an import duty since 
that would be one of their chief means of raising much 
needed revenue. It was further affirmed that only a 
limited examination of commercial statistics was suffi- 
cient to show that while the chief American exports to 
European countries were staples of the Confederate 
States, yet a very large proportion of the fabrics and 
products from abroad which were consumed in those 
states were obtained and must continue to be obtained 
not from Europe but from the northern states of 
America, and that the chief consumption of European 
goods imported into the United States took place in the 
same northern states; that the great features of that 
commerce could not be modified by the action of either 
the Confederate congress or the British parliament, since 
its composite character was due to the great variety of 
soils and climates of a continent, as well as the various 
institutions, customs and dispositions of the numerous 
communities living upon it. Mr. Seward was also of 
opinion that the Morrill tariff would not diminish the 
amount of English goods consumed in the United States, 
since the American people were active, energetic, in- 
dustrious, inventive and not penurious, and they were 
engaged in developing a practically new continent of 
unlimited natural resources. This in his opinion caused 
both individual and public wealth to increase daily, and 



INSTRUCTIONS TO MR. ADAMS. 87 

with such increase grew the habit of liberal if not pro- 
fuse expenditure — results which no revenue legislation 
could change other than to vary the character and not 
the amount and value of foreign imports. 

Mr. Adams was also advised to say that Great Britain 
was committed to a policy of industry and peace rather 
than of ambition and war ; that such a policy had un- 
doubtedly brought the best results to her as a nation ; 
and that continued success in this career required peace 
throughout the civilized world and especially on this 
contment. "Recognition by her of the so-called Con- 
federate States," continued Mr. Seward, "would be in- 
tervention and war in this country. Permanent dis- 
memberment of the American Union in consequence of 
that intervention would be perpetual war — civil war. 
The new Confederacy which Great Britain would have 
aided into existence would, like any other new state, seek 
to expand itself northward, westward and southward. 
What part of the continent or of the adjacent islands 
would be expected to remain in peace? President 
Lincoln would not for a moment believe that upon con- 
sideration of mere financial gain that government could 
be induced to lend its aid to a revolution designed to 
overthrow the institutions of this country and involving 
ultimately the destruction of the liberties of the Ameri- 
can people." 

Another point to be noted was that recognition of the 
independence of a new state was the highest possible 
exercise of sovereign power, because it might result in 
establishing the new nation among the powers of 
earth — a result often fraught with grave consequences 



88 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

to other nations and to the peace of the world ; that such 
a use of sovereign power should be made with greater 
prudence and caution in American than in European 
affairs, since its effects could not fail to be more serious. 

That principle of international law was also invoked 
which regards nations as moral persons, bound so to act 
toward each other that not only the least injury but the 
most good will be done. It was held that this great 
principle of international law would be reduced to the 
merest abstraction, too refined for an enlightened nation 
to practice, if recognition were granted to the Confed- 
eracy. 

Lastly, Mr. Adams was instructed to remind the 
British government that the empire over which it ruled 
was made up of an aggregation of divers communities 
covering a large portion of the earth and including one- 
fifth of its total population ; that many of its possessions 
were held by ties no stronger than those which held to- 
gether the Federal Union ; that a time would come 
when the strength of those bonds would be put to a 
severe test by insurrection or otherwise ; and to conclude 
by asking whether it would be wise on that occasion to 
set so dangerous a precedent or to pursue such a course 
as might invoke the future retaliation of a powerful state. 

Such were the arguments as they were outlined for 
the use of Mr. Adams in answering the expected appeal 
of the Confederate agents for the recognition of their 
government. They afford a thorough analysis of the 
whole matter. Every possible argument for recognition 
is fairly stated, fully discussed, and a logical conclusion 
reached. They are amply sufficient to convince any 



INSTRUCTIONS TO MR. ADAMS. 89 

candid mind that not a single valid reason existed for 
recognizing the Confederacy, and that the mission of 
Mason and Slidell deserved only failure. 



AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. Appleton's Cyclopedia of American Biography, 

2. Blaine, James G.: Twenty Years of Congress. 

3. Congressional Globe: Part i, ist Session 36th Congress 
and Part i, 2d Session 36th Congress. 

4. Dana's Wheaton's International Law, note, pp. 653-6, 

5. Diplomatic correspondence with Great Britain, 1861, 

6. Lossing, B.J.: The Civil War in America. 

7. Senate Ex. Doc: 2d Session 37th Congress, Vol. i. 

8. Winchester Virginian, May 16, 1861, 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE DEPARTURE OF THE COMMISSIONERS FOR EUROPE. 

After all necessary arrangements for their departure 
had been made, Messrs. Mason and Slidell experienced 
some difficulty in getting out of the country. A strict 
blockade of all the Confederate ports was maintained at 
that time and it was necessary for these men to await a 
favorable opportunity to escape on some departing 
blockade-runner. 

In the earliest days of blockade running, it was not 
always foreign vessels alone that engaged in the busi- 
ness. The Confederates possessed a few steamers that 
were armed for the naval service of the South and also 
did duty as blockade-runners, carrying cargoes in and 
out of the blockaded ports as often as they could con- 
veniently do so. These vessels were commissioned as 
privateers, or bore Jefferson Davis's letters of marque, 
in order that, while on their voyages, they might cap- 
ture and burn Federal merchant ships whenever they 
fell in with them. To this class of vessels belonged the 
Gordon, which was afterward renamed the Theodora. 

Charleston seems to have been a favorite port for the 
operations of the blockade-runners. It seems to have 
been more difficult to guard than any of the other ports, 

(90 



92 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

and it was conveniently near to the neutral ports of the 
West Indies. To this port, then, the commissioners 
accordingly came. It was announced by the Confed- 
erate press that they would take passage on the priva- 
teer Nashville, a very swift vessel which was then lying 
in the harbor. On tbe night of October lo, 1861, the 
Nashville passed out of the harbor in order to draw off 
any Federal cruiser which might be hovering around 
outside with the intention of giving chase to the vessel 
that should escape with the commissioners on board. 

It was arranged for the envoys to take passage on the 
armed steamer Theodora. The entire party was com- 
posed of Mr. Mason and his secretary, Mr, McFarland ; 
Mr. Slidell, his wife and four children; Mr. Slidell's sec- 
retary, Mr. George Eustis, who was also accompanied by 
his wife, a daughter of Mr. Corcoran, the eminent 
banker of Washington city. 

The night of October 12 was dark and stormy. Rain 
was falling in torrents as the Theodora left Charleston 
harbor a little past midnight. In the intense darkness 
which prevailed she escaped the watchful cruisers of the 
blockading squadron and arrived at Nassau, New Provi- 
dence, on the 13th. This was a British port where 
blockade-runners and Confederate vessels of whatever 
kind always received a warm welcome. 

The United States government sent armed vessels in 
pursuit as soon as it was learned that Mason and Slidell 
had escaped, but the ship which conveyed the envoys 
was not overtaken. The secret of their movements had 
been well kept and several days had elapsed before 
news of their departure was published, even in the 
Charleston papers. It is probable, therefore, that the 



THE ENVOYS ARRIVE AT HA VAN A. 93 

Federal authorities did not learn of the escape in time 
for their steamers to have any chance whatever to over- 
take the Theodora. 

At Nassau the envoys had fully expected to take passage 
on an English steamer, but v^^ere deterred from So doing 
when they learned that the vessel would stop at New 
York on her route to Liverpool. Their journey was, 
therefore, continued on board the Theodora to Cardenas 
in Cuba, whence they afterward proceeded overland to 
Havana, and took lodgings at the Hotel Cubana while 
waiting for the English steamer. The Theodora con- 
tinued her voyage to Havana and steamed into that port 
on the 17th with Confederate colors flying. She was 
received with great honors at the Cuban capital. A 
public reception was held at the Tacon Theater in honor 
of her officers and crew. Captain Lockwood, of the 
Theodora, was presented with a "handsome Confederate 
flag" by the ladies of Havana, who sympathized with 
the southern cause. After a short stay the Confederate 
steamer returned to Charleston. 

As soon as the envoys arrived they were waited upon 
by her Britannic majesty's consul at Havana, Mr. Craw- 
ford, in full dress. This gentleman introduced them to 
Captain-General Serrano as ministers of the Confederate 
States on their way to England and France, 1 but the 
Spanish officer would not receive them officially but 
only upon the footing of distinguished gentlemen and 
strangers. The English consul was very attentive to the 
envoys during their entire stay at Havana. No attempt 
was made to conceal their station or identity, and with 

* In a letter to Lord Lyons dated Dec. 2, 1861, Mr. Crawford 
denied having done this. 



94 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



a full knowledge of this, the consul's son, who was 
agent for the British line of steamers touching at 
Havana, allowed them to engage passage to Southamp- 
ton. 

On November 7 the envoys and their party embarked 
onboard the British steamer Trent at Havana, with the 
full knowledge and consent of her captain, who after- 
ward did what he could to conceal their identity by re- 
fusing to allow his passenger list and papers of the ves- 
sel to be seen by a boarding officer from the San Jacinto. 

The Trent was a British packet which made regular 
trips between Vera Cruz and the Danish island of St. 
Thomas. It is was one of a line of steamers which car- 
ried the English mails under contract with the govern- 
ment. At St. Thomas direct connection was made with 
steamers running to Southampton. The Trent had on 
board probably a hundred passengers, a cargo of con- 
siderable value and a large quantity of specie. The 
departure of the envoys from Havana on board this ves- 
sel seemed to assure the safety of the remainder of their 
journey, since it was to be made under a neutral flag. 

The apparently successful journey of their commis- 
sioners was a cause of congratulation among the Confed- 
erates. In discussing this matter the Richmond Exam- 
iner probably voiced the sentiment of the Confederacy 
when it said: "By this time our able representatives 
abroad, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, are pretty well on 
their way over the briny deep toward the shores of 
Europe. We commit no indiscretion in stating that 
they have embarked upon a vessel which will be abun- 
dantly able to protect them against most of the Yankee 
cruisers they may happen to meet, and the chances are 



CONFEDERATE COMMENTS. 



95 



consequently a hundred to one that they will reach their 
destination in safety. The malice of our Yankee ene- 
mies will thus be foiled and the attempt to capture them 
fail of success. Great will be the mortification of the 
Yankees when they shall have learned this result. Our 
ministers did not choose to leave at any other port than 
one of our own or under any but the Confederate flag. 

"We anticipate from Mr. Mason's presence in England 
a very happy effect upon our interests in that quarter. 
Mr. Mason is, in his points of character, a very good 
representative of the best qualities of the English peo- 
ple. He is frank, bold and straightforward, disdaining 
all concealments or evasions. His diplomacy will con- 
sist in telling the truth in the language of a gentleman 
and a statesman. As the representative of a name linked 
with the earlier ages of the American republic, an ex- 
senator of the United States for many years, and the 
honored servant of the Confederate government, he will 
wield an influence abroad such as perhaps no other man 
could hope to enjoy. He is the very best man we 
could send abroad to show foreign nations that the 
Southerner is a different type altogether from the Yan- 
kee — that he scorns like the latter to lie, to evade or dis- 
semble, to fawn or play the bully and the braggart ; that 
the despicable traits of avarice, meanness, cant and vul- 
garity which enter into the universal idea of a Yankee 
were left behind us when we seceded from the Lincoln 
government. We are glad to be able to contrast such 
a gentleman with Charles Francis Adams, the Puritan 
representative of freedom at the Court of St. James, 
and he knows little of British character who is disposed 
to set a slight value upon the advantages derived from 



96 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



the personal character o£ a representative in this matter. 
We believe that at no distant day Mr. Mason will have 
the pleasure of signing a treaty of amity, on behalf of 
the Confederate States, with one of the oldest and 
greatest dynasties of Europe, and thus cement those re- 
lations of commerce upon which our future so largely 
depends." * 

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. Battles and Leaders of the Civil War. 

2. Bernard, Montague: Neutrality of Great Britain During 
the American Civil War. 

3. Lossing, B. J.: The Civil War in America. 

4. Sharf, J. Thomas: History of the Confederate States 
Navy. 

5. Reports of Captain Wilkes. 

6. Richmond Examiner, Oct. 2g, 1861. 

7. Victor, O.J. : History of the Southern Rebellion. 

* Richmond Examiner, Oct. 29, 1861. 



CHAFTEK X. 

THE SEIZURE OF MASON AND SLIDELL BY CAPT. WILKES- 

In August, 1 86 1, the United States war steamer San 
Jacinto, a first-class screw sloop mounting fifteen guns, 
left St. Paul de Loando on the western coast of Africa 
where she had been engaged during twenty months in an 
active cruise for slavers. She was at that time tem- 
porarily commanded by Lieutenant D. M. Fairfax, of 
the United States navy, who had been instructed to pro- 
ceed to Fernando Fo and await at that place the arrival 
of Captain Charles Wilkes, an able naval officer in the 
service of the United States. Captain Wilkes soon ar- 
rived and took permanent command of the ship, Lieu- 
tenant Fairfax resuming his former position of executive 
officer. 

The name of Charles Wilkes was one which was not 
unknown In American naval circles and in the scientific 
world. He had commanded an exploring expedition to 
the South Folar Ocean and had discovered there the 
dreary land which now bears his name. He was a man 
of great scientific acquirements. That he had been a 
devoted student and an original investigator in his 
chosen field is attested by his voluminous scientific 
writings. The leisure hours of his long voyages among 
7 (97) 



98 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

polar icebergs and elsewhere were chiefly spent in that 
way. He was regarded by his acquaintances as ec- 
centric and independent in disposition. 

After taking command of the San Jacinto, Captain 
Wilkes spent about a month cruising close to the shore 
of Africa for the purpose of ascertaining whether the 
Confederate privateers had taken any prizes to that 
coast. Having arrived at Cape Verd about the last of 
September, it was learned from newspapers received 
there that several Confederate privateers had run the 
blockade and taken numerous prizes in the waters of the 
West India islands. Captain Wilkes determined to 
cruise about those islands for a time and capture some 
of the Confederate privateers, before returning to New 
York. On October 10, 1861, the San Jacinto arrived 
at the port of St. Thomas in the West Indies. The 
Powhatan and the Iroquois, two United States war ves- 
sels, were already there. On the day after the arrival 
of the San Jacinto the British brig Spartan arrived, and 
her commander informed Captain Wilkes that on Octo- 
ber 5 his vessel had been boarded by a steamer, evi- 
dently a war vessel in disguise, and that after answering 
all questions, he could get no satisfactory mformation 
concerning the strang-er. Being shown a photograph 
of the Confederate privateer oumter, he immediately 
recognized it as the one by which his own vessel had 
been boarded. All of the United States war vessels im- 
mediately left the harbor with the hope of overtaking 
the Sumter. About ten days afterward the San Jacinto 
touched at Cienfuegos on the south coast of Cuba. 
There it was learned from the newspapers that the Con- 



CAPTAIN WILKES'S PLAN. g^ 

federate commissioners were at Havana, having escaped 
in the Theodora. 

Captain Wilkes immediately put to sea with the in- 
tention of intercepting the Confederate vessel on her re- 
turn to Charleston. Arriving at Havana on October 28 
it was learned that Messrs. Mason and Slidell were 
still there as guests of the Hotel Cubana, where one 
of Captain Wilkes's officers met Mr. Mason in the par- 
lor. The commissioners were waiting for the English 
steamer Trent which would leave Havana on Novem- 
ber 7. 

Upon hearing this latter bit of information, Captain 
Wilkes conceived the bold design of intercepting the 
Trent and making prisoners of the envoys, but about 
ten days must necessarily elapse before this plan could 
be put into execution. 

The Theodora had already started upon her return 
voyage to Charleston. A supply of coal and provisions 
having been secured in great haste, Captain Wilkes fol- 
lowed in the wake of the Theodora, but failed to over- 
take her. The voyage was then continued to Key 
West in the hope of finding there the Powhatan or some 
other United States war vessel to accompany him to the 
Bahama Channel and assist in intercepting the British 
mail packet. In this, however, he was disappointed, as 
the Powhatan had left Key West on the day before the 
arrival of the San Jacinto, and there was no available 
war steamer in the harbor. Nothing daunted, however, 
Captain Wilkes resolved to undertake the enterprise 
alone, and, having previously ascertained when the 
Trent would leave Havana, he readily calculated when 



lOO THE TRENT AFFAIR, 

and where in the Bahama Channel it would be easiest 
to intercept the British vessel. 

Any doubt of his right to board the Trent and remove 
the envoys from her seems never to have entered the 
mind of Captain Wilkes. Before arriving at Key 
West, he took into his confidence Lieutenant Fairfax, 
the executive officer of the San Jacinto, and told him of 
the plan to intercept the British packet, and, if the Con- 
federate commissioners were on board her, to take them 
prisoners. Lieutenant Fairfax entered a vigorous pro- 
test against the proposed action and urged strongly 
upon Captain Wilkes the necessity of proceeding with 
the utmost caution in order to avoid international dif- 
ficulties and possibly a war with England as a result of 
the affair. After reaching Key West Lieutenant Fair- 
fax suggested that Judge Marvin, an eminent authority 
upon maritime law, should be consulted, but Captain 
Wilkes never asked advice of any one after he had once 
resolved to do a thing. 

Accordingly on the morning of November 5, the San 
Jacinto steamed out of the harbor of Key West and 
directed her course toward Sagua la Grande on the 
northern coast of Cuba. Having arrived there an at- 
tempt was made to get information by telegraph from 
the United States consul at Havana concerning the ex- 
act time of the departure of the Trent. Failing in this 
the San Jacinto ran out about two hundred and fifty 
miles from Havana and took a position in the Old 
Bahama Channel where it contracts to a width of about 
fifteen miles. Being stationed about the middle of the 
channel, Captain Wilkes determined to await the pas- 
sage of the Trent which he thought would not be able 



APPROACH OF THE TRENT. loi 

to pass him on either side without being observed. 
With battery loaded and everything in readiness, the 
San Jacinto cruised here during the night of November 
7, and until about noon on the 8th, when a vessel was 
seen to be approaching from the westward. When she 
had approached sufficiently near a round shot was fired 
across her bows from the pivot gun of the San Jacinto 
and the American flag was hoisted at the same moment. 
The approaching vessel displayed English colors, but 
did not check her speed or show any disposition what- 
ever to heave to. After a lapse of some ten minutes, 
the English vessel still moving under a full head of 
steam, a shell was fired across her bows, exploding sev- 
eral hundred feet in front of her. This had the desired 
effect. The Trent, being then only a few hundred yards 
distant, stopped. Captain Wilkes hailed that he in- 
tended to send a boat to board her. 

The following instructions had previously been issued 
to Lieutenant Fairfax who had charge of the party that 
went on board the Trent : 

"U. S. Steamer San Jacinto, 
"At Sea, Nov. 8, i86i 

"Sir — You will have the second and third cutters of 
this ship fully manned and armed, and be in all respects 
prepared to board the steamer Trent now hove-to under 
our guns. 

"On boarding her you will demand the papers of the 
steamer, her clearance from Havana, with the list of 
passengers and crew. 

"Should Mr. Mason, Mr. Slidell, Mr. Eustis and 
Mr. McFarland be on board you will make them pris- 
oners, and send them on board this ship immediately, 
and take possession of her as a prize. 



I02 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

"I do not deem it will be necessary to use force; that 
the prisoners will have the good sense to avoid any 
necessity for using it ; but if they should, they must be 
made to understand that it is their own fault. They 
must be brought on board. All trunks, cases, pack- 
ages and bags belonging to them you will take posses- 
sion of, and send on board this ship. Any dispatches 
found on the persons of the prisoners, or in possession 
of those on board the steamer, will be taken possession 
of also, examined, and retained, if necessary. 

"I have understood that the families of these gentle- 
men may be with them. If so, I beg you will offer 
them, in my name, a passage in this ship to the United 
States, and that all the attention and comforts we can 
command are tendered them, and will be placed in their 
service. 

"In the event of their acceptance, should there be 
anything which the captain of the steamer can spare to 
increase the comforts in the way of necessaries or stores, 
of which a war vessel is deficient, you will please to 
procure them. The amount will he paid by the pay- 
master. 

"Lieutenant James A. Greer will take charge of the 
third cutter, which accompanies you, and assist you in 
these duties. 

"I trust that all those under your command, in ex- 
ecuting this important and delicate duty, will conduct 
themselves with all the delicacy and kindness which be- 
comes the character of our naval service. 

"I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"Charles Wilkes, Captain. 

"Lieutenant D. M. Fairfax, 

"U. S. N., Executive Officer San Jacinto." 



THE TRENT BOARDED. 



103 



Captain Moir of the Trent was evidently much an- 
gered at the manner in which he had been compelled to 
stop, and called out through his trumpet, "What do you 
mean by heaving my vessel to in this manner?" Lieu- 
tenant Fairfax says that he was greatly impressed with 
the gravity of the situation and resolved to perform his 
disagreeable duty with the utmost possible courtesy. In 
a few minutes the boats had reached the Trent, and, 
directing his crew to remain alongside for orders, Lieu- 
tenant Fairfax boarded the British vessel alone and was 
escorted by the first officer to the quarter deck. There 
he was introduced to Captain Moir, who manifested 
great indignation at what he styled the unusual treat- 
ment he had received, although he observed the out- 
ward forms of courtesy in receiving the American lieu- 
tenant, who at once asked to see the passenger list, but 
this request was denied by the British captain. Lieu- 
tenant Fairfax then said that he had information of the 
Confederate commissioners and their secretaries having 
taken passage at Havana, and that he would satisfy 
himself as to whether Messrs. Mason and Slidell were 
on board before allowing the steamer to proceed. Mr. 
Slidell, evidently hearing his own name mentioned, 
stepped up and said, "I am Mr. Slidell; do you want 
to see me?" Mr. Mason, with whom Lieutenant Fair- 
fax was well acquainted, came up at the same time and 
was asked about the two secretaries, Messrs. Eustis and 
McFarland. They were pointed out as they stood near. 
Having the four desired gentlemen before him then. 
Lieutenant Fairfax informed Captain Moir that he had 
been ordered by his commander to arrest them and send 
them prisoners on board the San Jacinto nearby. 



I04 "^HE TRENT AFFAIR. 

In the meantime the passengers, numbering almost 
one hundred, many of them being southerners, had 
crowded upon the deck, and a howl of rage and indigna- 
tion burst from them when the object of the visit to the 
Trent was announced. The British captain, the com- 
missioners and their secretaries were quiet and dignified, 
but the other passengers yelled, "Throw the d — fellow 
overboard." Lieutenant Fairfax then asked Captain 
Moir to preserve order and also reminded the passen- 
gers that the deck of the Trent was being closely 
watched through glasses from the San Jacinto, that a 
heavy battery was at that moment trained upon them 
and that to carry out their threat might result in dread- 
ful consequences. This, with the example set by the 
captain, restored partial order. During the uproar 
caused by the first announcement of Lieutenant Fairfax's 
object in visiting the Trent, the guard which had been 
left below, fearing violence to him, came hurrying to the 
upper deck. At sight of the marines Captain Moir re- 
monstrated and Lieutenant Fairfax ordered them to re- 
turn to their boat with an assurance to the British cap- 
tain that they had come up contrary to instructions. 
The purpose of the visit was then discussed more gen- 
erally. Captain Moir saying very little. Among those 
on board who were noisiest and most abusive was 
Commander Richard Williams, an officer on the retired 
list of the royal navy in charge of her majesty's mails. 
He denounced the whole proceeding in the bitterest and 
most offensive language possible, repeatedly stating that 
he officially represented the British government, that he 
meant to report the matter at once, that England would 
break the blockade of the southern ports in twenty days 



COMMANDER WILLIAMS PROTESTS. 



105 



and that the northerners might as well give up now. 
His formal "protest" on the deck of the Trent was as 
follows: "In this ship I am the representative of her 
majesty's government, and I call upon the officers of the 
ship and passengers generally to mark my words, when, in 
the name of the British government, and in distinct lan- 
guage, I denounce this as an illegal act, an act in viola- 
tion of international law ; an act indeed of wanton 
piracy, which, had we the means of defense, you would 
not dare to attempt." Not the slightest notice was 
taken of Commander Williams or his insults either by 
Lieutenant Fairfax or any of his men, as they could 
have official relations only with Captain Moir. Mrs. 
Slidell inquired who was in command of the San Jacinto, 
and upon being informed that it was Captain Wilkes 
she expressed surprise at his playing into Confederate 
hands by doing a thing which would certainly arouse 
England, thus accomplishing what the southern people 
most desired, Mr. Mason suggested to her that the 
matter be not discussed at that time. Both Mrs. Sli- 
dell and Mrs. Eustis declined to accept Captain Wilkes's 
offer of his cabin, and declared their intention not to 
leave the Trent. 

After trying in vain to induce the commissioners and 
their secretaries to go with him peaceably, Lieutenant 
Fairfax called to one of the officers in his boat below and 
directed him to return to Captain Wilkes with the in- 
formation that the gentlemen whom they desired to ar- 
rest were all on board, but that force would be neces- 
sary to execute the order to remove them from the 
packet. Lieutenant James A. Greer was at once sent 
with another boat in which were a number of armed 



io6 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

marines. A comfortable boat was also sent for the 
commissioners and their secretaries ; a second for their 
luggage, and still a third for provisions which had been 
purchased from the steward of the Trent for the benefit 
of the prisoners. 

Meanwhile Messrs. Mason and Slidell had repaired 
to their respective cabins and arranged their luggage, 
but still insisted that force would be necessary to com- 
pel them to go. Lieutenant Greer's armed marines 
were then brought up and formed just outside the main 
deck cabin. Calling to his aid several officers who had 
been previously instructed concerning their duties, Lieu- 
tenant Fairfax said to them, "Gentlemen, lay your 
hands upon Mr. Mason," which they accordingly did, 
seizing him by the shoulders and the coat-collar. Mr. 
Mason then said that he yielded to force under protest 
and would go, after which he was escorted to the boat 
in waiting. 

Lieutenant Fairfax then returned for Mr. Slidell who 
insisted that considerable force would be necessary to 
remove him. During all of this time excitement was 
rapidly increasing among the passengers. They crowded 
around the entrance to the cabin making a great deal of 
noise and all kinds of disagreeable and contemptuous 
remarks, such as: "Did you ever hear of such an out- 
rage.'"' "These Yankees will have to pay well for 
this." "This is the best thing in the world for the 
South ; England will open the blockade." "We will 
have a good chance at them now." "Did you ever hear 
of such a piratical act?" "They would not have dared to 
have done it, if an English man-of-war had been in 
sight." One person, supposed to be a passenger, be- 



THE ENVOYS SEIZED. 



107 



came so violent that the captain ordered him to be 
locked up. Commander Williams, it is said, advised 
Captain Moir to arm the crew and passengers. The 
confusion and loud talking increased. Lieutenant 
Greer, in charge of the armed marines stationed just 
outside of the main deck cabin, feared that there would 
be trouble, as he heard some one near Lieutenant Fair- 
fax call out, "Shoot him." An order was given for the 
marines to advance into the cabin at quickstep. As 
they moved foi'ward with fixed bayonets the passengers 
fell back. A passage-way was cleared and the armed 
guard ordered back. Mr. Slidell at the same moment 
jumped out of a window of a state-room into the cabin. 
He was then seized by two of the officers and enough of 
force applied to convey him into the boat with Mr. 
Mason. 

Many accounts of this affair state that while her 
father was being taken out of the cabin. Miss Slidell, a 
young lady of perhaps seventeen, screamed and slapped 
Lieutenant Fairfax in the face. The truth of the mat- 
ter seems to be that while the lieutenant was at the door 
of Mr. Slidell's state-room, the latter 's daughter was 
protesting against having her father taken from her 
when a slight roll of the ship caused Miss Slidell to lose 
her balance for a moment and involuntarily to touch 
Lieutenant Fairfax's shoulder. The two secretaries en- 
tered the boat quietly under protest. The entire party 
was then transferred to the San Jacinto. Their lug- 
gage having been put into another boat was also trans- 
ferred. 

It will be noticed from the instructions given by Cap- 
tain Wilkes to Lieutenant Fairfax that the latter's or- 



Io8 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

ders were to take possession of the Trent as a prize 
after having captured the commissioners. When the 
transfer had been made, Lieutenant Fairfax returned to 
the San Jacinto and reported that he had not made a 
prize of the Trent in accordance with his original or- 
ders, assigning at the same time saisfactory reasons for 
not having done so. The first was that as the San 
Jacinto was expecting to move northward at once and 
co-operate with Admiral Du Pont in his naval attack on 
Port Royal, their force and efficiency would be greatly 
weakened, if a large prize crew of officers and men 
should be put on board the Trent in order to carry her 
into port. The second reason was that great incon- 
venience and loss would be occasioned to the large 
number of innocent passengers aboard the Trent. After 
consideration of these suggestions Captain Wilkes ap- 
proved them and consented that the Trent be allowed 
to go. Lieutenant Fairfax then returned to the Trent 
and informed Captain Moir that he would be detained 
no longer and that he might continue his voyage. The 
British vessel then continued on her course, having been 
detained about two hours by the San Jacinto. 

Lieutenant Fairfax says that he resolved in the very be- 
ginning to perform his duty as courteously as possible 
so as not to irritate the British captain, his passengers, 
or the envoys lest they might decide to throw the Trent 
upon his hands, which would necessitate his taking her 
as a prize. While the Trent was stationary, with steam 
shut off, she drifted out of channel and into sight of 
shoal water. Captain Moir noticed this and said to 
Lieutenant Fairfax, "If you do not hurry and get out of 
my vessel, I will not be responsible for her safety." The 



LIEUT. FAIRFAX AND CAPT. MOIR. 



109 



Heut&nant at once hailed the San Jacinto and requested 
that she be kept more nearly in the middle of the chan- 
nel. After she had taken a new position Lieutenant 
Fairfax said to Captain Moir: "Now you can move 
up nearer to the San Jacinto." This he accordingly 
did. Lieutenant Fairfax cites this to show how careful 
he was to keep the British captain in an agreeable frame 
of mind so that the chances of his throwing the Trent 
upon the hands of the Americans would be less. 

Lieutenant Fairfax gives an account of a conversa- 
tion which he had with Captain Moir at St. Thomas 
after the close of the war. The latter "reverted to an 
interview he had with the British admiralty on his return 
to England whither he had been from St. Thomas. The 
admiralty were very much displeased with him for not 
having thrown the Trent on our hands, to which he re- 
plied (so he said to me) that it had never occurred to 
him; that in fact, the officer who boarded the Trent 
was so civil and had so closely occupied him in con- 
versation about foreign matters, that he had failed to 
see what afterward was very plain. He recounted the 
excitement on 'change over the affair, and expressed the 
conviction that all England would have demanded 
speedy redress had I taken the Trent. He had seen 
the reports in print in our newspapers, and had read my 
order to take possession and wondered that I had not." ^ 

After parting company with the Trent the San Jacinto 
proceeded to the Florida coast and thence northward, 
but was too late to take part in the attack on Port 
Royal. On November 15 Fortress Monroe was reached. 
Captain Wilkes came ashore and reported the seizure. 

* Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol.ii, p. 142. 



no THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

His report of the movements of the ship and the facts 
in regard to the capture of the commissioners was for- 
warded to Washington by Lieutenant Taylor, who was 
a passenger from the coast of Africa to the national 
capital. In an extended talk with Captain Wilkes, 
General Wool, who was then in command of Fortress 
Monroe, expressed the opinion that the right thing had 
been done in capturing the commissioners, and that, if 
a wrong had been committed, no greater penalty than 
"cashiering" could be inflicted. On November i6, 
after receiving Captain Wilkes's report, the following 
telegram was sent to the commandant of the New York 
navy yard by the secretary of the navy: "You will 
send the San Jacinto immediately to Boston, and direct 
Captain Wilkes to deliver the prisoners at Fort War- 
ren. Let their baggage be strictly guarded and deliv- 
ered to the colonel at Fort Warren for examination." 
On the same day the following telegram, which had 
been united in by the secretary of state and the secre- 
tary of the navy, was sent to Robert Murray, United 
States marshal at New York: "You will proceed in 
the San Jacinto to Fort Warren, Boston, with Messrs. 
Mason and Slidell and suite. No persons from shore 
are to be permitted on board the vessel prior to her de- 
parture from New York." 

Severe weather and a lack of coal compelled Captain 
Wilkes to stop at Newport, Rhode Island, on Novem- 
ber 21. The prisoners expressed a wish to be allowed 
"to remain in custody at Newport on account of the 
comparative mildness of the climate," which they 
thought would benefit the delicate health of one of 
their number. They offered to pledge themselves "not 



ARRI VAL AT BOS TON. j i j 

to make any attempt to escape, nor to communicate 
with any person while there unless permitted to do so." 
The matter having been referred by telegraph to the 
secretary of the navy, he immediately sent the following 
reply: "The government has prepared no place for 
confinement of the prisoners at Newport. The depart- 
ment can not change the destination of the prisoners." 
Two days before the arrival of the San Jacinto at Bos- 
ton, Captain Hudson, who was in command of the Bos- 
ton navy yard, received the following telegram from 
Gideon Welles, secretary of the navy: "Direct Cap- 
tain Wilkes immediately upon his arrival to have the 
effects of the rebel prisoners on board the San Jacinto 
. thoroughly examined, and whatever papers may be found 
to send them by special messenger to the department." 
Finally the San Jacinto steamed into Boston harbor on 
November 24, after having encountered both a heavy 
fog and a very severe storm off the coast of New England. 
During the entire voyage of sixteen days the prisoners 
had been treated with great courtesy. They messed 
with Captain Wilkes at his table, and occupied his 
cabin. Lieutenant Fairfax frequently talked with Mr. 
Eustis while on the way. The latter expressed the 
opinion that Great Britain would demand the release of 
the prisoners and that the United States would have to 
accede. Before leaving the ship the prisoners ad- 
dressed a courteous note to Captain Wilkes thanking 
him for the kindness with which they had been treated 
while on board his vessel. When first brought on 
board, however, they prepared and signed a formal pro- 
test against the manner in which they had been seized. 
They requested that it be forwarded to the govern- 



112 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

merit of the United States. This was done by Captain 
Wilkes when his own report was sent. The prisoners 
knew very well that it would have no effect whatever 
on the government of the United States. It was a state- 
ment intended for Confederate sympathizers in Europe 
and elsewhere. The commissioners doubtless thought 
that their protest of injured innocence would secure 
much sympathy for them abroad. 

Colonel Dimmick, in command of Fort WaiTen, took 
charge of the prisoners and their baggage, which con- 
sisted of about half a dozen trunks and as many valises, 
several cases containing an assortment of fine wines and 
liquors and a good supply of cigars. A careful exam- 
ination was made but no dispatches were found among 
their effects. None had been asked for and no particu- 
lar effort had been made to secure them when the Trent 
was boarded. Whatever of dispatches that were in 
possession of the commissioners were doubtless secretly 
given to some of the other passengers of the Trent — 
probably the ladies — and by them conveyed to England 
from St. Thomas in the British steamer La Plata. ^ 

On November i6, the day after his departure from 
Fortress Monroe, Captain Wilkes prepared his final re- 
port of the capture. A number of passages in this re- 
port are of great interest, giving, as they do, his reasons 
for making the capture, and his arguments by which he 
justifies the act. He says: "I determined to inter- 
cept them, and carefully examined all the authorities on 

*It seems that a Mr. Hanckel, of Charleston, took charge of 
them and delivered them to the Confederate agents, Yancey» 
Rost and Mann, in London. See U. S. and Confederate Naval 
Records, Ser. i, Vol. i, p. 155. 



REASONS FOR THE SEIZURE. 



"3 



international law to which I had access, viz. : Kent, 
Wheaton and Vattel, besides various decisions of Sir 
William Scott, and other judges of the admiralty court of 
Great Britain, which bore upon the rights of neutrals 
and their responsibilities." 

"The question arose in my mind whether I had the 
right to capture the persons of these commissioners — 
whether they were amenable to capture. There was 
no doubt I had the right to capture vessels with written 
dispatches ; they are expressly referred to in all authori- 
ties, subjecting the vessel to seizure and condemnation 
if the captain of the vessel had the knowledge of their 
being on board, but these gentlemen were not dispatches 
in the literal sense, and did not seem to come under 
that designation, and nowhere could I find a case in 
point." 

"That they were commissioners I had ample proof 
from their own avowal, and bent on mischievous and 
traitorous errands against our country, to overthrow its 
institutions, and enter into treaties and alliances with 
foreign states, expressly forbidden by the constitution." 

"I then considered them as the embodiment of dis- 
patches, and as they had openly declared themselves as 
charged with all authority from the Confederate govern- 
ment to form treaties and alliances tending to the estab- 
lishment of their independence, I became satisfied that 
their mission was adverse and criminal to the Union, and 
it therefore became my duty to arrest their progress and 
capture them if they had no passports from the Fed- 
eral government, as provided for under the law of 
nations, viz. : 'That foreign ministers of a belligerent 
8 



114 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



on board of neutral ships are required to possess papers 
from the other belligerent to permit them to pass free.' 

"They went into the steamer with the knowledge 
and by the consent of the captain, who endeavored 
afterward to conceal them by refusing to exhibit his pas- 
senger list and the papers of the vessel. There can be 
no doubt he knew they were carrying highly important 
dispatches, and were endowed with instructions inimical 
to the United States. This rendered his vessel (a neu- 
tral) a very good prize, and I determined to take pos- 
session of her, and, as I mentioned in my report, send 
her to Key West for adjudication, when, I am well sat- 
isfied, she would have been condemned for carrying 
these persons, and for resisting to be searched. The 
cargo was also liable, as all the shippers were knowing 
to the embarkation of these live dispatches, and their 
traitorous motives and actions to the Union of the United 
States." 

"I forbore to seize her, however, in consequence of 
my being so reduced in officers and crew, and the de- 
rangement it would cause innocent persons, there being 
a large number of passengers who would have been put 
to great loss and inconvenience, as well as disappoint- 
ment, from the interruption it would have caused them 
in not being able to join the steamer from St. Thomas 
to Europe. I therefore concluded to sacrifice the in- 
terests of my officers and crew in the prize, and suffered 
the steamer to proceed, after the necessary detention to 
effect the transfer of these commissioners, considering I 
had obtained the important end I had in view, and which 
affected the interests of our country and interrupted the 
action of that of the Confederates." 



CAPTAIN WILKES SINCERE. 115 

A perusal of these paragraphs from Captain Wilkes's 
report is sufficient to show that he acted in accordance 
with what he believed to be his duty, and if subsequent 
events proved him to be in the wrong, it was only an 
error of judgment. 



AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. Appleton's Cyclopedia of American Biography. 

2. Fairfax, D. M.: Account of the Seizure of Mason and 
Slidell in Volume 11 of "Battles and Leaders of the Civil War." 

3. Magazine of American Historj', March, 1886. 

4. Log Book of the San Jacinto. 

5. Moore's Rebellion Record, Vol. iii. 

6. Official reports of the officers who visited the Trent. 

7. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in 
the War of the Rebellion. Ser. i, Vol. i. 

8. Paris, Comte de: The Civil War in America. 

9. Reports of Captain Wilkes. 



CHAPTER XL 



THE EFFECT IN AMERICA. 



The fact of Messrs. Mason and vSlidell's appointment, 
the nature of their mission to Europe, and their desire 
to escape through the blockade and proceed to their re- 
spective destinations, was well understood throughout 
the northern states before the commissioners left Charles- 
ton. All of these matters had been published in the 
New York and other northern newspapers before the 
close of October, 1861. To this was added in due time 
an account of the running of the blockade at Charles- 
ton by the Theodora with the envoys on ])oard. Know- 
ing the character of these men, and the disposition of 
the governments of France, and especially of England, 
toward the United States, the loyal people of the North 
felt somewhat solicitous concerning the outcome of this 
traitorous mission. 

When Captain Wilkes came ashore at Fortress Mon- 
roe on November 15, and announced that he had cap- 
tured the envoys, and had them prisoners' on board his 
vessel, and when the telegraph flashed this news 
throughout the northern states, the people were pre- 
pared to receive it with the greatest demonstrations of 
delight. No event of the war up to that time caused so 

(117) 



Ii8 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

much genuine rejoicing in all of the states except those 
composing the Confederacy. The people of the North 
had been so completely engrossed by the peculiar spirit 
of war time that they were not prepared to consider 
correctly the real issue which was certain to be involved 
in this act of a popular sea captain. The masses did 
not stop at first to consider its policy, neither did they 
question its legality. It was to them only the capture 
of two dangerous rebels. To the masses it was a mat- 
ter which concerned only themselves and the public 
enemy in the South. In the beginning it never occurred 
to any one that the envoys had been taken from the pro- 
tection of the flag of a great maritime nation beyond the 
sea — a power that was disposed to be unfriendly to the 
United States, and that this semi-hostile nation might 
deny the right to make such a seizure and offer only the 
alternative of war, in case of a refusal to liberate the 
prisoners. 

War times are productive of heroes and hero-worship. 
The name of Captain Charles Wilkes was at once added 
to the list of heroes which the war had thus far devel- 
oped. Praises of the gallant captain and his wonderful 
exploit were sounded throughout the length and breadth 
of the loyal states. Newspapers and public officials 
could not say too much in support of his act. The 
bookwrights at once incorporated into their war histories 
not only the story of the hero and his valor in seizing 
the ambassadors, but also an account of his intimate ac- 
quaintance with international law from which he had 
deduced an unanswerable argument to justify his action. 

On November 26, two days after the arrival of Cap- 
tain Wilkes in Boston harbor, a banquet was given to 



HONORS FOR CAPTAIN WILKES. u^ 

him and his officers at the Revere House in that city. 
Hon. J. Edmunds Wiley presided. The conservative 
Bostonians became quite enthusiastic over the recent 
capture of the commissioners. The presiding officer 
highly applauded the act. He was follov^ed by Hon. 
John A. Andrew, governor of Massachusetts, who 
thought the act exhibited "not only wise judgment but 
also manly and heroic success." He declared that it 
was "one of the most illustrious services that had made 
the war memorable," and rejoiced in the idea that the 
gallant captain then present had "fired a shot across the 
bows of the ship that bore the English lion's head." 
Chief Justice Bigelow delivered a speech containing 
similar sentiments. Captain Wilkes and Lieutenant 
Fairfax also made speeches, in which the capture was 
briefly described. In the course of his speech Captain 
Wilkes said: "Before deciding on the course I 
adopted, I examined the authorities — Kent, Wheaton, 
and the rest — and satisfied myself that these 'commis- 
sioners' or 'ministers' as they styled themselves, had no 
rights which attach to such functionaries when properly 
appointed, and finding that I had a right to take written 
dispatches, I took it for granted that I had a right to 
take these 'commissioners' as the embodiments of dis- 
patches. I therefore took it upon myself to say to 
those gentlemen that they must produce their passports 
from the general government, and as they could not do 
that, I arrested them." At New York an ovation was 
given to Captain Wilkes, and the hospitality of that city 
was offered to him. At a stated meeting of the New 
York Historical Society at which he was present, on 
December 3, he was elected by acclamation an honorary 



I20 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

member of that body. Special honors were also ten- 
dered to him at Washington about the middle of the 
month. 

Everybody was electrified by the good news. Every 
member of the cabinet was elated by the capture ex- 
cept Mr. Blair. ^ When the message which announced 
the capture was brought into the office of Simon Cam- 
eron, secretary of war, Governor Andrew of Massa- 
chusetts and a number of other distinguished men were 
present. Cheer after cheer was given with a will by 
the delighted assemblage, led by the secretary and 
heartily seconded by Governor Andrew. 

In the beginning Mr. Seward, secretary of state, ap- 
proved of the proceeding of Captain Wilkes and re- 
joiced over it. At first "no man was more elated or 
jubilant over the capture of the emissaries than Mr. 
Seward, who, for a time, made no attempt to conceal 
his gratification and approval of the act of Wilkes." ^ 

Hon. Gideon Welles, secretary of the navy, was 
much pleased, and sent the following congratulatory 
letter to Captain Wilkes : 

"Navy Department, Nov. 30, 1861. 
Captain Charles Wilkes, Commanding U. S. S, San 

Jacinto, Boston : 

Dear Sir — I congratulate you on your safe arrival, 
and especially do I congratulate you on the great public 
service you have rendered in the capture of the rebel 
commissioners, Messrs. Mason and Slidell, who have 
been conspicuous in the conspiracy to dissolve the 

^ See Welles's Lincoln and Seward, p. 187. 
• Welles's Lincoln and Seward, p. 185. 



OFFICIAL THANKS. 121 

Union, and it is well known that, when seized by you, 
they were on a mission hostile to the government and 
the country. 

"Your conduct in seizing these public enemies was 
marked by intelligence, ability, decision and firmness, 
and has the emphatic approval of this department. It 
is not necessary that I should in this communication — 
which is intended to be one of congratulation to your- 
self, officers and crew — express an opinion on the course 
pursued in omitting to capture the vessel which had 
these public enemies on board, further than to say that 
the forbearance exercised in this instance must not be 
permitted to constitute a precedent hereafter for infrac- 
tions of neutral obligations. 

"I am, respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"Gideon Welles." 

In his annual naval report, issued a few days after the 
congratulatory letter was written, Secretary Welles 
said: "Captain Wilkes, in command of the San Ja- 
cinto, while searching in the West Indies for the Sum- 
ter, received information that James M. Mason and 
John Slidell, disloyal citizens and leading conspirators, 
were, with their suite, to embark from Havana in the 
English steamer Trent, on their way to Europe, to pro- 
mote the cause of the insurgents. Cruising in the 
Bahama Channel he intercepted the Trent on the 8th of 
November, and took from her these dangerous men, 
whom he brought to the United States. His vessel 
having been ordered to refit for service at Charleston, the 
prisoners were retained on board and conveyed to Fort 
Warren, where they were committed to the custody of 
Colonel Dimmick, in command of the fortress. 



122 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

' ( "The prompt and decisive action of Captain Wilkes 

on this occasion merited and received the emphatic 
approval of this department, and if a too generous for- 
bearance was exhibited by him in not capturing the ves- 
sel which had these rebel emissaries on board, it may, 
in view of the special circumstances and of its patriotic 
motives, be excused, but it must by no means be per- 
mitted to constitute a precedent hereafter for the treat- 
ment of any case of similar infraction of neutral obliga- 
tions by foreign vessels engaged in commerce or the 
carrying trade." 

On Monday, December 2, congress assembled and 
before the close of the first day's session, Mr. Lovejoy, 
of Illinois, by unanimous consent, offered a joint reso- 
lution which read as follows : 

Resolved^ That the thanks of congress are due, and 
are hereby tendered, to Captain Wilkes, of the United 
States navy, for his brave, adroit and patriotic conduct 
in the arrest and detention of the traitors, James M. 
Mason and John Slidell." 

Mr. Edgerton, of Ohio, moved the following resolu- 
tion as a substitute, viz. : 

"That the president of the United States be requested 
to present Captain Charles Wilkes a gold medal, with 
suitable emblems and devices, in testimony of the high 
sense entertained by congress of his good conduct in 
promptly arresting the rebel ambassadors, James M. 
Mason and John Slidell." 

This substitute was not agreed to, however, but the 
joint resolution offered by Mr. Lovejoy was promptly 
passed. 



RESOLUTIONS IN CONGRESS. 123 

On the same day Mr. Colfax, of Indiana, offered the 
following preamble and resolution : 

"Whereas, Colonel Michael Corcoran, who was 
taken prisoner on the battlefield of Manassas, has, after 
suffering other indignities, been confined by the rebel 
authorities in the cell of a convicted felon; therefore, 

'■'■Resolved^ That the president of the United States be 
requested to similarly confine James M. Mason, late of 
Virginia, now in custody at Fort Warren, until Colonel 
Corcoran shall be treated as all the prisoners of war, 
taken by the United States on the battlefield, have been 
treated." 

This preamble and resolution was adopted without 
dissent. 

Just before adjournment on the same day, Hon. 
Moses F. Odell, of New York, introduced the follow- 
ing preamble and resolution : 

"Whereas, Colonel Alfred M. Wood, of the four- 
teenth regiment of New York state militia, who was 
wounded and taken prisoner at the battle of Bull Run, 
has now, by rebel authorities, been ordered to confine- 
ment in a felon's prison, and, by the same order, is to 
be treated as a prisoner convicted of infamous crimes ; 
therefore, 

'■'-Resolved^ That the president of the United States be 
respectfully requested to order John Slidell to the same 
character of prison, and to the same treatment, until 
Colonel Wood shall be treated as the United States have 
treated all prisoners taken in battle." 

This was read, considered and agreed to. ' 

' Congressional Globe, Dec. 2, 1861. 



124 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



When the news of the capture was first received, the 
press throughout the North heartily indorsed the act and 
indulged in the most extravagant expressions of joy. 
One metropolitan newspaper said: "There is no draw- 
back to our jubilation. The universal Yankee nation 
is getting decidedly awake. As for Captain Wilkes and 
his command, let the handsome thing be done. Con- 
secrate another 4th of July to him, load him down with 
services of plate and swords of the cunningest and cost- 
liest art. Let us encourage the happy inspiration that 
achieved such a victory." Another prominent news- 
paper said: "Two of the magnates of the Southern 
Confederacy, two, perhaps, who have been as potent 
for mischief as any that could have been selected (out 
of South Carolina) from the long list of political in- 
grates, have 'come to grief in their persistent attempts 
to destroy the noble government to which they owe all 
the honorable distinction they have hitherto enjoyed." 

Amateur poets all over the country found Captain 
Wilkes's exploit a fitting theme to be celebrated in the 
best verse which they were able to produce. The col- 
umns of the New York Evening Post, the Brooklyn 
Times, the Indianapolis Journal and other leading 
newspapers were graced by orginal contributions of this 
kind. 

In the great storm of applause that passed over the 
country immediately after the capture had been an- 
nounced, no dissenting voices could be heard. The 
more conservative opinions must needs wait for an op- 
portunity to be heard. While most of the cabinet, the 
house of representatives, the people and the press 
were bestowing praises without stint upon Captain 



MR. LINCOLN'S VIEWS. 



125 



Wilkes and his heroic deed there was one grave, 
thoughtful man who was able to look beyond the mere 
fact of the capture of two dangerous traitors and con- 
spirators of the South, and see the real issues which he 
felt certain would be involved in the affair. In that 
man at that time was vested a greater executive power 
than has been wielded by any English-speaking person 
during the last two hundred years. In his opinion it 
was not a matter for rejoicing. 

In the evening of the day when the news of the cap- 
ture was first received in Washington, Dr. Benson J. 
Lossing, the eminent historian, and Hon. Elisha Whit- 
tlesy, comptroller of the treasury, called at the White 
House and were accorded a binef interview with Presi- 
dent Lincoln. To them he said: "I fear the traitors 
will prove to be white elephants. We must stick to 
American principles concerning the rights of neutrals. 
We fought Great Britain for insisting, by theory and 
practice, on the right to do precisely what Captain 
Wilkes has done. If Great Britain shall now protest 
against the act, and demand their release, we must give 
them up, apologize for the act as a violation of our doc- 
trines, and thus forever bind her over to keep the peace 
in relation to neutrals, and so acknowledge that she has 
been wrong for sixty years." 

We are also told by a member of Mr. Lincoln s cabi- 
net that while the rejoicing was well-nigh universal, the 
president was troubled with doubt and anxiety concern- 
ing the final result of the seizure. He could not see the 
matter in the same way as did his secretary of state. 
Having taken counsel with Senator Sumner concern- 



126 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

ing the matter, Mr. Lincoln's doubts and apprehensions 
were much increased. 

It is a fact worthy of notice that no mention whatever 
is made of the capture in Mr. Lincoln's annual message 
to congress, December 3, 1S61. He probably thought 
it inexpedient under the circumstances either to discuss 
the matter or even to allude to it. He may have been 
considering in his own mind what the final outcome of 
the matter would be when he penned the following sig- 
nificant passage which appears in his message: "Since, 
however, it is apparent that here, as in every other state, 
foreign dangers necessarily attend domestic difficulties, 
I recommend that adequate and ample measures be 
adopted for maintaining the public defenses on every 
side, while under this general recommendation pro- 
vision for defending our coast line readily occurs to the 
mind, and also in the same connection ask the attention 
of congress to our great lakes and rivers. It is believed 
that some fortifications and depots of arms and muni- 
tions, with harbor navigation improvements at well 
selected points upon these, would be of great importance 
to the nation's defense and preservation, and ask atten- 
tion to the views of the secretary of war expressed in 
his report upon the same general subject." 

ls\x. Blair, Lincoln's postmaster-general, seems from 
the first to have held more radical views concerning the 
matter than did the president or any one else. He did 
not publicly discuss the case, but to the other members 
of the cabinet he denounced Captain Wilkes's act as an 
outrage on the British flag, which, he said, the English 
ministry would seize upon to make war upon the United 
States. Not being an admirer of Captain Wilkes, Mr. 



mESS COMMENTS. 127 

Blair said that he should be ordered to take the Iroquois, 
with Messrs. Mason and Slidell on board, proceed to 
England and deliver them over to the British govern- 
ment. This, he thought, would be a manifestation of 
the greatest contempt and indifference for the Confed- 
erate ambassadors, and a severe rebuke to whatever of 
alleged intrigues that may have existed between the in- 
surgents in the United States and the English cabinet. 

After the first wave of universal rejoicing had passed 
over the country, the legality of the act was publicly dis- 
cussed at length by the press and the ablest jurists. The 
Baltimore American said that it was "a violation of the 
laws of neutrality strictly considered." Afterward the 
same journal said that it was a matter which was "be- 
yond the reach of mere diplomacy," since "in numerous 
ways the government and people have fully indorsed the 
act of Captain Wilkes, and the verdict will never be re- 
versed, although all Europe, with England at its head, 
demand it. One of the principal newspapers of Wash- 
ington ^ said: "The British government should direct 
Lord Lyons to return the thanks of her majesty to the 
United States government for its forbearance in not 
having seized the steamer Trent, brought her into port, 
and confiscated ship and cargo, for an open and flagrant 
breach of international law. The queen's proclama- 
tion of May last acknowledged the rebel states to be 
belligerents — enemies of the United States — and by their 
own principles of international law, British ships were 
thereafter to abstain from carrying dispatches, or doing 
any act that favored the Confederates, under penalty of 
seizure and confiscation. Slidell and Mason should be 

* Evening Star, Dec. 9, 1861. 



128 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

held in rigid custody until they can be tried and pun- 
ished for their crimes against the government of the 
United States. Their sham character of ambassadors 
affords no protection. It is a lawful right of belligerents 
to seize an ambassador, as soon as any other person, if 
he can be caught at sea." The National Intelligencer 
said: "The proceeding of Captain Wilkes is fully 
justified by the rules of international law as those rules 
have been expounded by the most illustrious British 
jurists and compiled by the most approved writers on 
the law of nations." This position was maintained by 
citing numerous British authorities. Such a position 
had been taken by the British government in the decla- 
ration of war against Russia in 1854, when the follow- 
ing language was used: "It is impossible for her 
majesty to forego her right of seizing articles contra- 
band of war, and of preventing neutrals from bearing 
enemies' dispatches." Hon. Lewis Cass expressed the 
opinion that the seizure was justifiable from the stand- 
point of international law. 

Hon. Edward Everett expressed a like opinion in an 
address before the Middlesex Mechanics' Association at 
Lowell. He said that the commissioners imprisoned in 
Fort Warren would no doubt be kept there until the 
restoration of peace, which we all so much desire." It 
was said by another equally good authority that "the 
act of Captain Wilkes was in strict accordance with the 
principles of international law recognized in England, 
and in strict conformity with English practice." ^ 
Numerous other opinions were volunteered, among them 
one from the English consul at New Orleans, who 

' * Geo. Sumner in Boston Transcript, Nov. 18, 1861. 



DISSENTING OPINIONS. 



129 



thought the act entirely in accord with the principles of 
international law as based upon English precedents, and 
from them furnished material for an editorial in one of 
the city newspapers. George Ticknor Curtis, the well- 
known constitutional lawyer of Boston, said the Trent 
should have been brought into port for adjudication in 
a prize court. 

On November 21, at a diplomatic dinner in Washing- 
ton, there was a full and free discussion of the act of 
Captain Wilkes. The opinion prevailed with almost 
perfect unanimity that the seizure was wholly unauthor- 
ized by the principles of international law, and some of 
the ministers took even more advanced grounds than 
these and asserted that the act, if not disavowed by the 
United States government, would be a justifiable cause 
of war. 

A special correspondent of one of the principal west- 
ern newspapers a few days later took a view of the case 
different from the most common ones at that time. 
Among other things he said: "But there is another 
view of the case, and a highly important one, which 
ought to be well considered. By justifying the act of 
Captain Wilkes, the United States justifies also that 
very conduct on the part of England toward this coun- 
try, our resistance to which caused the war of 18 12, 
namely, the right of search ; and we abandon the van- 
tage on this great question on which we have heretofore 
stood. The question then is simply and absolutely 
this : Is it expedient for the sake of a mere temporary 
advantage, and a slight one at that, for us to abandon 
the position on the question of the right of search which 
9 



130 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



we have heretofore held, and assume England's position 
on that question ? It is by no means certain that the 
arrest of these gentlemen may not be a positive advan- 
tage to the South, as the developments of the next two 
weeks may show. Besides, and over and above all 
other considerations, it is always better for nations to 
maintain such a strong and impregnable position as ours 
was on the right of search than to abandon it for such 
a slight advantage as this will be. If we give up the 
ground we occupy on that question, as we shall have to 
do if we justify the arrest of Mason and Slidell, we will 
have to submit tamely to the indignities of having all of 
our merchant vessels searched by every English cruiser 
that crosses their path, and of having our seamen im- 
pressed again into the British naval service." 1 

It was also asserted in New York about this time 
that the queen's neutrality proclamation, which had for- 
bidden her subjects to carry dispatches for either of the 
belligerents, had been violated by Captain Moir of the 
Trent, and it was proposed that an English subscrip- 
tion should be taken for the purpose of prosecuting 
him in case the queen's attorney-general or the owners 
of the vessel declined to bring a suit against him. 

Such was the effect of the capture as far as the north- 
ern states were concerned. At first there was universal 
rejoicing. This was followed by more or less of doubt, 
and by discussion in justification of the act. As the 
weeks progressed, anxiety developed concerning the 
position which England would assume in regard to the 
matter. At that time there was no ocean telegraph and 

* Chicago Times, special Washington correspondence, Nov. 
21, 1861. 



CONFEDERATE VIEWS. 131 

weeks must necessarily elapse before any news could be 
received from the opposite side of the Atlantic. Mean- 
time Lord Lyons maintained absolute silence in regard 
to the matter. If, during this time, he expressed any 
opinion, there is no record of it. It was said by the 
press that "his lordship was in a pet." He was too 
discreet to express any opinion when he did not know 
what position his government would assume in regard 
to the act. 

The sentiments of the Confederacy were freely ex- 
pressed as soon as it was known there that the envoys 
had been captured and brought to the United States. 
The New Orleans Crescent said that Captain Wilkes's 
act was a "high-handed interference with a British mail 
steamer by the Lincoln government," and that it would 
"either arouse John Bull to the highest pitch of indig- 
nation or demonstrate that there has been an under- 
standing between the two governments for a long time — 
that England has been and is assisting the abolition gov- 
ernment to the detriment of the South." 

In a few days after the seizure, Jefferson Davis sent 
a message to the Confederate congress, in the course of 
which he said: "The distinguished gentlemen, who, 
with your approval at the last session, were commis- 
sioned to represent the Confederacy at certain foreign 
courts, have recently been seized by the captain of a 
United States vessel of war while on board a British 
mail steamer, while on a voyage from the neutral Span- 
ish port of Havana to England. The United States 
have thus claimed a general jurisdiction over the high 
seas, and, entering a British ship sailing under its coun- 
try's flag, have violated the rights of embassy for the 



13* 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



most part held saqred even among barbarians, by seizing 
our ministers whilst under the protection and within the 
dominion of a neutral nation. 

"These gentlemen were as much under the jurisdic- 
tion of the British government upon that ship and be- 
neath that flag as if they had been on its soil, and a 
claim on the part of the United States to seize them in 
the streets of London would have been as well founded 
as that to apprehend them where they were taken ; had 
they been malefactors, or citizens even, of the United 
States, they could not have been arrested on board of a 
British ship or on British soil unless under the express 
provisions of treaty, and according to the forms therein 
provided for the extradition of criminals." 

This plaintive wail in behalf of Messrs. Mason and 
Slidell was intended for European ears. This portion 
of Mr. Davis's communication which has just been 
quoted is more of a message to the English government 
and people than it is to the Confederate congress. It 
was hoped that British sympathy would thus be more 
fully aroused. 

Discordant voices were heard, too, about this time 
from across the Canadian line. The Toronto Leader 
denounced the act as "the most offensive outrage which 
Brother Jonathan has dared to perpetrate upon the 
British flag," and claimed that immediate reparation 
should be demanded by requiring an apology and the 
liberation of the prisoners. 

Another well-known Canadian newspaper said as soon 
as the news of the capture had been confirmed: * "The 
seizure of Slidell and Mason was vsrrong, but it was also 

^Editorial, Toronto Globe of Nov. i8, x86z. 



CANADIAN COMMENTS. 



133 



one of the most absurd and stupid acts which history 
records. These diplomatists were going to Europe 
to stir up feeling against the North and secure the ac- 
knowledgment of the Southern Confederacy. In seiz- 
ing them the American officer did more to accomplish 
their errand than anything they could possibly have 
done themselves. We have no expectation that the 
British government will deal with the matter otherwise 
than temperately, but the collision will strengthen the 
hands of the not uninfluential parties in Britain who are 
striving to induce the government to interfere in the 
American quarrel. Better have had ten Slidells and 
Masons in Europe than permit such a cause of quarrel 
to arise. We do not know what may be the character of 
the captain of the San Jacinto for loyalty, but if he in- 
tended to help the insurgents he could not have gone 
about the work better. The American vessels have 
been vainly chasing the Sumter from port to port ; they 
have allowed the Bermuda to enter Savannah and to 
leave it ; they have permitted the Huntsvillei to reach the 
Bermudas, and receive the cargo of the Fingal; they 
have reserved all their courage and activity to stop an 
unarmed neutral vessel on the seas and take from her 
two venerable non-combatants. But for the Port Royal 
bombardment, the whole American naval service would 
sink beneath contempt. 

"The extreme anxiety of the Washington govern- 
ment to prevent the southern diplomatists reaching 
Europe is a curious proof of weakness in men who pro- 
fess to be careless as to the action of foreign powers. 
The United States have nothing to fear from Europe, 

* The Nashville is probably meant. 



134 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



if they go on with the war vigorously and succeed in the 
desired object of presei^ving the Union, and it is alto- 
gether a very small business to hunt a couple of men 
over the ocean to prevent them using their tongues to 
persuade the shrewd rulers of England and France to 
do violence to their own interests by entering upon a 
great war. It was bad enough to send four vessels 
after them when their departure by the Huntsville was 
announced, but to run the risk of a war with England 
for such an object is an act of mid-summer madness. 
It will add infinitely to the strength and dignity of the 
American government if, without waiting for remon- 
strances from Britain, they at once set free the captives 
and send them on their road to Europe. It will be 
right, which is infinitely better than being expedient, but 
it will also show that the North has confidence in the 
goodness of its cause, and does not fear the tongues of 
traitors, well-poised thoi.gh they may be." 

On November 30, six days after the commissioners 
had been received at Fort Warren, Mr. Seward for- 
warded a dispatch to Minister Adams at London, in 
which, after mentioning other matters, the following 
language was used: "Since that conversation was held 
Captain Wilkes, of the steamer San Jacinto, has boarded 
a British colonial steamer and taken from her deck two 
insurgents who were proceeding to Europe on an errand 
of treason against their own country. This is a new in- 
cident, unknown to, and unforeseen, at least in its cir- 
cumstances, by Lord Palmerston. It is to be met and 
disposed of by the two governments, if possible, in the 
spirit to which I have adverted. Lord Lyons has pru- 
dently refrained from opening the subject to me, as, I 



MR. SEWARD TO MR. ADAMS. 



135 



presume, waiting instructions from home. We have 
done nothing on the subject to anticipate the discussion, 
and we have not furnished you with any explanations. 
We adhere to that course now, because we think it more 
prudent that the ground taken by the British govern- 
ment should be first made known to us here, and that 
the discussion, if there must be one, shall be had here. 
It is proper, however, that you should know one fact in 
the case, without indicating that we attach much im- 
portance to it, namely, that, in the capture of Messrs. 
Mason and Slidell on board a British vessel. Captain 
Wilkes having acted without any instructions from the 
government, the subject is therefore free from the em- 
barrassment which might have resulted if the act had 
been specially directed by us 

"I trust that the British government will consider the 
subject in a friendly temper, and it may expect the best 
disposition on the part of this government." 

It will be seen hereafter how important this timely 
statement of Mr. Seward's became in the final settle- 
ment of the matter between the two countries. 

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. Congressional Globe: 2d Session 37th Congress, Part i. 

2. Diary of War Events, Moore's Rebellion Record, Vol. vii. 

3. Lossing, B. J.: The Civil War in America. 

4. Magazine of American Historjs May, 18S6. 

5. McPherson, Edward: Political History of the Rebellion. 

6. Official Report of the Secretary of the Navy, Dec. 2, 1861. 
/. Porter, D. D.: Naval History of the Civil War. 

8. Principal Northern and Canadian newspapers during the 
latter half of November, 1861. 

9. Paris, Comte de: The Civil War in America. 

10. Southern Law Review, Vol. viii. 

11. Welles, Gideon: Lincoln and Seward. 



CHAPTER XII. 



THE EFFECT IN ENGLAND. 



Immediately after the Trent and San Jacinto sepa- 
rated on the afternoon of November 8, the purser of the 
former vessel, thinking doubtless that it would be quite 
an honor to himself to be first in reporting the matter to 
the British public, addressed a statement to the editor of 
the London Times, giving the "particulars of the griev- 
ous outrage committed to-day against the English flag" 
by the American captain Wilkes. 

Then follows an account of the escape of the south- 
ern commissioners from Charleston in "the little steamer 
Theodora," their arrival at Havana and embarkation on 
the Trent, where they felt entirely safe under a neutral 
flag. The purser then says that on the second day of 
the voyage a large steamer was observed ahead in the 
Bahama channel ; that she was evidently waiting, and 
first gave notice of her nationality and intention by 
firing a round shot across the bows of the Trent, and at 
the same moment displaying American colors ; that upon 
a nearer approach, a large shell was fired across the 
bows of the English vessel ; that it "passed within a 
few yards of the ship, bursting about a hundred yards 
to leeward." It is then stated that the Trent stopped; 

(137) 



138 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

that a large boat containing between twenty ana thirty 
heavily-armed men pushed off from the side of the San 
Jacinto under the command of a lieutenant, who boarded 
the Trent and demanded the papers and passenger list 
of the vessel, and afterward the surrender of the com- 
missioners, all of which was indignantly refused ; that 
the lieutenant then walked to the side of the ship and 
waved his hand toward the San Jacinto, after which, 
"immediately three more heavily-aimed boats pushed 
off and surrounded the ship, and the party of marines 
who had come in the first boat came up and took pos- 
session of the quarter-deck," and that the envoys were 
then seized and forcibly put into the boat against the 
protest of all the passengers and crew, including Cap- 
tain Williams of the Royal Navy. 

The account continues as follows: "During the 
whole of this time the San Jacinto was about t%vo hun- 
dred yards distant from us on the port beam, her broad- 
side guns, which were all manned, directly bearing 
upon us. Any open resistance to such a force was of 
course -hopeless, although from the loud and repeated 
plaudits which followed Captain Williams's protestation, 
and which were joined in by every one, without excep- 
tion, of the passengers congregated on the quarter-deck, 
men of all nations, and from the manifested desire of 
some to resist to the last, I have no doubt but that every 
person would have joined heart and soul in the struggle 
had our commander but given the order. Such an order 
he could not, under such adverse circumstances, con- 
scientiously give, and it was therefore considered suffi- 
cient that a party of marines with bayonets fixed should 
forcibly lay hands on the gentlemen named. This was 



BRITISH ACCOUNT OF THE SEIZURE. 



139 



done, and the gentlemen retired to their cabins to ar- 
range some few changes of clothing." 

"A most heart-rending scene now took place between 
Mr. Slidell, his eldest daughter, a noble girl devoted to 
her father, and the lieutenant. It would require a far 
more able pen than mine to describe how, with flashing 
eyes and quivering lips, she threw herself in the door- 
way of the cabin where her father was, resolved to de- 
fend him with her life, till, on the order being given to 
the marines to advance, which they did with bayonets 
pointed at this poor defenseless girl, her father ended 
the painful scene by escaping from the cabin by a 
window, when he was immediately seized by the ma- 
rines and hurried to the boat, calling out to Captain Moir 
as he left that he held him and his government respon- 
sible for this outrage. 

"If further proof were required of the meanness and 
cowardly bullying in the line of conduct pursued by the 
captain of the San Jacinto, I may remark, first, that on 
being asked if they would have committed this outrage 
if we had been a man of war, they replied, 'certainly 
not;' and, secondly, that Captain Wilkes sent an order 
for Captain Moir to go on board his ship, and a second 
for Captain Moir to move the Trent closer to the San 
Jacinto. Of course not the slightest notice was taken 
of either order, nor did they attempt to enforce them." 

It will be noticed that the paragraphs quoted were 
specially prepared to excite the indignation of the British 
public. The entire account is very sensational and 
highly colored. Some statements in it are pure fictions, 
if the testimony of the oflJicers who boarded the Trent 
are at all worthy of credence. 



140 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

On November 9, while yet at sea, Commander Will- 
iams prepared an official report of the matter to be sub- 
mitted to the admiralty as soon as he arrived in Eng- 
land. This account was substantially the same as that 
given by the purser, except that some of the facts are 
more distorted, and the number of fictions in it some- 
what larger. 

The report of Commander Williams and the state- 
ment of the purser of the Trent reached England and 
were made public on November 27. With a ministry 
and parliament composed largely of enemies of the 
United States, with nearly all of the rich and influential 
class unfriendly, with a press which exhibited only 
hatred for the North, and continually advocated the 
cause of the South, with a large population of mer- 
chants, tradesmen and cotton workers who were com- 
plaining on account of the injuries they sustained from 
the blockade, and who were anxious for the govern- 
ment to interfere in the American difficulty, it may 
readily be imagined what effect the news of Captain 
Wilkes's act created in England. If it had been reported 
that the Americans had deliberately and wantonly cap- 
tured and burned the Trent and her cargo, the excite- 
ment throughout the country would not have been 
greater. No single announcement in modern times has 
affected the English government and people as did that 
of Commander Williams and the purser of the Trent. 
With a few notable exceptions among the prominent 
men, it was everywhere proclaimed by both press and 
people that Captain Wilkes's act was a violation of in- 
ternational law, an attack on the sacred right of asylum, 
a "wanton outrage and an insult" which should not for 



EXCITEMENT IN ENGLAND. 



141 



a moment be tolerated. The government was called 
upon to vindicate the honor of the British flag by in- 
stantly exacting a full and complete reparation, or, in 
the event of failure to obtain it, w^ar must be declared 
against the Federal States of America at once, and 
such a castigation administered to the insolent Yankees 
as would thrice over atone for the indignity they had 
dared to offer to England. There was very little dis- 
cussion of texts or precedents, or of the legality of the 
matter. The offensive and intolerant course which the 
English navy had pursued toward all neutral powers 
during and after the Napoleonic wars was apparently 
forgotten, because it was not convenient to remember it 
just then. Public meetings denounced the "outrage," 
prominent men condemned it, and the English news- 
papers with very few exceptions used their utmost en- 
deavors to stir' up the indignation and the war spirit of 
the British people. The most violent abuse and malig- 
nant hatred of everything American was exhibited, not 
only in the ordinary newspapers, but also in the conserv- 
ative reviews and quarterlies. A storm of indignation 
which has rarely been equaled swept the British nation 
from Edinburgh to Dover. 

It is not difficult for a government to find a pretext 
for making war or parading its military power in the 
sight of another nation, whenever it desires to do so. 
The British government was not slow to act in this case. 
Lord Palmerston, its leader, was an enemy of the Amer- 
ican republic, and was easily swayed by the popular 
feeling and by his own prejudice. 

Preparations for war were begun on a scale which 
was sufficient to tax the utmost strength and resources 



142 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

of the United Kingdom. There was no delay after the 
reception of the news, but operations were pushed with 
a feverish activity both day and night. On November 
30 the lords commissioners of the admiralty were in- 
structed by Lord Russell to direct Vice-Admiral Sir 
Alexander Milne to communicate fully with Lord Lyons 
at Washington. Earl Russell mentions the recent "act 
of wanton violence and outrage," and says it is neces- 
sary to "look to the safety of her majesty's possessions 
in North America," and that care should be taken not 
to place any of the ships in positions "where they may 
be surprised or commanded by batteries on land of a 
superior force." Arrangements were also made at 
once for a large increase in the British naval force in 
North American and West Indian waters. 

On the same day an official order was issued forbid- 
ding the shipment of any saltpeter until further notice 
was given. Large quantities of it had already been 
placed in lighters at the London custom-house ready to 
be loaded on board outgoing ships, but the whole was 
relanded and returned into warehouses under the super- 
vision of custom officers. On December 4, Queen 
Victoria issued a royal proclamation forbidding the ex- 
port of gunpowder, niter, nitrate of soda, brimstone, 
lead and fire-arms from all the ports of the United 
Kingdom. At the great Woolwich arsenal there was 
the bustle of extraordinary activity, and work which 
was not suspended either for night or Sunday. Enfield 
rifles, cannon, and great quantities of ammunition and 
other warlike material were being loaded on board the 
great ship Melbourne for transportation to Canada. On 
Sunday, December i, twenty-five thousand muskets 



PREPARA TIONS FOR WAR. 



H3 



were conveyed from the Tower and loaded for ship- 
ment. Large quantities of Armstrong and Whitworth 
cannon were immediately purchased by the govern- 
ment. Transports of large capacity were needed. The 
great steam packet Persia was taken from other service 
and employed to transport troops to Canada. The im- 
mense iron-clad ship, The Warrior, the best war vessel 
in the British navy, was hastily prepared for service. 
Unusual activity was noticeable at all of the dock yards. 
War vessels were being hastily put into a state of for- 
wardness for real service. 

The Earl of Derby was consulted by the government 
in regard to the "American difficulty." He approved 
its policy and suggested to ship-owners that the captains 
of outward bound ships be instructed to signal any 
English ships which they might see that war with 
America was probable. This suggestion was strongly 
approved by undei*writers, in whose imaginations pri- 
vateers were already at work. No insurance could be 
had on American vessels on any terms. 

In the stock market, too, a panic prevailed, and 
American securities dropped amazingly in view of the 
war which seemed at hand. 

Preparations were also made for placing the military 
forces upon a war footing, and it was arranged to in- 
crease the army in Canada at once by an addition of 
thirty thousand men. Recruiting began with unusual 
vigor. The very flower of the British standing army 
were mustered and passed in review, after which they 
embarked for Halifax. Among them were all of the 
most noted batteries and regiments, among which were 
the guards, to whom was accorded the distinguished 



144 



THE TRENT AFFAIR, 



honor of taking part in all important wars. These were 
the first to start to the seat of war. They believed that 
they were going to Charleston to help the Confederates. 
The guards played the well known American air, "I 
am off to Charleston," while embarking on their vessels. 

Thurlow Weed, who was then in England, says: "I 
rose early on Friday morning and went down to St. 
James's barracks to see a regiment of guards take up 
their line of march for Canada. Nearly fifty years had 
elapsed since I had seen 'British red-coats' whose mus- 
kets were turned against us. Something of the old 
feeling — a feeling which I supposed had died out, began 
to rise, and, after a few moments of painful thought, I 
turned away."^ 

One of the principal newspapers of London, in an ac- 
count of the departure of the transports Adriatic and 
Parana with troops for Canada, said: "As the Adriatic 
moved out of dock, the large shields on her paddle- 
boxes emblazoned with the stars and stripes, reminded 
everybody of the remarkable coincidence that an Amer- 
ican-built steamer, and until within a few months the 
property of American owners, should be one of the 
first employed in the transport of British troops to the 
northern part of the American continent, to operate, 
probably, against the country in which she was built. 

"On the two vessels leaving the docks, the volunteer 
band took up a position on the extreme end of the jetty, 
and as the Adriatic slowly moved past, they played the 
appropriate airs, "I Wish I Was in Dixie," and "The 
British Grenadiers," followed by, "Cheer, Boys, Cheer," 

» Life of Thurlow Weed, Vol. ii, p. 368. 



PREPARATIONS FOR WAR. 



H5 



and "Should Auld Acquaintance be Forgot," as the 
Parana passed, in each case closing with "God Save 
the Queen," after which several parting rounds of en- 
thusiastic cheers were exchanged between the multitude 
of spectators on shore and the gallant fellows on board 
the vessels."* 

A Paris correspondent of one of the principal news- 
papers of New York said: "The sudden dispatch of 
arms and men to Halifax, the outfit of numerous heavy 
ships of war, the violent language of the British press 
and concurrence of the French press, are events out of 
proportion to the nominal cause of them, and indicate 
a secret design and a foregone conclusion," after which 
the opinion is expressed that the British government 
from the beginning "was disposed to aid the rebellion 
for the purpose of dissolving the Union." 

The action of the governmental authorities as detailed 
thus far is well summarized by an English writer, who 
says: "The most energetic preparations were made by 
the English government to meet the contingency in case 
the demand they instantly made for the surrender of the 
passengers was not instantly complied with. Troops 
were dispatched to Canada with all possible expedition, 
and that brave and loyal colony called out its militia 
and volunteers so as to be ready to act at a moment's 
notice. Our dockyards here resounded with the din of 
workmen getting vessels fitted for sea, and there was 
but one feeling which animated all classes and parties 
in the country, and that was a determination to vindi- 

^ London Times, Dec. 19, 1861. 



146 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

cate our insulted honor, and uphold the inviolability of 
the national flag." ^ 

Another English writer says of the situation: "The 
outrage savored so much of contemptuous defiance that 
the national feeling was wounded to the quick. 'Bear 
this, bear all,' was the prevailing cry, and not an hour 
was lost in making preparations for the war which it 
seemed to be the object of the Americans to provoke. 
Among other measures which showed how thoroughly 
we were in earnest, troops to the number of eight thou- 
sand were dispatched to Canada." ^ 

The news of the boarding of the Trent by a Federal 
war steamer and the forcible removal of the southern 
commissioners was received at Liverpool by a private 
telegram soon after noon on the same day that the mat- 
ter first became known in England. The intelligence 
spread in a wonderfully rapid manner and caused the 
greatest excitement among all classes. The utmost in- 
dignation was expressed on 'Change and in a very brief 
space of time the following placard was conspicuously 
posted : 

"OUTRAGE ON THE BRITISH FLAG. 
The Southern Commissioners Forcibly Removed 
From a British Mail Steamer. 
•u "A public meeting will be held in the cotton sales- 

.(^l) room at 3 o'clock." 

The preceding announcement was sufficient to cause 
the assembling of a large crowd in the cotton sales- 

^ Annual Register of History, 1861, p. 254. 

• Martin's Life of the Prince Consort, Vol. v, p. 347. 



PUBLIC MEETING AT LIVERPOOL. 



147 



room promptly at 3 o'clock. Nearly all of the gentle- 
men who frequented the exchange were present. The 
most remarkable enthusiasm was manifested, and Mr. 
James Spence was called to the chair. 

The following resolution was offered: "That this 
meeting, having heard with indignation that an Amer- 
ican Federal ship of war has forcibly taken from a 
British mail steamer certain passengers, who were pro- 
ceeding peaceably under the shelter of our flag from 
one neutral port to another, do earnestly call upon the 
government to assert the dignity of the British flag by 
requiring prompt reparation for this outrage." The 
resolution having been read, the meeting demonstrated 
its concurrence with the views contained in it by long 
continued and uproarious applause. After order had 
been partially restored the chairman proceeded to dis- 
cuss the resolution. He said that "when the news of 
the outrage reached this town, the feeling created was 
one of surprise, mingled with indignation. He re- 
marked that we had all heard of the sacred dignity of 
the American flag. That dignity was a means by 
which the persons engaged in the nefarious slave trade 
could at once protect themselves by hoisting the Amer- 
ican flag, which fully enabled them to resist any at- 
tempt to search such vessel. He trusted it would not 
be allowed that men prosecuting so nefarious a trade 
should be protected, and that men peaceably proceeding 
on their own affairs, under the protection of our flag, 
might be forcibly taken out of our ships. [Cheers.] 
On the contrary, he believed that the people of this 
country would not by any means permit such an out- 
rage. [Cheers.] He said, in having agreed to take the 



148 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

chair on this occasion, he did so without reluctance or 
regret; he felt deeply that he only expressed the feeling, 
not merely of the meeting, but of the community in 
general, when he said it was the duty of the people to 
press on the government the imperative necessity of 
vindicating the honor and dignity of the British name 
and flag." [Loud and continued cheering.] 1 

Other speakers who desired to present a slightly more 
conservative view of the matter were greeted with the 
greatest manifestations of displeasure, the last one 
being compelled to desist from the attempt to address 
the meeting. The resolution after being slightly modi- 
fied was adopted. 

While all England was in a state of excitement over 
the seizure a great meeting was held at Dublin, Ireland. 
The "Young O'Donoughue," a member of one of the 
most ancient families of his native country, a brilliant 
and powerful young orator, addressed the people. Stand- 
ing before a crowd of probably five thousand people, 
he boldly declared that if England engaged in a war 
with the United States, Ireland would be found on the 
side of America — a statement which the vast assemblage 
cheered with tremendous enthusiasm. 

The tone of the British press was, with few excep- 
tions, quite vindictive. Captain Wilkes received much 
abuse. Some very absurd threats were made, and much 
bluster was indulged in. 

The London Times in discussing the matter was un- 
willing to admit that similar British precedents were 
entitled to be considered in justification of the act of 

* London Times, November 28, 1861. 



THE LONDON TIMES BECOMES ABUSIVE. 149 

Captain Wilkes. The comment was as follows: "But 
it must be remembered that these decisions were given 
under circumstances very different from those which 
now occur. Steamers in those days did not exist, and 
mail vessels carrying letters wherein all of the nations 
of the world have immediate interests were unknown. 
We were fighting for existence, and we did in those 
days what we should neither do nor allow others to do, 
nor expect ourselves to be allowed to do in these days." ^ 
This journal was the accredited exponent of British 
opinion at that time so far as the government and ruling 
classes were concerned. The following tirade of coarse 
abuse of Captain Wilkes and Americans generally 
graced the columns of the Times on one occasion while 
the matter of difference between the two nations was 
yet unsettled: "He is unfortunately but too faithful a 
type of the people in whose foul mission he is engaged. 
He is an ideal Yankee. Swagger and ferocity, built on 
a foundation of vulgarity and cowardice — these are his 
characteristics, and these are the most prominent marks 
by which his countrymen, generally speaking, are 
knowTi all over the world. To bully the weak, to triumph 
over the helpless, to trample on every law of country 
and custom, willfully to violate all the most sacred in- 
terests of human nature, to defy as long as danger does 
not appear, and, as soon as real peril shows itself, to 
sneak aside and run away — these are the virtues of the 
race which presumes to announce itself as the leader of 
civilization and the prophet of human progress in these 
latter days. By Captain Wilkes let the Yankee breed 
be judged." 

* London Times, Nov. 28, 1861. 



150 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

The Saturday Review, the special organ of the aristo- 
cratic classes, said: "The American government is in 
the position of the rude boor, conscious of infinite pow- 
ers of annoyance, destitute alike of scruples and of 
shame, recognizing only the arbitration of the strong 
arm, which repudiates the appeal to codes, and presum- 
ing, not without reason, that more scrupulous states 
will avoid or defer such an arbitration as long as they 
can." 

The London Punch published a cartoon about the 
first of December, in which America is represented by 
a little blustering slave-driver bearing the American 
flag. England appears as a large British sailor, who 
faces the little American and says: "You do what's 
right, my son, or I'll blow you out of the water." The 
big Briton also says to a very ungainly American officer 
who appears: "Now mind you sir, no shuffling, an 
ample apology, or I will put the matter into the hands 
of my lawyers, Messrs. Whitworth and Armstrong." 
These individuals were manufacturers of cannon which 
the government was buying at that time for shipment to 
Canada. 

The London Herald was especially bitter in its at- 
tacks on President Lincoln and Mr. Seward, and in its 
condemnation of Captain Wilkes's act. In one of its 
issues this newspaper said editorially: "Mr. Seward's 
want of common sense, reticence and principle, have 
long been notorious to Americans, and recent circum- 
stances have directed to him an amount of English at- 
tention which has made him equally well understood 
and despised in this country. Unhappily, until yester- 
day, we had not been able fully to appreciate the ex- 



COMMENTS OF THE LONDON HERALD. 



151 



tent and depth of his moral and mental worthlessness. 
We knew that he had proposed to 'annex' Canada, but 
the idea was to us who know our strength and the weak- 
ness of the United States so utterly ludicrous that we did 
not, and could not, appreciate the folly and desperate 
wickedness of the man who could put it forward as a 
serious proposal. Since then Mr. Seward has done 
everything in his power to insult Great Britain. He has 
encouraged the piratical seizure of our ships; he has 
ordered the illegal arrest of British subjects ; he has 
directed his envoys at foreign courts to resist and men- 
ace us. 

"Unless Mr. Seward be simply out of his senses with 
rage, fear and helplessness — unless he be intoxicated with 
his own boastfulness till he believes his own statements 
— he must be aware that England can, before the present 
month is passed, destroy or take possession of every 
seaport in the northern states, raise the blockade of the 
southern coast and sweep the seas clear of the Federal 
flag. And yet with this knowledge, he has ventured on us 
an outrage which ought to be avenged by the immediate 
appearance of a British fleet in the Chesapeake, bring- 
ing the alternative of instant reparation or war. 

"The chastisement which the offending government 
will receive will, we trust, be severe enough, without 
the stimulus of this additional atrocity to rouse the 
indignation of England into fury, and spur the timidity 
of her majesty's cabinet into action. We are glad to 
know that the agent in charge of the mails warned the 
offenders in a tone which suited the occasion and the 
rank he held." 

The hope was then expressed that Commander Will- 



'52 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



iams*s protest would "be speedily enforced by the still 
sterner protest of a British fleet, conveying even to Mr. 
Seward's dull conscience and Mr. Lincoln's bewildered 
brain a proper sense of the consequences which follow 
the perpetration on board a British vessel" of such a 
terrible outrage as the Americans had lately been guilty 
of committing. The last paragraph read as follows: 
"What we have to do is sufflciently clear. It is the 
duty of our government to demand the immediate re- 
turn of the gentlemen stolen from under our flag, in 
honorable guise, together with an ample apology for a 
lawless act of piratical aggression, and to prepare for 
the rejection of such a demand by dispatching forthwith 
to the American coast such a naval force as may insure 
the total destruction of the Federal navy, and the in- 
stant blockade of all of the chief northern ports, if due 
satisfaction be not given without delay." 

During the entire period of excitement which was 
caused in England by the seizure of the commissioners, 
the concentrated wrath of the British press and public 
was poured upon the devoted head of Mr. Seward. His 
bold stand against any recognition being extended to 
the Confederates by England, and his recommendation 
that the coasts and lake frontiers of the United States 
be put into a condition to resist foreign aggression, 
caused all Englishmen who sympathized with the South 
to hate him. It was said in England, and continually 
repeated and emphasized by the British press, that Mr. 
Seward and the Federal government at Washington 
proposed to annex Canada to the United States ; that 
a pretext was wanted for a quarrel and a war with Great 
Britain ; and that the boarding of the Trent and seizure 



FALSEHOODS BELIEVED IN ENGLAND. 



153 



of the commissioners was a deliberate insult in pur- 
suance of the secretary of state's design to provoke a 
rupture between the two countries. Universal and wide- 
spread circulation was also given to a silly story to the 
effect that while the Prince of Wales was in the United 
States, Governor Morgan had given a dinner party to 
the royal guest, at which Mr. Seward and the Duke of 
Newcastle were both present, when the former said to 
the duke: "I expect soon to hold a very high office 
here in my own country ; it will then become my duty to 
insult England, and I mean to do so." There can be 
no doubt but that the Duke of Newcastle told such a 
silly story, and it is highly probable that a belief in its 
truthfulness strongly influenced the government of Eng- 
land in the active and hasty preparations for war. 1 

Mr. Thurlow Weed, who had been previously sent 
to England to influence public opinion there in favor of 
the North, wrote to Mr. Seward about the matter. Mr. 
Seward was greatly surprised, and replied that the story 
was so extremely absurd that to give it sufficient notice 
to deny it would be almost a sacrifice of personal dignity 
on his own part. 

The London Times having expressed at one time a 
"yearning" in England after American views upon the 
existing complication between the two countries, Mr. 
Weed ventured to supply the desired information in a 
letter which he immediately contributed to that journal. 
In this letter he entered a general denial of the asser- 
tion that the Federal government desired a rupture with 
England, and did what he could to undeceive the British 

^ See Geo. Peabody's letter to Thurlow Weed. Memoir of 
Weed, p. 365. 



154 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

public concerning the Seward-Newcastle story. Mr. 
Adams was referred to for a true reflex of American 
sympathies. The opinion was expressed that England 
had no real grievance of any substantial nature against 
the United States, as the boundary disputes and other 
questions of importance had been satisfactorily settled. 
The magnificent reception of the Prince of Wales in 
the United States, and the high estimation in which 
Americans held the Queen, also the fact that both na- 
tions were of kindred origin, and spoke the same lan- 
guage, were all dwelt upon. Gen. Scott's recent letter 
on the situation contributed to the Paris press was men- 
tioned. 

Mr. Weed said that he knew nothing of the proposed 
course of the British government, but he expressed the 
opinion that a peremptory demand for the release of the 
envoys would be met by as peremptory a refusal, since 
in temper and pride Americans were as unreasoning as 
the bad example of their mother country could make 
them. He did not believe that Mason and Slidell were 
worth a war, and hoped the matter would be considered 
calmly and with due deliberation. 

The same issue of the Times which contained Mr. 
Weed's letter accompanied it with a leader replying to 
his views and asserting the English position. It was 
held that "the present prime minister of the Northern 
States of America" had long possessed "a deliberate 
and long cherished intention" to do England a wrong. 
The proofs were ample, being the Newcastle incident, 
the expressed wish of Mr. Seward to annex Canada, his 
circular to the governors of the northern states, and 
lastly the seizure of the commissioners on board an 



MR. WEED AND THE LONDON TIMES. 



155 



English ship. This was sufficient evidence "that upon 
his ability to involve the United States in a war with 
England, Mr. Seward has staked his official, and, most 
probably, also his political existence, and that whatever 
may be the advantage to America of a war with this 
country, to him it has become an article of the very first 
necessity." Mr. Seward was then abused for design- 
ing so great an evil. Exception was taken to each point 
made by Mr. Weed, and the leader closed with the fol- 
lowing paragraph: "But her forbearance (that of 
America) will never be tried. We can, we think, con- 
vey to Mr. Thurlow Weed the sentiments of every En- 
glishman on this painful subject. We do not ask from 
America courtesy or affection, respect for our Queen 
or regard for our Prince. These things are hers to give 
or withhold. We do not even ask that amount of fair 
treatment which we are in the habit of receiving from 
other nations. We have long ago made up our minds 
to dispense with that ; but we do demand that she 
abstain from actual outrage, or that, if it is committed, 
she shall make reasonable reparation. If she will do 
this, it is well ; if not, the alternative will not come in 
the desired form of protracted negotiations." 

When the news of the seizure of the southern com- 
missioners was received in Europe, General Winfield 
Scott was in Paris. It was his intention to spend the 
winter in southern Europe. The storm which the news 
created in England extended in a less degree to France. 
The newspapers of Paris condemned the act. It was 
fortunate, perhaps, that General Scott was in the 
French capital, for he, being one of the most distin- 
guished of Americans at that time, was best able to 



156 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

command a hearing in England and France. He im- 
mediately addressed a letter to the Paris press giving 
his views of the situation, which he comprehended with 
the greatest clearness. He expressed the opinion that 
the seizure could not have been authorized from Wash- 
ington, and that the matter was capable of being amica- 
bly adjusted. 

The following paragraphs taken from the general's 
letter very nearly indicate grounds which Mr. Seward 
assumed afterward in the settlement of the case. 

"If, under the circumstances, England should deem 
It her duty in the interest of civilization to insist upon 
the restoration of the men taken from under the protec- 
tion of her flag, it will be, without doubt, that the law 
of nations in regard to the rights of neutrals, which she 
has taken a leading part in establishing, requires re- 
vision." 

"If England is disposed to do her part in stripping 
war of half its horrors by accepting the policy long and 
persistenly urged upon her by our government, and 
commended by every principle of justice and humanity, 
she will find no ground, in the visit of the Trent, for 
controversy with our government." 

"I am sure that the president and people of the 
United States would be but too happy to let these men 
go free, unnatural and unpardonable as their offenses 
have been, if by it they could emancipate the commerce 
of the world." 

A few days later the general became alarmed at the 
threatening state of affairs and hastily embarked for the 
United States, saying that if there was to be a war with 
England, perhaps he could be of some service to his 



SPEECH OF COMMANDER WILLIAMS. 157 

country. In the sudden departure of General Scott, the 
London press found additional evidence of feelings in 
America hostile to England, as, they said, he had gone 
home in obedience to a hasty summons from Washing- 
ton. This was not true. He returned because he re- 
garded it as his duty to do so. 

While the excitement was so great in England, Com- 
mander Williams suddenly became an individual of 
national prominence. His "protest" against the seizure 
of the commissioners was everywhere applauded. Much 
was made of him by the press and by various organiza- 
tions. On December 12 a pvtblic dinner was given to 
him by the Royal Western Yacht Club of England. 
That he had evidently lost his head is apparent from the 
perusal of the "braggadocio" speech made upon that 
occasion. He gave such an account of the seizure of 
the envoys as would suit the occasion and make a hero 
of himself. The following verbatim extract is illustra- 
tive : 

"Now, gentlemen, I have only one more subject that 
I know of on which to speak — the circumstances attend- 
ing the gallant Federal marines rushing with the points 
of their bayonets at Miss Slidell. [Hear, hear.] It 
was at this point that she screamed, for her father 
snatched himself away from her — I do not mean 
snatched himself rudely, but he snatched himself away 
from her to break the window of his cabin, through 
which he thrust his body out. But the hole was so 
small that I hardly thought it would admit the circum- 
ference of his waist. It was then the lady screamed. I 
am charged by Mr. Fairfax 'that my manner was so 
violent that he was compelled to request Captain Moir 



158 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

to remove me.' [Nonsense.] But when the marines 
rushed on at the point of their bayonets — and I believe 
it is not necessary that I should make a solemn assevera- 
tion that it is true — [No, no] — w^hen they rushed on at 
the point of the bayonet, I had just time to put my 
body between their bayonets and Miss Slidell — [oh!] — 
and I said to them, and if Henry of Exeter were here 
I would ask him for his absolution for it — [laughter] — 
I said to them, 'Back, you d — cowardly poltroons.' " 
This ridiculous speech was believed, applauded and 
given a wide circulation. 

The chances of an English war with the United States 
caused great excitement in Canada, and there was a 
general call to arms at once. The militia were called 
out and volunteers were everywhere drilled with the 
greatest exactness and constancy. Extra time was taken 
from business for military duties, and one Canadian 
journal estimated that an army of two hundred thousand 
men could easily be put into the field. Bodies of regu- 
lar troops were in motion from one part of the provinces 
to another. Old fortifications were carefully inspected 
and new ones begun along the whole Canadian frontier. 
Toronto and other exposed cities were carefully looked 
after, and, although it was in the midst of a severe Cana- 
dian winter, preparations were made everywhere for im- 
mediate war. 1 

There was in England from the beginning a very 
feeble undercurrent of sentiment opposed to the well- 
nigh universal view of the case, just as in America the 
feeling of congratulation was not quite common to every 
one. John Bright, than whom the United States never 

* See New York Herald's account, Dec. 20, 1861. 



yOHN BRIGHTS VIEWS. 159 

had a truer or more steadfast friend, took a very con- 
servative view of the case. At a public dinner given at 
Rochdale on December 4, Mr. Bright made a speech 
in which he said that he did not indorse the seizure of 
the southern commissioners, but believed that it was an 
unauthorized act for which sufficient reparation would 
be made. He thought that the United States had 
evinced a great desire to be guided by wise and mod- 
erate counsels in the construction of cases under the 
maritime law. It had been asserted, Mr. Bright said, 
that this was one of a series of acts showing ill-will on 
the part of the North, but he believed that irritating ac- 
cidents were unavoidable in a struggle like the present 
one and advised his countrymen to be calm. "Let us 
remember," said he, "how we were dragged into the 
Russian war — we drifted into it. It cost a hundred 
million pounds. It cost the lives of forty thousand 
Englishmen; it injured trade; it doubled the armies of 
Europe, and it did not accomplish a single thing that 
was promised." 

He then reminded the meeting that large numbers of 
English people had recently emigrated to the Northern 
States, and that people bound by such close ties could 
only be involved in war by misrepresentation, and the 
most gross and wicked calumny. In conclusion Mr. 
Bright said he prayed that in future it might not be 
said by the millions of freemen in the North that in 
their darkest hour of need the English people, from 
whom they sprung, had looked on with icy coldness on 
the trials and sufferings of their terrible struggle. 

There was one London newspaper which also dis- 
sented from the prevailing view of the case. Aftet 



l6o THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

a careful review of the whole matter, on the first day 
after the news was received, the editor said he "could 
not understand the fairness of excluding the Unionists 
from such an obvious resort of belligerent power." 

"It would be asking too much that they should stand 
by and make no effort to prevent ships conveying to 
and fro persons and papers on the enemy's service. It 
is at any rate to be desired that questions of this sort 
should be discussed without heat and decided without 
haste. "1 

Two days later the same journal said: "Our readers 
know that our opinion of the affair of the Trent has not 
been in accordance with that of the law officers of the 
crown. That opinion is unchanged. We believe that, 
interpreting the code of international law in the spirit 
in which that ill-digested code is laid down. Captain 
Wilkes was justified in taking possession of Messrs. 
Mason and Slidell. We have not, however, been so 
much concerned to establish that point as to deprecate 
sudden and passionate action, which might lead to the 
most serious complications, and we feel the greatest 
confidence that our government, actuated as it is by a 
spirit of moderation, will be met in a like spirit of 
calmness, moderation, and good sense by the govern- 
ment of the United States. It would indeed be a dis- 
grace to the boasted civilization of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, if, in a disputed point of international law, there 
were no other mode of obtaining a decision than by a 
brutal resort to arms." 2 

These opinions, however, were of no avail. They 

* London Star, November 30, 1861. 

• Editorial London Star, November 28, 1861. 



SOME OPINIONS NOT CONSIDERED. i6i 

were given so little consideration either by the people 
or the government of Great Britain that they might just 
as well never have been uttered. England proposed 
to settle the matter upon her own terms and without 
discussion, delay, or consideration of any views but 
those of herself. 



AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. British Annual Register, 1861. 

2. Lossing, B. J.: The Civil War in America. 

3. Magazine of American History, May, 1886. 

4. Moore's Rebellion Record: Diary, and Vol. in, Doc. 139. 

5. Martin, Theodore: Life of the Prince Consort. 

6. Paris, Comte de: The Civil War in America. 

7. Principal London newspapers, the Times, Herald, Star, 
and Saturday Review, Nov. 28-30, 1S61, also first weeks of De- 
cember, 1861. 

8. Victor, O.J. : History of the Southern Rebellion. 

9. Weed, Thurlow; Life of, Vol. 11. 



CHAPTER XIII. 



THE BRITISH DEMAND. 



It was well understood in England that Messrs. 
Mason and Slidell had been commissioned to represent 
the Confederacy at London and Paris respectively. The 
difficulties incident to their departure from a blockaded 
port and the anxiety of the Federal government to pre- 
vent the success of their mission were also well known. 

An English writer, after giving a brief account of the 
escape of the commissioners in a blockade-runner, says : 
"It was correctly assumed that they would embark at 
Havana on the Trent, a West Indian mail steamer, and 
travel in her to Europe ; it was believed that the gov- 
ernment of the United States had issued orders for in- 
tercepting the Trent and for capturing the envoys ; and 
it was noticed that a Federal man-of-war had arrived at 
Falmouth and after coaling had proceeded to South- 
ampton. Lord Russell laid these facts before the law 
officers, and was advised that a United States man-of- 
war falling in with a British mail steamer would have 
the right to board her, open her mail bags, examine 
their contents, and, if the steamer should prove liable 
to confiscation for carrying dispatches from the enemy, 

(163) 



164 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

put a prize crew on board and carry her to a port of the 
United States for adjudication. In that case the law 
officers thought she might, and in their opinion she 
ought to, disembark the passengers on the mail steamer 
at some convenient port. But they added 'she would 
have no right to remove Messrs. Mason and Slidell and 
carry them off as prisoners, leaving the ship to pursue 
her voyage.' A few days before the law officers gave 
this opinion, the San Jacinto, an American war steamer, 
Intercepted the Trent and did the very thing which the 
law officers had advised she had no right to do." 1 

As soon as Commander Williams landed in England 
he was sent to London in hot haste on a special train in 
order to report the circumstances to the government 
without any delay. After arriving there he spent the 
remainder of that day and part of the night at the British 
foreign office making an official report to Premier 
Palmerston and the lords commissioners of the admi- 
ralty. 

The facts as reported by Commander Williams were 
immediately submitted to the crown law officers, who, 
after a brief consideration of the matter, reported that 
the seizure of the commissioners was entirely illegal and 
not sanctioned by the law of nations. 2 

The case was then considered by the cabinet, and, on 
November 29, only two days after the news of the 
boarding of the Trent and seizure of the envoys had 

^ Spencer Walpole's Life of John Russell, Vol. 11, pp. 344-5. 

*The authority for this statement is a letter from the Rt. Hon. 
Earl of Kimberly, her majesty's secretarj' for foreign aflfairs, in 
response to an inquiry addressed to him by the author. 



PREPARING A DEMAND. 165 

reached England, Lord Palmerston prepared a note to 
the queen in which he formulated a statement of a de- 
mand to be made at once upon the American govern- 
ment. He wrote to her majesty as follows: "The 
general outline and tenor which appeared to meet the 
opinions of the cabinet would be, that the Washington 
government should be told that what has been done is a 
violation of international law and of the rights of Great 
Britain, and that your majesty's government trust that 
the act will be disavowed and the prisoners set free and 
restored to British protection, and that Lord Lyons 
should be instructed that, if this demand is refused, he 
should retire from the United States." ^ 

A copy of the proposed dispatch to Lord Lyons was 
also forwarded to her majesty, who, with Prince Al- 
bert, carefully examined it. Both were profoundly im- 
pressed by the fact that the communication indicated a 
crisis in the affairs of the two countries and that a 
speedy rupture and war were not improbable. Illness 
and the serious character of this new political question 
made it impossible for the prince to sleep during the 
following night. Upon getting up, although scarcely 
able to hold a pen while writing, he prepared a memo- 
randum of thq changes which her majesty desired to 
have made in the dispatch to America. The queen 
preferred that language should be used which was less 
harsh and offensive in character than that contained in 
the first draft of the note to the American government. 
In its uncorrected form the draft of the note not only 
charged the violation of international law but added an 
accusation of "wanton insult," although the belief was 

* Martin's Life of the Prince Consort, Vol. v, p. 420. 



l66 THE TRENT AFFAIR, 

asserted that it was not intentional. Prince Albert's 
memorandum, corrected with the queen's own hand, 
was returned, and the dispatch which was subsequently 
forwarded to Lord Lyons shows that her majesty's sug- 
gestions were fully observed. This was the prince's 
last political writing. His illness grew worse and he 
died before the communication which he and the queen 
had aided in preparing was answered by the American 
government. 

The prince's memorandum, as corrected by the queen 
and returned by her to the ministry, was as follows : 
"The queen returns these important drafts which upon 
the whole she approves, but she can not help feeling 
that the main draft — that for communication to the 
American government — is somewhat meagre. She would 
have liked to have seen the expression of a hope that 
the American captain did not act under instructions, or, 
if he did that he misapprehended — that the United 
States government must be fully aware that the British 
government could not allow its flag to be insulted and 
the security of its mail communications to be placed in 
jeopardy, and her majesty's government are unwilling 
to believe that the United States government intended 
wantonly to put an insult upon this country, and to add 
to their many distressing complications by forcing a 
question of dispute upon us ; and that we are, therefore, 
glad to believe that upon a full consideration of the cir- 
cumstances of the undoubted breach of international law 
committed, they would spontaneously offer such redress 
as alone would satisfy this country, viz., the restoration 
of the unfortunate passengers and a suitable apology." ' 

* Martin's Life of the Prince Consort, Vol. v, p. 423. 



TEXT OF THE BRITISH DEMAND. 167 

Having received this memorandum from the queen, 
Earl Russell immediately prepared dispatches for Lord 
Lyons at Washington instructing his lordship to make cer- 
tain demands of the American government and ordering 
him what to do in case they were refused. The text of 
the one containing the demands to be made was as fol- 
lows: 

"Foreign Office, Nov. 30, 1861. 

"My Lord — Intelligence of a very grave nature has 
reached her majesty's government. 

"This intelligence was conveyed officially to the 
knowledge of the admiralty by Commander Williams, 
agent for mails on board the contract steamer Trent. 

"It appears from the letter of Commander Williams, 
dated 'Royal Mail Contract Packet Trent, at sea, No- 
vember 9,' that the Trent left Havana on the 7th in- 
stant, with her majesty's mails for England, having on 
board numerous passengers. Commander Williams 
states that shortly after noon, on the 8th, a steamer having 
the appearance of a man-of-war, but not showing colors, 
was observed ahead. On nearing her, at 1:15 p. m., 
she fired a round shot from her pivot-gun across the 
bows of the Trent and showed American colors. While 
the Trent was approaching her slowly, the American 
vessel discharged a shell across the bows of the Trent 
exploding half a cable's length ahead of her. The 
Trent then stopped, and an officer with a large armed 
guard of marines boarded her. The officer demanded 
a list of the passengers, and, compliance with this de- 
mand being refused, the officer said he had orders to 
arrest Messrs. Mason, Slidell, McFarland and Eustis, 
and that he had sure information of their being passen- 



l68 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

gers in the Trent. While some parley was going on 
upon this matter, Mr. Slidell stepped forward and told 
the American officer that the four persons he had named 
were then standing before him. The commander of 
the Trent and Commander Williams protested against 
the act of taking by force out of the Trent these four 
passengers, then under the protection of the British 
flag. But the San Jacinto was at that time only two 
hundred yards from the Trent, her ship's company at 
quarters, her ports open and tompions out. Resistance 
was therefore out of the question and the four gentle- 
men before named were forcibly taken out of the ship. 
A further demand was made that the commander of the 
Trent should proceed on board the San Jacinto, but he 
said he would not go unless forcibly compelled likewise, 
and this demand was not insisted upon. 

"It thus appears that certain individuals have been 
forcibly taken from on board a British vessel, the ship 
of a neutral power, while such vessel was pursuing a 
lawful and innocent voyage — an act of violence which 
was an affront to the British flag and a violation of in- 
ternational law. 

"Her majesty's government, bearing in mind the 
friendly relations which have long subsisted between 
Great Britain and the United States, are willing to be- 
lieve that the United States naval officer who committed 
the aggression was not acting in compliance with any 
authority from his government, or that if he conceived 
himself to be so authorized he greatly misunderstood 
the instructions he had received. For the government 
of the United States must be fully aware that the British 
government could not allow such ?in affront to the na- 



TEXT OF THE BRITISH DEMAND. 



169 



tional honor to pass without full reparation, and her 
majesty's government are unwilling to believe that it 
could be the deliberate intention of the government of 
the United States unnecessarily to force into discussion 
between the two governments a question of so grave a 
character, and with regard to which the whole British 
nation would be sure to entertain such unanimity of feel- 
ing. 

"Her majesty's government, therefore, trust that 
when this matter shall have been brought under the con- 
sideration of the government of the United States that 
government will, of its own accord, offer to the British 
government such redress as alone could satisfy the British 
nation, namely, the liberation of the four gentlemen and 
their delivery to your lordship, in order that they may 
again be placed under British protection, and a suitable 
apology for the aggression which has been committed. 

"Should these terms not be offered by Mr. Seward, 
you will propose them to him. 

"You are at liberty to read this dispatch to the secre- 
tary of state, and, if he shall desire it, you will give him 
a copy of it. I am, etc., Russell." 

It will be noticed that this communication is in all re- 
spects a model of brevity, precision and clearness. The 
matter to be considered is directly approached and all 
facts of whatever kind that are not absolutely necessary 
to his lordship's view of the case are omitted. The 
citizenship of the captured persons is not even hinted at, 
nor is anything said about the nature of their mission. 
No use is made of the term "confederate" or "rebel." 
There is no discussion of the principles of international 



;; 



lyo 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



law bearing upon the case, no reference to texts or prec- 
edents, no statement of the rights of belligerents among 
themselves or their relations to neutral nations. The 
fact that a great civil w^ar was then raging in the United 
States, and that the hostile sections of the country were 
then in belligerent attitudes toward each other is no- 
where mentioned in the paper. It is denuded of almost 
every statement that one would expect to find in such a 
diplomatic communication. His lordship contents 
himself with a statement of the main facts in Com- 
mander Williams's official report, after which he pre- 
sents simply the naked idea of four individuals having 
been forcibly taken from a British ship which was pur- 
suing a lawful and innocent voyage from one neutral 
port to another, on the high seas and not within the 
municipal jurisdiction of the United States. The simple 
act of doing this constitutes a violation of the law of 
nations, and is "an affront to the British flag." The 
only measure of redress which will atone for the act is 
then dictated by Lord Russell, and that is the complete 
undoing of Captain Wilkes's act by liberating "the four 
gentlemen," delivering them to Lord Lyons so that they 
might be placed again under British protection, and 
apologizing for what had been done. 

On the same day that the foregoing dispatch was pre- 
pared. Earl Russell also addressed a second communi- 
cation to Lord Lyons. It was a private letter in which 
the intentions of the British government could be easily 
read between the lines. It meant either reparation or 
an alternative of a very serious character. The follow- 
ing is the body of the letter: "In my previous dispatch 
of this date I have instructed you by command of her 



PRIVATE ORDERS TO LORD LYONS. 171 

majesty, to make certain demands of the government of 
the United States. 

"Should Mr. Seward ask for delay in order that this 
grave and painful matter should be deliberately consid- 
ered, you will consent to a delay not exceeding seven 
days. If, at the end of that time, no answer is given, 
or if any other answer is given except that of a com- 
pliance with the demands of her majesty's government, 
your lordship is instructed to leave Washington with all 
the members of your legation and repair immediately to 
London. If, however, you should be of the opinion 
that the requirements of her majesty's government are 
substantially complied with, you may report the facts to 
her majesty's government for their consideration and re- 
main at your post until you receive further orders. 

"You will communicate with Vice-Admiral Sir A. 
Milne immediately upon receiving the answer of the 
American government, and you will send him a copy of 
that answer, together with such observations as you may 
think fit to make. 

"You will also give all the information in your power 
to the governors of Canada, Nova Scotia, New Bruns- 
wick, Jamaica, Bermuda and such other of her majesty's 
possessions as may be within your reach." 

The indecent haste and manifest unfairness of the 
whole proceeding, as well as the bombast and implied 
threats toward the United States contained in the pri- 
vate note, seem to have slightly impressed even the 
Earl Russell, for on the same day he addressed a sec- 
ond private note to Lord Lyons as follows: "My wish 
would be that at your first interview with Mr. Seward 
you should not take my dispatch with you, but should 



/4 



172 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



prepare him for it and ask him to settle it with the presi- 
dent and cabinet what course they will pursue. The 
next time you should bring my dispatch and read it to 
him fully. If he asks what will be the consequence of 
his refusing compliance I think vou should say that you 
wish to leave him and the president quite free to take 
their own course, and that you desire to abstain from 
anything like menace." 

This last diplomatic note clearly reveals the motives 
and policy of the British government in the whole pro- 
ceeding. It was publicly to browbeat and menace the 
United States by a parade of their military power and a 
threat of war, and, at the same time, privately to pave 
the way for getting out of the ditTiculty without a resort 
to arms. 

The messenger of the British government an-ived in 
Washington and delivered Earl Russell's dispatches to 
Lord Lyons on December iS. On the afternoon of the 
19th, in accordance with his instructions, his lordship 
waited on !Mr. Seward at the department of state and 
acquainted him in general terms with the nature of Earl 
Russell's dispatch demanding reparation, adding at the 
same time that he hoped the government of the L^nited 
States would of its own accord offer the desired repara- 
tion, and that it was to facilitate such an arrangement 
that he had come without any sort of written demand. 

Mr. Seward received this communication seriously but 
without manifesting dissatisfaction. He then made 
some inquiries concerning the exact character of the dis- 
patch and requested that he be given until the next day 
to consider the matter and to communicate with the 
president. On the day after, he said that he would be 



THE BRITISH DEMAND PRESENTED. 1^3 

prepared to give an opinion concerning the matters pre- 
sented to him at that interview. When Lord Lyons 
made his next call upon Mr. Seward he brought with 
him, and formally read to the secretary, the dispatch 
containing Earl Russell's demand. 

Only seven days' grace were allowed from the time 
when the matter was first presented. Two of these had 
now gone, and if the demand were complied with, it must 
be done with promptness, otherwise the doors of the 
British legation would be closed and diplomatic rela- 
tions between the two countries suspended. 

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. British Annual Register, 1S61. 

2. Martin, Theodore: Life of the Prince Consort, Vol. v. 

3. McPherson, Edward: Political History of the Rebellion. 

4. Nicolay and Hay: Life of Lincoln. 

5. Southern Law Review, Vol. viii. 

6. Walpole, Spencer: Life of Lord John Russell. 

7. The Union and Confederate Navies,official records of, Series 
I, Vol. I. 



CHAPTER XIV. 

CONSIDERATION OF THE BRITISH DEMAND IN AMERICA. 

Before the middle of December, news of the intense 
excitement which prevailed in England reached the 
United States. About this time the New York Tribune 
said: "England is almost beside herself, is the tenor of 
the latest and most trustworthy private letters. They 
say that passion has swept away reason in a manner to 
an extent unknown since 1831, and that the national 
sympathy with the South developed by recent events is 
startling." It having been suggested that the president 
submit a proposal to settle the matter by arbitration, the 
New York Journal of Commerce said that if only an 
adjudication by a court of admiralty were desired by 
the English government, it "could be easily accom- 
modated by a return of the prisoners on board of the 
Trent at the point of capture, and then Captain Wilkes 
could fire a gun across her bow and bring her into port 
according to law." 

On December the i8th, the messenger of the British 
government, who had been sent from London with dis- 
patches from his government relative to the affair, 
reached Washington and reported to Lord Lyons. The 
nature of the messages immediately became known by 

(175) 



176 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

some means, and the entire North was excited anew by 
the prospect of a double war, but still there was a pop- 
ular belief that the prisoners would not be surrendered, 
since there appeared to be no reason for a reversal of 
the almost universal verdict given at the time of the 
capture. 

The momentous question everywhere was, "Will the 
government at Washington concede the British demand 
and give up the men ?' ' Everybody wondered whether 
the angry growl of the British lion would have a sensible 
effect upon Mr. Lincoln and the administration. "The 
press took up the exciting theme, and, as usual, differed 
widely as to the course the government should adopt. 
Meanwhile the keen-sighted and r.dventurous began to 
to talk of and to take steps toward the preparation 
of cruisers to prey upon the shipping of England, and 
an army of volunteers to meet the attack of the British 
army expected at Canada was on the tapis. Stocks 
went down at home and abroad as the warlike feeling in 
both countries went up, and to the public, war, for a 
while, seemed imminent." 1 

It was rumored that the prisoners would be given up 
by the administration. Among those that denied it was 
the New York Herald, which said it was only a "silly 
rumor" and that there "was not the slightest truth in 
the report." 

The "silly rumor," however, speedily became a mat- 
ter of seriousness, and, although not confirmed, it was 
universally believed, and was discussed by the press and 
the people of the North. Public opinion was every- 

* C. K. Tuckerman in Magazine of American History, June, 
1886. 



PUBLIC OPINION IN AMERICA. 177 

where strongly opposed to the course of action which 
rumor said would be pursued by the government. Such 
a proceeding, it was said, would be degrading to the 
nation, and was too humiliating to be endured. The 
right of a nation to deal as it wishes with its own citi- 
zens who are seeking to compass its destruction was 
confidently affirmed, and, although the case seemed a 
desperate one in view of the consequences which were 
almost certain to result from a refusal to accede to the 
British demand, there was a strong sentiment in favor of 
accepting what appeared to be the only alternative that 
remained to the American people, namely, to engage in 
another war with England. This opinion found favor 
with many public men, including prominent congress- 
men. 

While this rumor was being discussed by the press 
and the public. Senator John P. Hale, of New Hamp- 
shire, made a speech in the United States senate concern- 
ing the matter. After saying that the measure involved 
more of good or evil to the country than anything that 
had ever occurred before, he continued as follows : "To 
my mind a more fatal act could not mark the history of 
this country — an act that would surrender at once to the 
arbitrary demand of Great Britain all that was won in 
the revolution, reduce us to the position of a second 
rate power, and make us the vassal of Great Britain. I 
would go as far as any reasonable man would go for 
peace, but not further. I would not be unwilling to 
submit this subject to the arbitration of any of the great 
powers of Europe, but I would not submit to the arbi- 
trary, the absolute demand of Great Britain, to surren- 
12 



1^8 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

der these men, and humble our flag even to escape from 
a war with Great Britain. No man would make more 
honorable concessions than I would to preserve the peace, 
but sometimes peace is less honorable and more calami- 
tous than war. The administration which is now in 
power ought to know what the feeling of the country is." 
Mr. Hale then referred to a conversation which he 
had just had with Senator Lane, of Indiana, who had 
said that the state of Indiana had then sixty thousand 
men in the field, and that she would double that num- 
ber in sixty days if a war with Great Britain were 
brought about. "I have seen many gentlemen," con- 
tinued Mr. Hale, "and I have seen none, not a man 
can be found, who is in favor of this surrender, for it 
would humiliate us in the eyes of the world, irritate our 
own people and subject us to their indignant scorn. If 
we are to have war with Great Britain, it will not be 
because we refuse to surrender Messrs. Mason and Sli- 
dell ; that is a mere pretense. If war shall come it will 
be because Great Britain has determined to force war 
upon us. They would humiliate us first and fight us 
afterwards. If we are to be humiliated I prefer to take 
it after a war, and not before. It is true, war would be 
a sacrifice to the people. I think I see its horrors, its 
disasters, its carnage, its blood, and its desolation, but, 
sir, let war come ; let your cities be battered down, 
your armies be scattered, your fields barren, to preserve 
untarnished the national honor ; a regenerating spirit 
among your people will restore your armies, and rebuild 
your cities and make fruitful your fields. * * * I 
pray that this administration will not surrender our na- 
tional honor. I tell them that hundreds and thousands 



SENATOR HALE'S SPEECH. 



179 



will rush to the battle-field, and bare their breasts to its 
perils rather than submit to degradation. 

% 'i^ % 'H: ^ 'ik ^ ^ ^ ^ 

"But if we are to have war — I do not say that we shall 
— it will not be without its advantages. It will be a 
war that can not be carried on without fighting, and if 
we only understand our true position, we can proclaim 
to every man who speaks the English language on 
God's footstool, the cause for which we are fighting; 
and this appeal will reach the hearts of millions of En- 
lishmen, Irishmen and Frenchmen. 

"We have heard, Mr. President, some fears expressed 
that Louis Napoleon is taking sides with England, and 
that we are to contend with the combined energies of 
both France and England. I do not believe it. I be- 
lieve if Louis Napoleon harbors one single sentiment, 
if his action is guided by one single principle, if he has 
one single feeling that is predominant over all others, it 
is to have a fair field to retrieve the disastrous issue of 
Waterloo. And besides, sir, all over this country, 
throughout Canada, and in Ireland, there are hundreds 
and thousands and hundreds of thousands of true- 
hearted Irishmen who have long prayed for an oppor- 
tunity to retaliate upon England for the wrongs which 
for centuries that government has inflicted upon their 
fatherland. If we know our own position and our own 
strength — I refer to the strength of principle — there will 
be nothing to be afraid of in this contest. If war must 
come, let it come ; but I tell you, and I do not pretend 
to be a prophet, I think the slightest sagacity in public 
councils will sustain me in the position that if England 



l8o THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

enters upon this war, she will enter upon one of more 
than doubtful contingency." i 

On December i6, in anticipation of the action of the 
government, Mr. Vallandigham, of Ohio, introduced 
into the House of Representatives a long preamble re- 
citing the facts concerning the capture of the commis- 
sioners by Captain Wilkes, and the subsequent approval 
of his act by the secretary of the navy and by the pop- 
ular branch of congress. To this was appended a reso- 
lution affirming it to be the sense of the house, "That 
it is the duty of the president to now firmly maintain 
the stand thus taken, approving and adopting the act 
of Captain Wilkes, in spite of any menace or demand 
of the British government, and that this house pledges 
its full support to him in upholding now the honor and 
vindicating the courage of the government and people 
of the United States against a foreign power." By a 
vote of one hundred and nine to sixteen the resolution 
w^as referred to the committee on foreign affairs, Mr. 
Vallandigham and his friends voting with the minority. 2 

A prominent public man who at that time was hold- 
ing the position of minister to one of the European 
courts thought that "men and money should be sent 
into Ireland, India and all of the British dominions all 
over the world, to stir up revolt. Our cause is just, 
and vengeance will sooner or later overtake that per- 
fidious aristocracy." 

The press throughout the North commented very 
freely upon the situation while the British demand was 

* Congressional Globe, Dec. 26, 1861. 

*Mr. Vallandigham's sincerity may well be doubted. His 
purpose was probably to embarrass the government. 



VIEWS OF THE NORTHERN PRESS. i8i 

being considered. In general the newspapers did not 
sanction the proposed course of the government and 
their belligerent tone plainly indicated that they, too, 
favored a settlement of the controversy by a resort to 
arms. The Cincinnati Commercial said: "If war w^ith 
England can with honor be avoided, we must avoid it; 
but if a peremptory demand for the release of Mason 
and Slidell has been made we do not see how it can be 
honorably complied with." 

"If we must fight we should pattern after England 
and hasten preparations on every side, on a scale com- 
mensurate with the danger, and with the celerity becom- 
ing action in so dreadful an emergency. One of the 
first things to be done would be the withdrawing from 
the southern coast of our fleets and armies, for, if ex- 
posed as at present, they would be annihilated in a 
month after the British commenced hostilities. We 
should also withdraw the outposts at Fortress Monroe, 
and provide that place with ample stores of provisions 
and ammunition that it might laugh a siege to scorn. 
The defense of our coast would also demand the utmost 
resources of the endangered communities and the super- 
vision and assistance of the government." 

About the same time the Detroit Free Press said that 
"The threatened attitude of our affairs with England 
has once more called the attention of the public to our 
national defenses In the northern states. So far as the 
lakes are concerned, it would be impossible for England 
and Canada to offer any resistance, for our mercantile 
marine — much of which can be used temporarily until 
ships of war can be constructed — is more than a hundred 
fold more than theirs. We have more than a hundred 



1 82 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

ships where England and Canada have one, and our 
sailors upon these inland seas are in the same proportion. 
Under these circumstances it would be idle to expend 
any large sums of money, if war was probable, in forti- 
fying our harbors or roadsteads. It is hardly pgssible to 
conceive of such a state of things to occur when we 
should not command the lakes absolutely. But to keep 
this ascendency the states bordering on the lakes should 
have large arsenals or depots of ammunition ready for 
instant use. If we had rifled cannon we could fit out a 
hundred gun-boats, which would command every har- 
bor in the lakes in thirty days. We have the small 
steamers, but we have not the guns, the shot, the shell and 
other ammunition necessary to use the vessels to the best 
advantage." 

Another very well known newspaper said: "We 
can only hope that those at the head of the government 
may be equal to the emergency and that they will main- 
tain the honor of the nation at whatever sacrifice." ^ 

On December i2, the Cincinnati Gazette discussed 
the probabilities of a war with England and the true 
motive of that country for engaging in a contest with 
the United States: "National consciences are easily 
bent to suit their own interests. The possessions and 
the wars of England in every part of the world show 
this virtue in her to an eminent degree. She is now suf- 
fering great distress from our war, and has apprehen- 
sions of greater, as the winter advances. Therefore she 
supposes she has nothing additional to suffer by a war, 
and that by opening a market for her goods, and releas- 
ing the cotton supply, she will have immediate relief 

* Indianapolis Sentinel, Dec. 7, 1861. 



SURRENDER OF PRISONERS POSSIBLE. 183 

and a return to prosperity; while with her immense 
fleet she believes the job will be an easy one, and will 
not cause her any great additional expense. England 
believes it her interest to interfere, and her interest is 
her most reliable motive, as it is of all nations." 

On December 19, John W. Forney, who was, at that 
time, one of the best informed newspaper correspondents 
in the United States, discussed the situation in a contri- 
bution to the Philadelphia Press. He said: "England 
knows she is strong. This is our hour of weakness and 
she may make it her opportunity to strike. She can 
now be arrogant and insulting, for now her arrogance 
and insult can not be resented. The northern coast is 
exposed to her large and powerful navy ; our towns are 
not fortified, and she may bring desolation upon our 
people and our manufacturing interests. All this she 
knows. Her armaments are large and well appointed ; 
her army has been increased almost to a war footing ; 
she is prepared to throw large bodies of troops into the 
eastern and northern portion of our republic ; Canada is 
filled with armed men, and the frontiers of Canada are 
simply so many garrisons. Our commerce is at her 
mercy. In the Mexican gulf there is a large British 
fleet, which could render our newly gained strongholds 
on the southern coast untenable, and accomplish tke 
destruction of the brave men at Port Royal, Hatteras 
and Santa Rosa Island. She may break our blockade 
and entirely nullify our expeditionary operations. With 
the Potomac virtually blockaded, and an immense army 
under Beauregard in our rear, Washington would prob- 
ably fall. With the Chesapeake Bay open to any navy 
that may choose to enter ; with a disloyal population in 



// 



184 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

Maryland, with enemies along the Virginia and At- 
lantic coasts, England could precipitate a fearful series 
of disasters, and, perhaps, with the aid of the southern 
armies, turn the bloody tide of war upon the northern 
states. 

"It maybe in view of all these grave considerations, 
and the sad necessities of the case, that in order to avoid 
a war which could only end in our discomfiture, the 
administration may be compelled to concede the de- 
mands of England, and, perhaps, release Messrs. Mason 
and Slidell. God forbid, but in a crisis like this we 
must adapt ourselves to stern circumstances and yield 
every feeling of pride to maintain our existence. If this 
contingency should ever arrive — and I am only speculat- 
ing upon a disagreeable possibility — then let us swear — 
not only to ourselves, but to our children who come 
after us — to repay this greedy and insolent power with 
the retribution of a just and fearful vengeance. If 
England, in our time of distress, makes herself our foe, 
and offers to become our assassin, we will treat her as a 
foe when we can do so'untrammeled and unmenaced by 
another enemy." 

Mr. Seward evidently did not take so gloomy a view 
of the situation. About a month later, in a private let- 
ter in which was discussed the probability of English 
interference, he gave it as his opinion that "whatever 
nation makes war against us, or forces itself into a war, 
will find out that we can and shall suppress rebellion 
and defeat invaders besides. The courage and deter- 
mination of the American people are aroused for any 
needful effort — any national sacrifices." 1 

, * Life of Thurlow Weed, Vol. 11, p. 410. 



A PERIOD OF UNCERTAINTr. 185 

News of the English demand and its consideration at 
Washington was quickly received throughout the South 
where it caused great rejoicing. The southern newspa- 
pers of December 21 are filled with expressions of de- 
light at the prospect of a war between England and the 
United States. In the South it was believed that such 
a war would overcome the power of the Federal navy, 
bring upon thaNorth and easily secure the independence 
of the Southern Confederacy. Virginia orators pro- 
claimed at Richmond "that the key of the blockade had 
been lost in the trough of the Atlantic." ^ It was said 
by southern leaders that the only condition of war was 
that the North should maintain the position already as- 
sumed. Governor Letcher, of Virginia, seems to have 
exhibited much enthusiasm, for he said in a public ad- 
dress that his own nightly prayers were offered to God 
that upon this occasion "Lincoln's backbone might not 
give way." 

Still an ominous silence prevailed at Washington. 
"The leading statesmen, senators and members of con- 
gress, clergymen and delegates from peace societies, 
newspaper reporters, speculators in the funds and many 
other lesser men, openly or surreptitiously, worked 
heaven and earth to ascertain the intentions of the presi- 
dent, but in vain. Lincoln and Seward smiled calmly 
at the questioners and evaded a reply." 2 

To one inquirer who seemed unusually anxious Mr. 
Lincoln replied by telling a story. "Your question re- 
minds me," said he, "of an incident which occurred 
out west. Two roughs were playing cards for high 

* Pollard, p. 196. 

* Tuckerman, Magazine American History, June, 1886, 



l86 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

stakes, when one of them, suspecting his adversary of 
foul play, straightway drew his bowie-knife from his 
belt and pinned the hand of the other player upon the 
table, exclaiming: 'If you haven't got the ace of 
spades under your palm, I'll apologize.' " ^ 

To persons who expressed a fear that public senti- 
ment might become so strongly in favor of war that 
that course would have to be determined upon, and that 
such a proceeding would be fatal to the country, Mr. 
Lincoln replied by telling a characteristic story. He 
said: "My father had a neighbor from whom he was 
only separated by a fence. On each side of that fence 
there were two savage dogs, who kept running backward 
and forward along the barrier all day, barking and 
snapping at each other. One day they came to a large 
opening recently made in the fence. Perhaps you think 
they took advantage of this to devour each other.? Not 
at all ; scarcely had they seen the gap, when they both 
ran back, each with their tails between their legs. 
These two dogs are fair representatives of America and 
England." 2 

The language of Earl Russell's demand and Lord 
Lyons' s manner of presenting it were in themselves suf- 
ficiently courteous. This feature of it would be worthy 
of commendation, if there were nothing else to be con- 
sidered in connection with it. The United States gov- 
ernment was to be allowed no opportunity for a full 
statement of the facts or to present its own views of the 
right to make the capture. Behind the demand was the 
instruction to Lord Lyons to leave Washington within a 

^Magazine of American History, June, 1886. 
*Comte de Paris, Civil War in America, pp. 470-1. 



SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DEMAND. 187 

week in the event of the failure of the Federal govern- 
ment to comply with the British terms ; there were the 
extensive preparations in England for war ; there was 
the hurrying of several thousand troops into Canada 
and the hasty fortification of the frontier of that prov- 
ince, and lastly the evasive answer Lord Lyons should 
return, if he were asked what would be the conse- 
quences of a refusal to surrender the prisoners. These 
things all foretold with unmistakable clearness what the 
consequence would be, if any attempt were made by 
the United States to maintain the seizure on the princi- 
ples of international law as determined even by British 
precedents and practice. It meant simply instant war — 
a struggle in which England would be actuated by 
motives of selfish policy in a much greater degree than 
by the principle that she was pretending to uphold and 
defend. The weavers of Lancashire at that time were 
beginning to suffer from a cotton famine, and there was 
much impatience from that quarter on account of the 
continuance of the civil war in America. It was a 
struggle in which England had everything to gain so far 
as her industrial and material interests were concerned, 
for it meant an abundant supply of cotton for Lancashire 
and the addition of millions of customers to British mar- 
kets with all the advantages which that would confer. 
To the United States, on the other hand, such a war 
meant the loss of everything — the transfer of the Fed- 
eral armies to the northern frontier, the raising of the 
blockade, the ravaging of unprotected coasts, the bom- 
bardment and blockade of sea coast cities, a probable 
invasion of the northern states by British troops from 
Canada, and last but not least an alliance between Eng- 



l88 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

land and the Confederacy — a move which would proba- 
bly result in establishing the independence of the latter 
and the permanent disseverance of the Union. It was 
necessary to bear all of these things in mind while con- 
sidering the British demand. 

Mr. Seward evidently did not expect England to take 
such a serious stand in regard to the matter. It had 
been his belief that the British government would not 
want the prisoners. * He said on a later occasion that 
Lord Lyons's communication was "our first knowledge 
that the British government proposed to make it a ques- 
tion of insult and so of war." ^ 

Nothing is known of the first private conferences be- 
tween Secretary Seward and the president concerning 
this matter. It is more than probable, however, in the 
light of subsequent events, that Mr. Lincoln foresaw the 
inevitable at once and hoped only for some method of 
escape from the difficulty, without dishonor to the coun- 
try or loss of any indirect advantage to the United States 
which might result from a compliance with the British 
demand. He saw, too, the necessity of making the 
compliance in such a way that it would be as agreeable 
as possible to public opinion throughout the country, 
which was decidedly opposed to the suiTender of the 
commissioners. A cabinet meeting was appointed for 
December 24, at which it was expected to consider the 
demand for the suiTender of Messrs. Mason and Slidell. 
The date of this meeting was afterward postponed, on 
account of urgent domestic affairs, until December 
25. It is to be presumed that Mr. Lincoln gave the 

* Welles's Lincoln and Seward, p. 186. 

* Seward to Weed, March 7, 1862. 



MR. LINCOLN'S PROPOSED DISPA TCH. 189 

matter much earnest consideration during the intei-val. 
He prepared an experimental draft of a dispatch in an- 
swer to the one which had been submitted by Lord 
Lyons. In his proposed answer Mr. Lincoln acknowl- 
edged the receipt of his lordship's dispatch, and said 
that redress would be due and cheerfully made to Eng- 
land, if the facts as stated in the British demand were 
all that bore upon the case. But such, he said, was 
not the case ; the British side of the matter only had 
been presented and the record was incomplete. An un- 
willingness to express an opinion was then asserted, in- 
asmuch as the Federal government had no assurance 
that its views would be heard or considered by her 
majesty's government. It was then stated that no in- 
sult to the British flag had been intended, neither was it 
desired to force any embarrassing question into discus- 
sion. Both of these facts were evident, it was stated, 
because the seizure had been made without any instruc- 
tions whatever from the United States government. The 
difficulty incident to a complete undoing of Captain 
Wilkes's act, unless it were wrong or very questionable, 
was then mentioned and an inquiry made as to whether 
the British government would consider the American 
side of the question, including the fact of existing in- 
suirection in the United States ; the neutral attitude of 
England toward the belligerents ; the American citizen- 
ship and the traitorous mission of the captured persons ; 
the British captain's knowledge of these things when the 
commissioners embarked at Havana ; the place where 
the capture was made, and the bearing of international 
law and precedent upon the case. It was then stated 
that, if the foregoing facts together with any others per- 



190 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



tinent to either side of the case could be submitted, the 
Federal government would, if England were willing, 
cheerfully submit the whole affair to a peaceable arbi- 
tration and would abide the result. The last paragraph 
of the proposed dispatch provided that no redress should 
exceed in kind and amount that which was already de- 
manded and that the award should constitute the basis 
of a rule for the determination of similar cases between 
the two nations in future. 

When the cabinet meeting to consider the matter was 
finally held Mr. Lincoln's proposed dispatch was not 
discussed, neither was any similar proceeding urged. 
More than half of the days of grace had elapsed and 
something must be done quickly else a foreign war 
would be added to the domestic one. However desira- 
ble arbitration may have been it was precluded by the 
nature of the demand of England. 

The principal discussion seems to have been devoted 
to a proposed dispatch of Secretary Seward by the terms 
of which the commissioners were to be surrendered. 
There may have been some miscellaneous talk and a 
discussion of current rumors. Senator Sumner, chair- 
man of the senate committee on foreign relations, was 
invited in. One day was not found sufficient for the 
consideration of this important matter, and the session 
was therefore continued on the following day. Mr. 
Seward's proposed dispatch upon which the suirender 
was based could not be fully discussed at one session, as 
the paper appears to have been prepared solely by the 
secretary of state without the assistance of either Mr. 
Lincoln or any of his cabinet officers. Of the debate 
and the various opinions, we have some record in the 



CABIN E T DIS C US SI ON. 1 9 1 

subsequent writings of the different persons who were 
present. 

From the published extracts taken from the diary of 
Attorney-General Bates, it appears that there was a full 
and frank discussion of the paper of Mr. Seward. All 
of the members of the cabinet were impressed with the 
extraordinary gravity of the situation as probably the 
fate of the nation depended on the result of their delib- 
erations. Mr. Bates himself urged the surrender. 
Waiving the legal right about which there was much 
doubt, he favored compliance with the British demand 
on account of the necessity of the case. The country 
could not afford to have a war with England, he thought, 
as that would be to give up hope of subduing the insur- 
rection ; it would ruin trade, bankrupt the treasury, and 
bring other calamities. President Lincoln and the other 
members were slow to acknowledge these truths. 

Mr. Welles has said: "The president was from the 
first willing to make concession. Mr. Blair advocated 
it. Mr. Seward was at the beginning opposed to any 
idea of concession which involved giving up the emis- 
saries, but yielded at once and with dexterity to the per- 
emptory demand of Great Britain, "i In another place 
Mr. Welles says: "Mr. Seward should receive credit 
for the dexterous and skillful dispatch which he prepared 
on his change of position. It exhibits his readiness and 
peculiar tact and talent to extricate himself from and to 
pass over difficulties." ^ 

In private correspondence Mr. Seward afterward said 
of the matter: "The consideration of the Trent case 

* Lincoln and Seward by Gideon Welles, i, p. 188. 
•Ibid, p,iS5. 



192 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



was crowded out by pressing domestic affairs until 
Christmas day. It was considered on my presentation 
of it on the 25th and 26th of December. The govern- 
ment when it took the subject up had no idea of the 
grounds upon which it would explain its action nor did 
it believe that it would concede the case. Yet it was 
heartily unanimous in the actual result after two days 
examination in favor of the release. Remember that 
in a council like ours there are some strong wills to be 
reconciled."! 

Secretary Chase recorded his own opinion as he gave 
it in the discussion. He thought it was too much for 
the English government to expect of the United States 
on that occasion, and that she ought to overlook the 
little wrong. He believed that Great Britain did not 
fully understand all of the circumstances as did the 
United States, and if she did, the surrender of the com- 
missioners would not be expected. If the conditions 
were reversed the Federal government would accept 
the explanations of the English government, and allow 
their rebels to be retained, and he could not help believ- 
ing that Great Britain would do likewise were the case 
fully understood. He continued to discuss the subject 
as follows: "But we can not afford delays. While 
the matter hangs in uncertainty the public mind will re- 
main disquieted, our commerce will suffer serious harm, 
our action against the rebels must be greatly hindered, 
and the restoration of our prosperity — largely identified 
with that of all nations — must be delayed. Better, then, 
to make now the sacrifice of feeling involved in the sur- 
render of these rebels, than even avoid it by the delays 

[ * Seward to Weed, Life of Thurlow Weed, Vol. 11, p. 409. 



AN A GREEMENT RE A CHED. 193 

which explanations must occasion. I give my adhesion, 
therefore, to the conclusion at which the secretary of 
state has arrived. It is gall and wormwood to me. 
Rather than consent to the liberation of these men I 
would rather sacrifice everything I possess. But I am 
consoled by the reflection that, while nothing but sever- 
est retribution is due to them, the surrender, under ex- 
isting circumstances, is but simply doing right — simply 
proving faithful to our own ideas and traditions under 
strong temptations to violate them — simply giving to 
England and the world the most signal proof that the 
American nation will not under any circumstances, for 
the sake of inflicting just punishment on rebels, commit 
even a technical wrong against neutrals."^ 

The main reason for hesitation was doubtless the fear 
of public opinion in the North. It was certain that a 
surrender of the commissioners would bring the dis- 
pleasure of the people upon the government, which 
would be accused of having timidly submitted to the 
unjust demands of England. Statesmen greatly dislike 
to act under what appears to be menace or dictation 
from a foreign power. The cabinet discussion ended, 
however, as has been stated already by two of the mem- 
bers, in a unanimous agreement upon the letter of reply 
which the secretary of state had prepared. This com- 
munication proposed a surrender upon diplomatic reasons 
which were apparently a triumph of the American prin- 
ciple. 

* Warden's Life of Chase, pp. 393-394. 
13 



194 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 



1. Congressional Globe: Pt. i, 2d Sess., 37th Cong. 

2. Diarj of Events, Moore's Rebellion Record, Vol. iii. 

3. Magazine of American History, March, 1886, and June, 1886, 

4. McPherson's Political History of the Rebellion, p. 343. 

5. Nicolayand Hay: Life of Lincoln, Vol. V. 

6. Paris, Comte de: The Civil War in America. 

7. Pollard, E. A.: The Lost Cause. 

8. Principal American Newspapers, December, 1861. 

9. Southern Law Review, Vol. viii. 

10. Weed, Thurlow: Life of. Vol. 11. 

11. Welles, Gideon: Lincoln and Seward. 



CHAPTER XV. 

VIEWS OF OTHER EUROPEAN NATIONS CONCERNING 
THE TRENT CASE. 

The forcible seizure of the Confederate commissioners 
while on board the Trent caused more or less of discus- 
sion throughout Europe. The technical right of Cap- 
tain Wilkes to make the capture was not admitted. 
Neutral governments regarded it as prejudicial to their 
own interests. It was held that such an act tended to- 
ward an abridgment of the rights and privileges which 
had been previously enjoyed by the neutral flag. Many 
of the European governments took occasion to make 
public their views concerning the matter, and to express 
the hope that the government at Washington would not 
insist upon maintaining the right to seize even its own 
rebellious citizens on board a neutral ship. Such a pro- 
ceeding, it was said, did not conform to the principles 
of international law, and was not consistent even with 
American precedents and practice. 

Many of the United States ministers in Europe sent 
reports to Washington concerning the feeling in the va- 
rious capitals to which they were respectively accredited. 

Three of the principal European powers communi- 
cated their views of the matter to the United States gov- 

(195) 



1^6 THE TRENT AFFAIR, 

ernment. This was done in the usual courteous lan- 
guage of diplomacy and through the medium of their 
respective ministers at Washington. In a dispatch to 
M. Mercier, M. Thouvenel, the French minister for 
foreign affairs, communicated his opinion as follows: 

"Paris, December 3, 1861. 

"Sir — The arrest of Messrs. Mason and Slidell on 
board the English mail packet Trent by an American 
cruiser has produced in France, if not the same emotion 
as in England, at least a profound astonishment and sen- 
sation. Public opinion was immediately occupied with 
the legality and the consequences of such an act, and the 
impression which has been thereby produced has not 
been for an instant doubtful. The act seemed to the 
public to be so entirely at variance with the ordinary 
rules of international law that it has determined to 
throw the responsibility exclusively on the commander 
of the San Jacinto. We are not yet in a position to 
know if this supposition is well founded, and the gov- 
ernment of the emperor have been therefore compelled 
to examine the question raised by the removal of the 
two passengers from the Trent, The desire to aid in 
preventing a conflict, perhaps imminent, between the 
powers towards whom they are animated by equally 
friendly sentiments, and the desire to maintain, with a 
view to placing the rights of their own flag beyond the 
danger of any attack, certain priciples essential to the 
security of neutrals, have convinced them, after mature 
reflection, that they could not remain perfectly silent on 
the matter. 

"If, to our great regret, the cabinet at Washington 



M. THOUVENBUS OPINION. 



197 



should be disposed to approve the conduct of the com- 
mander of the San Jacinto, it would be because they 
consider Messrs. Mason and Slidell as enemies, or be- 
cause they only recognize them as rebels. In the one 
case as in the other there would be an extremely pain- 
ful forgetfulness of principles on which we have always 
found the United States agree with us. 

"On what ground can the American cruiser, in the 
first case, have arrested Messrs. Mason and Slidell ? The 
United States have admitted, with us, in the treaties 
concluded between the two countries, that the freedom 
of the flag extends to persons found on board, even 
were they enemies of one of the two parties, except, at 
least, in the case of military men actually in the service 
of the enemy. Messrs. Mason and Slidell were, by vir- 
ture of this principle, the insertion of which in our treat- 
ies of amity and commerce has never encountered any 
difficulty, perfectly free under the neutral flag of Eng- 
land. It will not, doubtless, be pretended that they 
could be considered as contraband of war. That which 
constitutes contraband of war has not yet, it is true, 
been precisely determined. Its limits are not absolutely 
the same with all the powers. But, as far as regards 
persons, the special stipulations which are found in 
treaties concerning military men clearly define the 
character of those who may be seized by belligerents. 
Now there is no occasion to demonstrate that Messrs. 
Mason and Slidell can not be assimilated to persons in 
this category. There would therefore remain nothing 
to explain their capture but this pretext — that they were 
bearers of official dispatches of the enemy. Now this 
is the place to recall a circumstance which should gov- 



198 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



ern this entire affair, and which renders unjustifiable the 
conduct of the American cruiser. The Trent was not 
bound to a point belonging to either of the belligerents. 
She was carrying her cargo and passengers to a neutral 
country, and it was, moreover, in a neutral port where 
she had embarked them. If it was admissible that, un- 
der such circumstances, the neutral flag did not com- 
pletely cover the persons and goods on board, its im- 
munity would be an empty word. At any moment the 
commerce and navigation of third powers would be lia- 
ble to suffer in their innocent or even indirect relations 
with one or other of the belligerents. These latter 
would not have the right to require from the neutral a 
complete impartiality — to prohibit him from all partici- 
pation in acts of hostility ; they would impose upon his 
liberty of commerce and navigation restrictions of which 
modern international law has refused to admit the legal- 
ity. In a word, we should return to those vexatious 
practices against which, in former times, no power has 
protested more energetically than the United States. 

"If the cabinet at Washington could only regard the 
two persons arrested as rebels, whom they have always 
a right to seize, the question, to place it in another light, 
could not thereby be solved any the more in a sense 
favorable to the conduct of the commander of the San 
Jacinto. 

"In such a case there would be a non-recognition of 
the principle which constitutes a ship to be a portion of 
the territory of the country whose flag she bears, and 
there would be a violation of the immunity which for- 
bids a foreign sovereign to exercise there his jurisdic- 
tion. It is not necessary, doubtless, to recall the energy 



M. THOUVENBVS OPINION. i^^ 

with which on every occasion the government of the 
United States have defended this immunity, and the 
right of asylum, which is a consequence of it. 

"Without wishing to enter into a deeper discussion of 
questions raised by the capture of Messrs. Mason and 
Slidell, I have said enough, I think, to establish that the 
cabinet of Washington can not, without aiming a blow 
at those principles which all neutral powers are equally 
interested in maintaining, nor without putting itself in 
contradiction with its own conduct up to the present 
day, give its approval to the proceedings of the com- 
mander of the San Jacinto. 

"In this state of things, there can not be, in our opin- 
ion, any hesitation as to the course to pursue. Lord 
Lyons is already instructed to present the demands for 
satisfaction which the English government is under the 
necessity of drawing up, and which consist in the imme- 
diate release of the persons taken from on board the 
Trent, and in sending explanations calculated to remove 
from this act its offensive character to the British flag. 

"The Federal government would be inspired by a 
just and elevated sentiment in yielding to these demands. 
One would vainly search for what object or in what in- 
terest they would risk to provoke, by a different atti- 
tude, a rupture with Great Britain. For ourselves, who 
would see in this case a complication, in every way de- 
plorable, of the difficulties with which the cabinet at 
Washington has already to struggle against, and a prec- 
edent of a nature to render seriously uneasy all those pow- 
ers not parties to the present contest, we think we are giv- 
ing a proof of loyal amity towards the cabinet of Wash- 
ington in not allowing them to be ignorant of our opin- 



200 "^HB TRENT AFFAIR. 

ion in this circumstance. I invite you, sir, to take the 
first opportunity of speaking frankly to Mr. Seward, and 
if he should ask it, to leave with him a copy of this dis- 
patch. Receive, etc., Thouvenel." 

This dispatch was submitted to the president, but it 
had been previously decided to give up the commis- 
sioners. After stating this fact in his answer to the 
French dispatch, Mr. Seward said: "That disposition 
of the subject, as I think, renders unnecessary any dis- 
cussion of it, in reply to the comments of Mr. Thouvenel. 
I am permitted, however, to say that Mr. Thouvenel 
has not been in error in supposing, first, that the gov- 
ernment of the United States has not acted in any spirit 
of disregard of the rights or of the sensibilities of the 
British nation, and that he is equally just in assuming 
that the United States would consistently vindicate, by 
their practice on this occasion, the character they have 
so long maintained as an advocate of the most liberal 
principles concerning the rights of neutral states in mar- 
itime war. 

"You will assure Mr. Thouvenel that this govern- 
ment appreciates as well the frankness of his explana- 
tions, as the spirit of friendship and good will towards 
the United States in which they are expressed." 

Exception may be taken to some of the things said by 
M. Thouvenel in this letter. He expressed the opinion 
that Messrs. Mason and Slidcll were "perfectly free 
under the neutral flag of England," and referred to the 
treaties between the United States and France, which 
provided that persons, though enemies to either or both 
countries, should not be taken from a free ship. The 



M. THOUVENEVS E-RliORS. 201 

treaties referred to had expired and were, consequently, 
of no effect. If they had been in full force, however, 
they could have determined nothing definitely in the 
settlement of a maritime question between the United 
States and England. The analogy only, in such a case, 
would be of any value. 

M. ThouvcncI also held that in this case "there would 
be a non-recognition of the principle which constitutes a 
ship to be a portion of the territory of the country whose 
flag she bears." This doctrine is not sound. Neutral 
territory can not be seized and condemned because of- 
fenses against the rights of neutrals are practiced upon 
it. If a ship were simply a bit of neutral territory it 
could not be seized and condemned for carrying contra- 
band of war or otherwise offending against neutral rights. 
The law of nations, however, permits capture and con- 
fiscation of a vessel for such offenses. If M. Thouve- 
nel's doctrine be admitted, who can tell what this small 
portion of neutral territory, protected by its own flag, 
might not do? 

The views of the Austrian government were duly 
submitted in the following dispatch to its representative 
at Washington. 

"Vienna, December 18, 1861. 
(Confidential.) 
"The difference which has occurred between the gov- 
ernment of the United States and that of Great Britain 
in consequence of the arrest of Messrs. Slidell and Ma- 
son, effected by the captain of the American ship of war, 
the San Jacinto, on board the English packet, the Trent, 
has not failed to attract the most serious attention of the 



202 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

imperial cabinet. The more importance we attach to 
the presentation of good relations between the United 
States and England the more must we regret an accident 
which has complicated in such a grave manner a situation 
already surrounded with difficulties. 

"Without having any intention of entering here into 
an examination of the question of right, we can not, 
however, overlook the fact that according to the notions 
of international law adopted by all the powers, and 
which the American government itself has often taken 
as the rule of its conduct, England could not by any 
means refrain in the present case from making a repre- 
sentation against the attack made on its flag, and from 
demanding a just reparation for it. It appears to us, 
moreover, that the demands drawn up for this purpose 
by the cabinet of St. James have nothing in them hurt- 
ful to the feelings of the cabinet of Washington, and 
that the latter will be able to do an act of equity and 
moderation without the least sacrifice of its dignity. 

"We think that we can hope that the government of 
the United States, in taking counsel both from the rules 
which govern international relations, as well as from 
considerations of enlightened policy rather than from 
the manifestations produced by an over-excitement of 
national feeling, will bring to bear on its deliberation all 
the calmness which the gravity of the case requires, and 
will think it right to decide on a course which, while pre- 
serving from rupture the relations between two great 
states to which Austria is equally bound in friendship, 
will tend to avert the grave disturbances w^hich the event- 
uality of a w^ar could not fail to bring about, not only 



COUNT RECHBERG'S VIEWS. 203 

upon each one of the contending parties, but upon the 
affairs of the world in general. 

"Be so good, M. le Chevalier, as to bring the preced- 
ing reflections to the notice of Mr. Seward, and to in- 
form us of the manner in which the minister shall have 
received your communication. Receive, etc., 

"Rechberg." 

This dispatch having been submitted to the president, 
a brief answer was prepared by Mr. Seward as soon as 
a settlement of the matter had been effected with Great 
Britain. A copy of the correspondence which had 
passed between the United States government and those 
of Great Britain and France, concerning the detention 
of the Trent, and the capture of the Confederate com- 
missioners, was also forwarded to the Austrian govern- 
ment with the statement that important facts would be 
learned from them as follows: 

"First. That the United States are not only incapa- 
ble, for a moment, of seeking to disturb the peace of 
the world, but are deliberate, just and friendly in their 
intercourse with all foreign nations. 

"Secondly. That they will not be unfaithful to their 
traditions and policy, as an advocate of the broadest 
liberality in the application of the principle of interna- 
tional law to the conduct of maritime warfare. 

"The United States, faithful to their sentiments, and 
at the same time careful of their political constitution, 
will sincerely rejoice if the occasion which has given 
rise to this correspondence shall be improved so as to 
obtain a revision of the law of nations, which will 



204 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

render more definite and certain the rights and obliga- 
tions of states in time of war." 

Assurances were also expressed that the president 
highly appreciated the frankness and sincerity of the 
Austrian government on an occasion of such great in- 
terest to the welfare of the United States. 

In about a month after the reception of the news of 
the capture of the Confederate commissioners, the Prus- 
sian government expressed its views in the following 
dispatch to its minister at Washington : 

"Berlin, December 25, 1861. 

"M. LE Baron — The maritime operations undertaken 
by President Lincoln against the southern seceding 
states could not, from their very commencement, but 
fill the king's government with apprehension lest they 
should result in possible prejudice to the legitimate in- 
terests of neutral powers. 

"These apprehensions have unfortunately proved 
fully justified by the forcible seizure on board the neu- 
tral mail packet the Trent, and the abduction therefrom 
of Messrs. Slidell and Mason by the commander of the 
United States man-of-war the San Jacinto. 

"This occurrence, as you can well imagine, has pro- 
duced in England and throughout Europe the most pro- 
found sensation, and thrown, not cabinets only, but also 
public opinion into a state of the most excited expecta- 
tion. For, although at present it is England only which 
is immediately concerned in the matter, yet, on the other 
hand, it is one of the most important and universally re- 
cognized rights of the neutral flag which has been called 
into question. 



COUNT BERNSTORFrS OPINION. 205 

"I need not here enter into a discussion of the legal 
side of the question. Public opinion in Europe has, 
with singular unanimity, pronounced in the most posi- 
tive manner for the injured party. As far as we are 
concerned we have hitherto abstained from expressing 
ourselves to you upon the subject, because in the ab- 
sence of any reliable information we were in doubt as 
to whether the captain of the San Jacinto, in the course 
taken by him, had been acting under orders from his 
government or not. Even now we prefer to assume 
that the latter was the case. Should the former sup- 
position, however, turn out to be the correct one, we 
should consider ourselves under the necessity of attrib- 
uting greater importance to the occurrence, and to our 
great regret we should find ourselves constrained to see 
in it not an isolated fact, but a public menace offered to 
the existing rights of all neutrals. 

"We have as yet no certain information as to the de- 
mands made by England to the American cabinet, upon 
the acceptance of which the maintenance of peace ap- 
pears to depend. As far, however, as our information 
reaches on the subject, we are convinced that no condi- 
tions have been put forward by the British government 
which could justly offend President Lincoln's sense of 
honor. 

"His majesty, the king, filled with the most ardent 
wishes for the welfare of the United States of North 
America, has commanded me to advocate the cause of 
peace with President Lincoln, through your instrumen- 
tality, to the utmost of my power. We should reckon 
ourselves fortunate if we could in this wise succeed in 
facilitating the peaceful solution of a conflict from which 



2o6 THE TRENT affair: 

the greatest dangers might arise. It is possible, however, 
that the president has ah-eady taken his decision and an- 
nounced it. Whatever that decision may be, the king's 
government, when they reflect upon the uninterrupted 
relations of friendship and amity which have existed be- 
tween Prussia and the United States ever since the latter 
was founded, will derive satisfaction from the thought 
of having laid with the most unreserved candor their 
views of this occurrence before the cabinet at Wash- 
ington, and expressed the wishes which they entertain 
in connection with it. 

"You will read this dispatch without delay to the 
secretary of state for foreign affairs, and, should he de- 
sire it, you will give him a copy of it. I shall await 
your report upon the instructions contained in this dis- 
patch, and I avail, etc., Bernstorff." 

The publication of the opinions of other European 
governments caused the expression of much gratifica- 
tion in England. There appeared to be so much 
harmony of sentiment throughout Europe upon this 
matter that the confidence of the British ministry was 
much increased in the position which it had at first as- 
sumed. It endured with the greatest patience the severe 
criticism upon the past policy of Great Britain relating 
to the rights of neutrals. The cabinet probably thought 
that a substantial advantage would be gained to Eng- 
land in the immediate dispute which was under con- 
sideration, and hence it was easier to bear censure for 
past misconduct. In a discussion of the matter one of the 
English reviews said: "The whole of Europe has pro- 
nounced that we were right, "i 

* London Quarterly Review, No. 221, p. 273. 



REAL MOTIVES OF THE OTHER POWERS. 



207 



A brief consideration of the matter, however, is sufH- 
cient to show that it was not sentiments of unfriendli- / 

ness toward the United States which prompted the 
other nations of Europe so quickly to disapprove the 
the act of Captain Wilkes, and urge the Federal gov- 
ernment to concede the British demand to surrender the 
commissioners. For a century the tendency of Great 
Britain had been toward a restriction of the rights of / 
neutrals to the narrowest possible limits. When an act 
of doubtful legality was performed on the deck of an 
English cruiser by an American captain, it was with 
the greatest satisfaction that the nations on the continent 
of Europe saw England disavow her own former prece- 
dents bearing upon this case, and plant herself squarely 
upon the doctrine of enlarged neutral rights. The view 
of the other countries was that it was a most fortunate 
opportunity for securing new and enlarged modifications 
of the law of nations such as would restrain England 
in future from a policy that was disagreeable to them- , 
selves. It was their own interests which they were seek- ' 
ing to promote, not those of England. The concession 
of the British demand by the Federal government 
would establish a principle of maritime law which 
would be of value to the world in all future time. This 
was the motive which induced the other nations to as- 
sume the position that was common to all of them. 

One of the most devoted European friends of the 
United States at that time was Count Agenor De Gas- 
parin of France. ^ He says in his discussion of the 
views of other nations concerning the matter: "On 

* See his "L' Amerique devant I'Europe." Chapter on the Trent 
case. 



2o8 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

seeing such haste and so haughty a proclamation of in- 
disputable exigence, on seeing the idea of an impious 
war accepted with so much readiness by some, and so 
much ill-dissembled joy by others, Europe declared with- 
out circumlocution or reserve that if England were not 
miraculously rescued from her own enterprise, if she 
drew the sword against the North in the capacity of an 
ally of the South, she would destroy with her own hands 
her chief claim to the respect of the civilized world. 
The language on this point was the same at Paris, Ber- 
lin, St. Petersburg, Vienna and Turin. As they were 
unanimous in deciding the technical question of right 
against America, so were they unanimous in deciding 
the moral question against England. To recognize the 
technical right in favor of England, was to recognize 
the right of neutrals against her. Who is simple enough 
to be astonished at the eagerness displayed here by the 
other powers?" 

It is worthy of special notice that, during the entire 
period of the American civil war, the most powerful 
ruler in all Europe was an outspoken and steadfast friend 
of the United States. If a war had occurred between 
England and the northern states of America as a result 
of the affair of the Trent, it Is well-nigh certain that the 
Federal government would have had a powerful ally in 
the czar, Alexander of Russia, who, doubtless, remem- 
bered the losses he had recently sustained in the Crimean 
war. In this war England had been his most powerful 
enemy. In a few weeks after the capture of the Con- 
federate commissioners, a fleet of Russian war vessels ap- 
peared in New York harbor and remained there for sev- 
eral months. At the same time a number of Russian men- 



HUSSIAI^ FRIENDSHIP. 209 

of-war were stationed at San Francisco. No official 
explanation was ever given for the long-continued pres- 
ence of these war vessels in American waters. Their ex- 
tended visit caused much comment, but their purpose 
was easily divined and their presence was not unwel- 
come while a war between England and the northern 
states was imminent. 

While at the Astor House, in New York, Admiral 
Farragut was visited by the Russian admiral, with whom 
he had formerly become well acquainted. On being 
asked why he was spending the winter in idleness in an 
American harbor the Russian replied: "I am here un- 
der sealed orders, to be broken only in a contingency 
which has not yet occurred." He also added that the 
commander of the Russian men-of-war lying off San 
Francisco harbor had received similar orders. In the 
same interview he admitted that his orders were to 
break the seals, if, while he remained at New York, 
the United States became involved in a war with any 
foreign nation. 

Soon afterward, when Secretary Seward asked the 
Russian minister why the czar kept his war vessels so 
2ong in American harbors, he replied that, while he did 
not know the exact nature of the orders under which the 
commanders of the fleets were acting, he felt at liberty 
to say that it was no unfriendly purpose which caused 
the prolonged stay of these men-of-war in the waters of 
the United States. 

It seems that when official knowledge was conveyed 
to the czar that England was making preparations for 
war with the United States on account of the detention 

14 



2IO THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

of the Trent and the seizure of the Confederate commis- 
sioners two fleets of war vessels were immediately sent 
to America under orders which were sealed so that the 
intentions of the Russian government might remain un- 
known to the world in the event that the services of the 
men-of-war should not be needed on this side of the At- 
lantic. 

A prominent American who was m St. Petersburg at 
that time made an unofficial call upon the Russian 
chancellor, and was shown the czar's order to his ad- 
miral to report to the president of the United States for 
duty in case the northern states became involved in a 
war with England, i 

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. Bernard, Montague: Pamphlet on the Trent Question. 

2. British Annual Register, 1861. 

3. Dana's Wheaton's International Law, section 504, note^ 

4. De Gasparin: L'Amferique devant I'Europe. 

5. London Quarterly Review, No. 221. 

6. Seward, William H.: Works of, Vol. V. 

7. Weed, Thurlow: Life of. Vol. 11. 

* See Thurlow Weed's account of this matter. Life of 
Weed. Vol, 11, pp. 346-7, 



CHAPTER XVI. 

THE ANSWER OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. 

The president and cabinet having agreed to surrender 
the Confederate commissioners, Mr. Seward's letter of 
reply to the British demand was sent to Lord Lyons 
without delay. The communication was quite long, 
and began by making a careful and complete statement 
of the contents of Lord Russell's note of November 30, 
asking for reparation. Mr. Seward then stated that the 
capture was made without any direction, instniction, or 
even foreknowledge of the Federal government ; that no 
orders whatever had been issued to Captain Wilkes or 
to any other naval officer to arrest the four persons 
taken from the Trent or any of them, either on that 
vessel or any other British or neutral ship ; and that the 
British government would justly infer from these facts 
that the United States had no purpose or even thought 
of forcing into discussion the question that had arisen 
or any other which could affect the sensibilities of the 
British nation. 

The facts concerning the boarding of the Trent as 
reported by Commander Williams were then reviewed 
by Mr. Seward and correctly stated, the fictions being 
all pointed out. 

(311) 



212 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

"I have now to remind your lordship," continued Mr. 
Seward, "of some facts which doubtlessly were omitted 
by Earl Russell, with the very proper and becoming 
motive of allowing them to be brought into the case, 
on the part of the United States, in the way most satis- 
factory to this government. These facts are, that at the 
time the transaction occurred an insurrection was exist- 
ing in the United States which this government was en- 
gaged in suppressing by the employment of land and 
naval forces ; that in regard to this domestic strife the 
United States considered Great Britain as a friendly 
power, while she had assumed for herself the attitude of 
a neutral ; and that Spain was considered in the same 
light, and had assumed the same attitude as Great 
Britain. 

"It had been settled by correspondence that the United 
States and Great Britain mutually recognized as applica- 
ble to this local strife these two articles of the declara- 
tion made by the congress of Paris in 1S56, namely, 
that the neutral or friendly flag should cover enemy's 
goods not contraband of war, and that neutral goods not 
contraband of war are not liable to capture under an 
enemy's flag. These exceptions of contraband from 
favor were a negative acceptance by the parties of the 
rule hitherto everywhere recognized as a part of the law 
of nations, that whatever is contraband is liable to cap- 
ture and confiscation in all cases." 

The character and purposes of the persons seized 
were then carefully explained, and the statement made 
that it was to be presumed that the commissioners 
bore dispatches which it appeared from information sent 
by the American consul at Paris had escaped the search 



MR. SE WA RD'S IN^ U TRIES. 2 1 3 

of the Trent and reached England in safety. Mr. Sew- 
ard also stated, upon information and belief, that the 
agent and officers of the Trent, including Commander 
Williams, before leaving Havana knevvr that Messrs. 
Mason and Slidell were commissioners from the Confed- 
erate States on their way to Europe. 

From the foregoing facts Mr. Seward arrived at 
the conclusion that the case was not an act of violence 
or outrage but only an ordinary and legal belligerent 
proceeding against a neutral vessel carrying contraband 
of war for the use and benefit of the insurgents ; that 
the question was whether this had been done in accord- 
ance with the law of nations ; and that the following in- 
quiries were involved : 

"i. Were the persons named and their supposed dis- 
patches contraband of war? 

"2. Might Captain Wilkes lawfully stop and search 
the Trent for these contraband persons and dispatches } 

"3. Did he exercise that right in a lawful and proper 
manner? 

"4. Having found the contraband persons on board 
and in presumed possession of the contraband dispatches, 
had he a right to capture the persons ? 

"5. Did he exercise that right of capture in the man- 
ner allowed and recognized by the law of nations?" 

It was then stated that if these questions should be 
answered in the affirmative, the British government 
would have no claim for reparation. The first four 
were argued briefly by the secretary and an affirmative 
conclusion reached in the case of each one. The diffi- 
culties began with the fifth question. Maritine law is 
sufficiently clear as to the disposition to be made of cap- 



214 ^^^ TRENT AFFAIR. 

tured contraband vessels and property, but it says noth- 
ing concerning the mode of procedure in regard to con- 
traband persons. "The belligerent captor," said Mr. 
Seward, "has a right to prevent the contraband officer, 
soldier, sailor, minister, messenger or courier from pro- 
ceeding in his unlaw^ful voyage and reaching the destined 
scene of his injurious service. But, on the other hand, 
the person captured may be innocent — that is, he may 
not be contraband. He, therefore, has a right to a fair 
trial of the accusation against him. The neutral state 
that has taken him under its flag is bound to protect 
him if he is not contraband, and is therefore entitled to 
be satisfied upon that important question. The faith of 
that state is pledged to his safety, if innocent, as its jus- 
tice is pledged to his surrender if he is really contra- 
band. Here are conflicting claims, involving personal 
liberty, life, honor, and duty. Here are conflicting na- 
tional claims involving welfare, safety, honor, and em- 
pire. They require a tribunal and a trial. The captors 
and the captured are equals ; the neutral and the bellig- 
erent states are equals." 

It was then stated that the American government had 
early suggested that such controversies be settled by 
proper judicial proceedings. If the suspected persons 
were proved to be contraband, the vessel would also par- 
take of that character. If the men were not contraband, 
the vessel would escape condemnation. Although there 
would be no judgment for or against the captured per- 
sons, yet a legal certainty concerning their character 
would result from the determination of the court con- 
cerning the vessel. 

Objections were then pointed out even to this course 



NO JUDICIAL REMEDY. 215 

of proceeding, the chief of which was that such a judg- 
ment concludes nothing, for it binds neither the bellig- 
erent nor the neutral upon the question of the disposi- 
tion to be made of the captured persons. Such a ques- 
tion would still have to be really determined by diplo- 
macy or by war. Regret was expressed that maritime 
systems of law furnished no better processes of determin- 
ing the characters of contraband persons, and the state- 
ment made that is was practically then a choice between 
the illogical and circuitous methods already suggested 
and no judicial remedy at all. 

"If there be no judicial remedy," said Mr. Seward, 
"the result is that the question must be determined by 
the captor himself, on the deck of the prize vessel. 
Very grave objections arise against such a course. The 
captor is armed, the neutral is unarmed. The captor is 
interested, prejudiced, and perhaps violent ; the neutral, 
if truly neutral, is disinterested, subdued and helpless. 
The tribunal is irresponsible, while its judgment is car- 
ried into instant execution. The captured party is 
compelled to submit, though bound by no legal, moral, 
or treaty obligation to acquiesce. Reparation is distant 
and problematical, and depends at last on the justice, 
magnanimity or weakness of the state in whose behalf 
and by whose authority the capture was made. Out of 
these disputes reprisals and wars necessarily arise, and 
these are so frequent and destructive that it may well be 
doubted whether this form of remedy is not a greater 
social evil than all that could follow if the belligerent 
right of search were universally renounced and abolished 
forever. But carry the case one step farther. What if 
the state that has made the capture unreasonably refuse 



2i6 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

to hear the complaint of the neutral or to redress it? In 
that case, the very act of capture would be an act of 
war — of war begun without notice, and possibly entirely 
without provocation. 

"I think all unprejudiced minds will agree that, im- 
perfect as the existing judicial remedy may be supposed 
to be, it would be, as a general practice, better to fol- 
low it than to adopt the summary one of leaving the de- 
cision with the captor and relying upon diplomatic de- 
bates to review his decision. Practically, it is a ques- 
tion of choice between law, with its imperfections and 
delays, and war, with its evils and desolations." 

Mr. Seward then said there were cases where the 
judicial remedy would become impossible as by the 
shipwreck of the prize vessel, or other circumstances 
which excuse the captor from sending her into port for 
confiscation. Such a case, however, would not annul 
the right of the captor to the custody of the contraband 
persons so that their unlawful purposes can not be ac- 
complished. The captor in such a case should show 
that the failure of the judicial remedy resulted from cir- 
cumstances entirely beyond his control and without his 
fault. Any other course would permit him to derive 
advantages from his own wrongful act. 

Secretary Seward next reviewed the course of Cap- 
tain Wilkes in making a prize of the Trent and cap- 
turing the contraband persons lawfully, then permitting 
her to continue upon her voyage instead of sending her 
into port for adjudication. The capture was incomplete, 
if the whole thing constituted a single transaction. It 
was unfinished or abandoned. Whether the leaving of 
the act unfinished was voluntary or not, was the ques- 



RELEASE OF THE TRENT. 



217 



tion which was to determine the validity of the British 
claim for reparation. If necessary and, therefore, in- 
voluntary, the British claim for reparation would be un- 
founded ; if unnecessary and voluntary, then the claim 
was well founded. 

Captain Wilkes's reasons for not carrying the Trent 
into port were then review^ed and carefully examined. 
The first reason was on account of his being so reduced 
in officers and crew, and the second was the great in- 
convenience, loss, and disappointment which would 
have resulted to the passengers of the vessel. So far 
as Captain Wilkes was concerned the reasons were sat- 
isfactory to the United States government. It could not 
desire that the San Jacinto should be exposed to danger 
and loss by reducing her officers and crew in order to 
put a prize crew on board the Trent and cairy her into 
port ; neither could it disavow the humane motive of pre- 
venting inconveniences, losses, and possibly disasters to 
the passengers who were on board the captured vessel. 
It manifestly did not occur to Captain Wilkes that such 
a course might sacrifice the right of his government to 
retain the captured persons, although he was not de- 
serving of censure for anything that he had done. The 
question was not whether he was justified to his govern- 
ment, but what the view of his government was as to 
the effect of his course in not bringing the Trent into 
port. 

This brought into view the question whether the re- 
lease of the Trent was a voluntary or an involuntary 
proceeding. It would have been clearly involuntary, if 
made solely upon the ground that Captain Wilkes 
could not bring the prize vessel into port on account of 



2i8 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

a lack of officers and crew necessary to do so. The 
captor is not required to hazard his own vessel in order 
to bring the prize vessel into port. Neither is a large 
prize crew necessary, for it is the duty of the captured 
party to assent and to go willingly before the judicial 
tribunal which tries the case. Should the captured 
party express a determination to use force which there 
is no reasonable probability of the captor's overcoming 
without too much risk to himself, he may properly leave 
the prize vessel to proceed on her voyage and it can 
not afterward be objected that she has been deprived of 
the judicial remedy which was her due. 

Captain Wilkes's second reason was different from 
the first, so that the release of the Trent was voluntary 
and not made of necessity. 

Mr. Seward's next inquiry was how these explana- 
tions by the commander of the San Jacinto were to affect 
the British government. His first observation was that 
the explanations had not been made to the authorities of 
the captured vessel. If they had been so made the re- 
lease might have been accepted by the officers of the 
Trent on condition of waiving an investigation by a 
competent court, or such condition might have been en- 
tirely refused. But it was a case with the British gov- 
ernment and not with the officers of the Trent. If it 
were claimed by Great Britain that a judicial trial had 
been lost because Captain Wilkes had voluntarily re- 
leased the Trent, out of consideration for her innocent 
passengers, he did not see how Great Britain was "to be 
bound to acquiesce in the decision which was thus made 
by us without necessity on our part, and without knowl- 
edge of conditions or consent on her own. The question 



MR. SEWARD'S DISCUSSION. 



219 



between Great Britain and ourselves thus stated would 
be a question not of right and of law, but of favor to be 
conceded by her to us in return for favors shown by us 
to her, of the value of which favors on both sides we 
ourselves shall be the judge. Of course the United 
States could have no thought of raising such a question 
in any case." 

That any deliberate wrong in the transaction had been 
meditated, practiced, or approved, was disclaimed by 
Mr. Seward. He said that "on the contrary what has 
happened has been simply an inadvertency, consisting 
in a departure, by the naval officer, free from any 
wrongful motive, from a rule uncertainly established 
and probably by the several parties concerned either im- 
perfectly understood or entirely unknown. For this 
error the British government has a right to expect the 
same reparation that we, as an independent state, should 
expect from Great Britain or from any other friendly 
nation in a similar case. 

"I have notbeen unaware that, in examining this ques- 
tion I have fallen into an argument for what seems to 
be the British side of it against my own country. But 
I am relieved from all embarrassment on that subject. I 
had hardly fallen into that line of argument when I dis- 
covered that I was really defending and maintaining not 
an exclusively British interest, but an old, honored and 
cherished American cause, not upon British authorities, 
but upon principles that constitute a large portion of the 
distinctive policy by which the United States have de- 
veloped the resources of a continent, and, thus becom- 
ing a considerable maritime power, have won the re- 
spect and confidence of many nations. These principles 



220 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

were laid down for us in 1804, by James Madison, when 
secretary of state in the administration of Thomas Jef- 
ferson in instructions given to James Monroe, our min- 
ister to England." 

A quotation was then inserted from one of Mr. Madi- 
son's dispatches, in which he said that a belligerent 
commander is not permitted to condemn and seize, on 
the deck of a neutral vessel, property suspected of 
being contraband, but that the whole matter must be 
submitted to a prize court which can assess damages 
against the captor for an abuse of his power; hence it 
is unreasonable, unjust and inhuman to permit a naval 
officer, restricted in the case of mere property of trivial 
amount to decide, on the deck of his vessel without any 
sort of trial, the question of allegiance, and carry such 
decision into effect by forcing every individual he may 
choose into a service detestable and humiliating to the 
impressed seaman and dangerous even to life itself. 

Satisfaction was expressed at being able to decide the 
case upon strictly American principles, and the state- 
ment made that the claim of the British government had 
not been made in a discourteous manner. 

In coming to the conclusion that it was the duty of 
the American government to disavow Captain Wilkes's 
act and return the prisoners. Secretary Seward said: "If 
the safety of this Union required the detention of the 
captured persons, it would be the right and duty of this 
government to detain them. But the effectual check 
and waning proportions of the existing insurrection, as 
well as the comparative unimportance of the captured 
persons themselves, when dispassionately weighed, hap- 
pily forbid me from resorting to this defense." 



S TRENG TH OF MR. SE WA RD'S ANS WER. 2 2 1 

Attention was then called to the fact that Great 
Britain had often refused to yield claims like the one 
under consideration, and it was thought a matter of 
special congratulation that the British government had 
disavowed its former principles and was now contending 
for what the United States had always insisted upon. 

The last paragraph of the communication read as fol- 
lows: "The four persons in question are now held in 
military custody at Fort Warren in the state of Massa- 
chusetts. They will be cheerfully liberated. Your 
lordship will please indicate a time and place for receiv- 
ing them." 

Such was the answer of Mr. Seward- — the reply of 
the American government conceding the British de- 
mand. Most critics pronounce it a very able state 
paper. This judgment is certainly correct if all things 
be considered. It was prepared on the briefest notice 
and in the fever heat of war time. It was absolutely 
necessary to yield to the British demand. The circum- / 
stances were such that a refusal to do this meant national f 
ruin to the United States. Mr. Seward spoke for an ' 
administration already beset by innumerable difficulties 
and responsible to a people who were almost unani- 
mously opposed to the course which the necessities of 
the case required the government to pursue. The work 
of Secretary Seward in this case was very skillfully done. 
His course was both politic and wise. He yielded un- 
conditionally to the demand for the surrender of the 
commissioners, but, at the same time, he justified the 
spirit of Captain Wilkes's act and was able to place the 
surrender solely upon a simple mistake — an error made 
out of humane considerations and consequently one 



222 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

which was not deserving of censure. By showing that, 
in making the surrender, he was guided by long cher- 
ished American principles, he forestalled the censure 
and objections which were certain to come from his own 
countrymen. But this was not all. His positions were 
fortified by vigorous and acute argument, much of which 
was apparently unanswerable. 

While Mr. Seward deserv^es the gratitude of his coun- 
trymen for having extricated the nation from a difficulty 
that was very embarrassing, a careful examination shows 
that his letter is not entirely free from objections and in- 
consistencies. The entire communication bears the im- 
press of having been prepared for the special purpose 
of finding diplomatic reasons for surrendering the com- 
missioners — as it doubtless was. 

After having established the right to make the cap- 
ture, Mr. Seward says that the voluntaiy or involuntary 
release of the Trent by Captain Wilkes must determine 
the validity of the English claim for reparation. If the 
release were voluntary the claim was well founded ; if 
involuntary the validity of the claim could not be admit- 
ted by the Federal government. One of Captain Wilkes's 
reasons for releasing the British vessel was that he could 
not spare a prize crew of officers and men to bring her 
into port — an involuntary reason of great weight. The 
second reason for allowing the Trent to proceed was the 
desire not to discommode her numerous innocent pas- 
sengers — a purely voluntary proceeding on the part of 
Captain Wilkes. Here are two equally valid independ- 
ent reasons presented for a course pursued. To accept 
one does not nullify the other, although it leads, by Mr. 
Seward's reasoning, to a different conclusion. Although 



WEAKNESS OF MR. SEWARD'S ANSWER. 223 

the former seems the better reason, it was discarded in 
the letter of reply, and the grounds for surrender based 
upon the latter consideration, viz: The voluntary re- 
lease of the Trent in order not to cause inconvenience to 
her innocent passengers. This led to the conclusion 
that the British claim should be conceded. It is not 
easy to understand why the other reason might not have 
been accepted and an opposite conclusion reached, un- 
less Mr. Seward desired to escape from the consequences 
to which his own logic would lead in that case. 

It is also quite evident that Mr. Seward drew a wrong 
inference from the quotation made from Secretary Mad- 
ison's dispatch when he interpreted it to mean that the 
United States would have quietly submitted to the as- 
sumed British "right of search and seizure," if the de- 
crees of impressment had been passed upon American 
citizens by the prize courts of England rather than by 
the naval officers of that country on the decks at sea. 
Such a proceeding would not have made impressment 
any more acceptable to Americans, and the quotation 
from Mr. Madison's dispatch can not be properly con- 
strued to mean that it would have done so. 

Mr. Seward said that the British claim for reparation 
was "not made in a discourteous manner." If British 
courtesy consisted in pushing armies into Canada to 
menace the United States ; if it meant the fitting out of 
warlike armaments at home with more of haste than had 
been seen in such preparations for a third of a century ; 
if it meant an order for Lord Lyons to leave Washing- 
ton in one week unless the demands of the English min- 
istry were complied with fully and completely before 
the expiration of that time — then, indeed, the claim was 



224 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



made coLirteously. If all this be courtesy, then every 
American should hope that, in future, his country may 
be saved from the courtesy of such friends. 

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. Blaine, James G.: Twenty Years of Congress, Vol. il. 

2. British Annual Register 1861. 

3. Dana's Wheaton's International Law, section 504, note. 

4. McPherson, Edward: Political History of the Rebellion. 

5. North American Review, Vol. xcv. 

6. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in 
;he War of the Rebellion, Ser. i, Vol. i. 

7. Porter, Admiral D. D.: Naval History of the Civil War. 

8. Seward, Wm. IL: Works of, Vol. v. 



CHAPTER XVII. 

THE SURRENDER OF MASON AND SLIDELL. 

Mr. Seward's answer conceding the British de- 
mand was very gratifying to Lord Lyons. On Decem- 
ber 27 he acknowledged its receipt and said that he 
would immediately send a copy of this "important com- 
munication" to Earl Russell, and that he would at once 
confer with Mr. Seward concerning the necessary 
arrangements for the transfer of the "four gentlemen" 
again into British protection. It thus appears that, 
without waiting to hear from London, his lordship at 
once accepted the answer of the Federal government as 
a final and satisfactory solution of the difficulty. Three 
days after answering Mr. Seward's letter, Lord Lyons 
addressed a note to Commander Hewett, of the English 
sloop-of-war Rinaldo, directing him to proceed at once 
with his vessel to Provincetown, a small seaport in 
Massachusetts, about forty miles from Boston, and re- 
ceive the released prisoners at that place. His lordship 
added at the same time: "It is hardly necessary that I 
should remind you that these gentlemen have no official 
character. It will be right for you to receive them with 
all courtesy and respect as gentlemen of distinction, but 
it would be. improper to pay them any of those honors 

15 (225) 



226 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

which are paid to official persons." The transfer was 
directed to be made "unostentatiously." Having been 
conveyed from Fort Warren to Provincetown in the tug- 
boat Starlight, the prisoners and their luggage were put 
on board the Rinaldo on the evening of January i, 1863. 
Their "only wish," they said, "was to proceed to 
Europe." They were conveyed without delay to the 
Danish port of St. Thomas, the place to which they 
were proceeding when taken from the Trent by Captain 
Wilkes. At St. Thomas they embarked for Europe 
and reached their respective destinations without further 
mishap. The capture and removal of the envoys to 
the United States caused a delay of about seventy days 
in their journey. 

After the surrender had been made and the Confed- 
erate emissaries taken away, the prevalent tone through- 
out the North still upheld the act of Captain Wilkes. 
Temporary expediency was assigned as the only reason 
for giving up the men. The validity of the British 
claim was denied in many public utterances, in most of 
which care was taken to reserve the right of contesting 
the matter at a future time when the United States 
would be better able to do this. The outcome of the 
whole matter was looked upon by many public men as 
a national humiliation. In many instances there were 
expressed feelings of the bitterest indignation toward 
England and a purpose announced of avenging this in- 
sult so wantonly offered the United States in her hour of 
deepest distress. 

On the afternoon of January 7 the speaker of the 
house of representatives laid before that body copies 
of the correspondence which had taken place between 



OPPOSITION TO THE SURRENDER, 



227 



the secretary of state and the British government rela- 
tive to the Trent case. An extended debate followed 
in which there was a free expression of opinion concern- 
ing the British demand and the subsequent surrender 
of the commissioners. 

Mr. Vallandigham, of Ohio, thought a mistake had 
been made in giving up the men. He said that "for 
the first time has the American eagle been made to 
cower before the British lion. 

"Sir, a venal or fettered and terror-stricken press, or 
servile and sycophantic politicians in this house, or out 
of it, may applaud the act ; and may fawn and flatter 
and lick the hand which has smitten down our honor 
into the dust; but the people, now or hereafter, will de- 
mand a terrible reckoning for this most unmanly sur- 
render." 1 

Mr. Thomas, of Massachusetts, read a carefully pre- 
pared speech from manuscript. Some extracts from it 
are as follows : 

"Complaint of the government would be useless if 
not groundless. It was too much to ask of it to take 
another war on its hands. Possibly the elaborate and 
ingenious argument of the secretary might have been 
spared. The matter was in a nut-shell ; the answer in 
a word. Take them. There are duties lying nearer us. 
We can wait. 

"But we are not called upon, Mr. Speaker, to say 
that the demand was manly or just. It was unmanly 
and unjust. It was a demand which, in view of her 
history, of the rights she had always claimed and used 

^ Mr. Vallandigham's motive was probably different from that 
of any other speaker on that occasion. See note, page 180. 



228 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

as a belligerent power, of the principles which her great- 
est of jurists — Lord Stowell — had imbedded in the law 
of nations, England was fairly estopped to make." 

Continuing his discussion Mr. Thomas said that Eng- 
land had "done to us a great wrong in availing herself of 
our moment of weakness to make a demand which, 
accompanied as it was by the pomp and circumstance 
of war, was insolent in spirit and thoroughly unjust. It 
was indeed courteous inlanguage,butit was the courtesy 
of Joab to Amasa as he smote him in the fifth rib : 'Art 
thou in health, my brother.?' That message of Lord 
Russell to Lord Lyons which could cross the Atlantic 
had not projectile force enough to have passed from 
Dover to Calais." 

In conclusion he said of the course of England : "But 
the loss will ultimately be hers. She is treasuring up to 
herself wrath against the day of wrath. She has ex- 
cited in the hearts of this people a deep and bitter sense 
of wrong, of injury inflicted at a moment when we could 
not respond. It is night with us now, but through the 
watches of the night, even, we shall be girding our- 
selves to strike the blow of righteous retribution." 

Mr. Wright, of Pennsylvania, said: "I justify the 
act as I understand it is justified by the country. Public 
meetings were everywhere held ; Captain Wilkes was 
everywhere received with acclaim for the act he had 
done ; the secretary of the navy — one of the heads of 
the departments of this government — approved of that 
act. I understand the act to have been approved by the 
whole government. But in the meantime a state of 
things had arisen making it necessary to resort to expe- 
diency in this matter, to save the country from being in- 



OPPOSITION TO THE SURRENDER. 239 

volved in a war with Europe. In that view, I would 
rather surrender these rebel refugees a thousand times 
over than to have them the cause of war. Let England 
take them ; if she has a mind to fete and toast them, let 
her do it — it is none of our business ; if England desires 
to make lions of Confederate rebels, it is a mere matter 
of taste. If they have to be surrendered then let them 
be surrendered under a protest, while we shall remember 
hereafter that there is a matter to be canceled between 
the British government and the United States of North 
America." 

Before the close of the debate Mr. Vallandigham 
took the floor a second time and stated that under the 
circumstances he would "prefer a war with England to 
the humiliation which we have tamely submitted to; 
and I venture the assertion that such a war would have 
called into the field five hundred thousand men who are 
not now there, and never will be without it, and have 
developed an energy and power in the United States 
which no country has exhibited in modern times, except 
France, in her great struggle in 1793." 

A few days after this debate occurred it was proposed 
in the house to vote $35,000 to pay the expenses of an 
exhibit of the United States at an international exposi- 
tion which was soon to be held in London. Mr. Love- 
joy, of Illinois, objected to the measure, and said that 
the United States had "been insulted, dishonored and 
disgraced by the British nation." Continuing he said: 
"That disgrace was all that the nation could bear. We 
marched up to it 'sweating great drops of blood.' We 
approached it as Christ went up to the cross, saying, 'if 
it be possible, let this cup pass from us.' " 



230 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



Mr. Lovejoy then said that inasmuch as the United 
States had submitted to be dishonored by Great Britain he 
thought Americans ought to stay at home until a time 
should come when they would be able to whip the Brit- 
ish nation. Then he w^ould be willing to appear at a 
world's exhibition in London. He then likened his own 
grief to that of the suffering Trojans as related by 
y^neas to Queen Dido.i "Every time this Trent af- 
fair comes up," said he, "every time that an allusion 
is made to it ; every time that I have to think of it, that 
expression of the tortured and agonized Trojan exile 
comes to my lips. I am made to renew the horrible 
grief which I suffered when the new^s of the surrender of 
Mason and Slidell came. I acknowledge it, I literally 
wept tears of vexation. I hate it ; and I hate the British 
government. I have never shared in the traditional hos- 
tility of many of my countrymen against England. But 
I now here publicly avow and record my inextinguish- 
able hatred of that government. I mean to cherish it 
while I live, and to bequeath it as a legacy to my chil- 
dren when I die. And if I am alive when war with 
England comes, as sooner or later it must, for we shall 
never forget this humiliation, and if I can carry a mus- 
ket in that war I will carry it. I have three sons, and I 
mean to charge them, and do now publicly and solemnly 
charge them, that if they shall have at that time reached 
the years of manhood and strength, they shall enter into 
that war. I have always doubted the necessity of that 
surrender. We might have, I think, secured an arbi- 
tration at least, and compelled England to have recog- 

^ See the ^Eneid, Book ii, line 3: "Infandum, regina, jubes 
renovare dolorem," etc. 



MR. LOVEJOrS BITTERNESS. 231 

nized some rule as binding on herself as the law of na- 
tions. This we have not secured. If, however, it was 
a necessity, I could have submitted to it. But I have 
not reached that exalted sublimation of Christianity 
which allows me to be insulted and abused and dishon- 
ored without feeling some indignation. * * * 

"Sir, I trust in God that the time is not far distant 
when we shall have suppressed this rebellion, and be 
prepared to avenge and wipe out this insult that we have 
received. We will then stir ujo Ireland ; we will appeal 
to the Chartists of England ; we will go to the old 
French habitans of Canada ; we will join hands with 
France and Russia to take away the eastern possessions 
of that proud empire, and will darken every jewel that 
glitters in her diadem. Oh ! it was so mean and cow- 
ardly for a nation saying 'father' and 'mother' in the 
same words that we do to come into the house of a 
brother in the day of his calamity. I can not away 
with it." 

On January 6 President Lincoln sent to the senate a 
message transmitting copies of the diplomatic corre- 
spondence relative to the Trent case. Three days later 
the matter was discussed in an extended speech by Mr. 
Sumner who ably defended the course of the United 
States government in surrendering the commissioners. 
He held that the act of Captain Wilkes could be easily 
vindicated by British precedents, but that it became 
very questionable when tried by the liberal principles 
which the United States had always avowed and sought 
to advance with regard to the sea. He said that the 
American government, at an early day, had adopted as 
its policy the principle that only officers or soldiers could 



232 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

be stopped, thus positively excluding the idea of stop- 
ping ambassadors or emissaries of any kind while sail- 
ing under a neutral flag. In support of this statement 
Mr. Sumner reviewed American diplomatic history from 
the beginning so far as it touched upon this question. 
The doctrine of the United States was fully demonstrated 
by quotations from the diplomatic dispatches of Monroe 
and Madison, also by reference to the various treaties of 
the United States with foreign nations. 

"If I am correct in this review," said Mr. Sumner, 
"then the conclusion is inevitable. The seizure of the 
rebel emissaries on board a neutral ship can not be 
justified according to our best American precedents and 
practice. 

"Mr. President, let the rebels go. Two wicked men, 
ungrateful to their country, are let loose with the brand 
of Cain upon their foreheads. Prison doors are opened, 
but principles are established which will help to free 
other men, and to open the gates of the sea." 

This speech was timely and effective. It was well 
received throughout the North. The newspapers com- 
mented upon it in the most favorable terms and it doubt- 
less did much to influence public sentiment in support 
of the surrender. 

The news that the British demand had been conceded 
was a disappointment to the South. "The concession 
of Mr. Seward was a blow to the hopes of the southern 
people. The contemplation of the spectacle of their 
enemy's humiliation in it was but little compensation 
for their disappointment of a European complication in 
the war. Indeed, the conclusion of the Trent affair 
gave a sharp check to the long cherished imagination of 



C ONFEDERA TE VISA PP OIN THEN T. 



233 



the interference of England in the war, at least to the 
extent of her disputing the blockade, which had begun 
to tell on the war-power and general condition of the 
Confederacy, i 

The Richmond Examiner, a representative Confederate 
newspaper, said : "Never since the humiliation of the 
Doge and Senate of Genoa before the footstool of Louis 
XIV has any nation consented to a degradation so deep. 
If Lincoln and Seward intended to give them up at a men- 
ace, why, their people will ask, did they ever capture 
the ambassadors? Why the exultant hurrah over the 
event that went up from nineteen million throats.'' Why 
the glorification of Wilkes.'' Why the cowai^dly insults 
to two unarmed gentlemen, their close imprisonment, 
and the bloodthirsty movements of congress in their 
regard? But, most of all, why did the government 
of Lincoln indulge a full cabinet with an unanimous 
resolution that, under no circumstances, should the 
United States surrender Messrs. Slidell and Mason ? 
Why did they encourage the popular sentiment to a sim- 
ilar position ? The United States government and peo- 
ple swore the great oath to stand on the ground they 
had taken ; the American eagle was brought out ; he 
screeched his loudest screech of defiance — then 

'Dropt like a craven cock his conquered wing,' 

at the first growl of the lion. This is the attitude of the 
enemy." 

The Canadian press commented upon the release of 
Mason and Slidell in the same spirit as did other news- 
papers that were hostile to the United States. The 

* Pollard's Lost Cause, p. 197. 



234 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



Toronto Leader was very abusive and declared that the 
surrender was one of "the greatest collapses since the 
beginning of time." The same journal had much to 
say concerning the "humiliation" of the Federal gov- 
ernment. The Montreal Gazette thought the affair was 
a "bitter, bitter pill for the fire-eaters to cram down 
their noisy throats." 

In England there was, of course, much rejoicing over 
the outcome of the matter. The Federal government 
had been humbled in the eyes of the world and British 
arrogance had triumphed once more. The English 
press, including the reviews, generally sustained the 
course of the government as being necessary and proper. 
It was said that in America the unbridled passions of 
democracy controlled, that this force was unyielding 
and unreasonable, and that a display of military power 
and a menace of war was necessary to secure just con- 
cessions from such a country. 

The Quarterly Review discussed this matter as fol- 
lows: "There ought, then, to have been no difficulty 
nor demur in disavowing the act of Captain Wilkes, 
which, we are told, was not authorized by his govern- 
ment and of which he ostentatiously took the whole re- 
sponsibility upon himself ; nor any delay in releasing 
the prisoners. This is what we should expect from any 
other European power. But in America the pressure 
of mob opinion was brought to bear with disastrous 
weight upon a question the determination of which 
ought to have been left to the calm and dispassionate 
judgment of reflecting men, responsible for the charac- 
ter which the United States have to maintain in their 
relations with foreign powers." 



REJOICING IN ENGLAND. 235 

Continuing his discussion the writer said that the 
Federal states "are now undeceived as to the real 
attitude of England. They must see that it is danger- 
ous to try her patience too far. Her forbearance will 
not be again mistaken for the whispers of fear or at- 
tributed to the dictates of self-interest. We have shown 
that for the sake of restoring to the protection of the 
British flag four strangers — for whom personally we 
cared nothing — we were resolved to engage instantly in 
war." 1 

It was then said that those who assailed British honor 
in future would know the consequences in advance. 
"The lesson has been read; we hope it will be remem- 
bered," continued the writer, and whatever may now 
be said of conciliatory letters it must not be forgotten by 
ourselves that until we had evinced this determination 
by the dispatch of large and formidable armaments 
every act of the American government went to show 
that they fully intended to retain the prisoners." 2 

Mr. Gladstone, then a member of the English cabi- 
net, in a public speech concerning the matter, taunt- 
ingly charged the American people with being unstable 
and cowardly. He said: "Let us look to the fact 
that they are of necessity a people subject to quick and 
violent action of opinion, and liable to great public ex- 
citement, intensely agreed upon the subject of the war 
in which they are engaged, until aroused to a high pitch 
of expectation by hearing that one of their vessels of 
war had laid hold on the commissioners of the southern 
states whom they regarded simply as rebels. Let us 

^London Quarterly Review, No. 221, pp. 273-274. 
•London Quarterly Review, No. 221, pp. 273-274. 



236 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

look to the fact that in the midst of that exultation, and 
in a country where the principles of popular govern- 
ment and of democracy are carried to the extreme — 
that even, however, in this matter of life and death, as 
they think it to be — that while ebullitions were taking 
place all over the country, of joy and exultation at cap- 
ture — that even then this popular and democratic gov- 
ernment has, under a demand of a foreign power, writ- 
ten these words, for they are the closing words in the 
dispatch of Mr. Seward: 'The four commissioners will 
be cheerfully liberated.' " ^ 
' In the exultation over the "victory," as it was called, 
/ less notice was taken of Mason and Slidell personally. 
' Their importance to the British nation diminished after 

y ^ they were surrendered. It was enough to know that, 

under the menace of a foreign war in addition to the 

' domestic insurrection the United States government had 

■^^ yielded to a peremptory demand to surrender the pris- 

oners, and that they had actually been restored to British 
protection again. The London Star said: "When 
Mason and Slidell have been surrendered to us it will 
surely be time to declare in what capacity we, as a na- 
tion, are to receive them — whether as the envoys of Mr. 
Jefferson Davis or as inoffensive visitors to a country 
where the rebel slave-owner and fugitive negro are wel- 
come alike to the protection of the law." The Times 
said : "We do sincerely hope that our countrymen will 
not give these fellows anything in the shape of an ova- 
tion. The civility that is due to a foe in distress is all 
that they can claim. We have returned them good for 
evil, and sooth to say, we should be exceedingly sorry 

* Speech at Edinburgh, January, 1S62. 



COMMENTS OF THE ''TIMESr 



237 



that they should ever be in a situation to choose what 
return they will make for the good we have now done 
them. They are here for their own interests, in order, 
if possible, to drag us into their own quarrel, and, but 
for the unpleasant contingencies of a prison, rather dis- 
appointed, perhaps, that their detention has not pro- 
voked a new war. When they stepped on board the 
Trent they did not trouble themselves with the thought 
of the mischief they might be doing an unoffending neu- 
tral ; and if now, by any less perilous device, they could 
entangle us in the war, no doubt they would be only too 
happy. We trust there is no chance of their doing this, 
for, impartial as the British public is in the matter, it 
certainly has no prejudice in favor of slavery, which, if 
anything, these gentlemen represent. What they and 
their secretaries are to do here passes our conjecture. 
They are personally nothing to us. They must not sup- 
pose, because we have gone to the very verge of a great 
war to rescue them, that therefore they are precious in our 
eyes. We should have done just as much to rescue two 
of their own negroes ; and had that been the object of 
the rescue, the swarthy Pompey and Caesar would have 
had just the same right to triumphal arches and municipal 
addresses as Messrs. Mason and Slidell. So, please, 
British public, let's have none of these things. Let the 
commissioners come up quietly to town and have their 
say with anybody who may have time to listen to them. 
For our part, we can not see how anything they have to 
tell can turn the scale of British duty and deliberation. 
There have been so many cases of peoples and nations 
establishing an actual independence, and compelling the 
recognition of the world, that all we have to do is what 



238 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

we have done before, up to the very last year. This is 
now a simple matter of precedent. Our statesmen and 
lawyers know quite as much on the subject as Messrs. 
Mason and Slidell, and are in no need of their informa- 
tion or advice. "1 

When the commissioners were surrendered, a por- 
tion of the British troops dispatched to Canada to 
menace the United States had not yet arrived. With a 
stroke of the wit which often characterized his dealing 
with his opponents, !Mr. Seward proceeded to inform 
the British consul at Portland, Maine, that these troops 
would be permitted to land at that city and pass freely 
through the territory of the United States by rail to their 
destination, thus avoiding the risk and suffering inci- 
dent to a passage by the Canadian route beset by the 
snow and ice of an inclement midwinter season. 

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES, 

1. Congressional Globe, 2d Session 37th Congress. 

2. London Quarterly Review, No. 221. 

3. Lossing, B. J.: The Civil War in America, Vol. 11. 

4. Magazine of American History, March, 18S6. 

5. Newspapers, January, 1S62, as follows: Richmond Ex- 
aminer, Toronto Leader, Montreal Gazette, London Star, Lon- 
don Times. 

6. Paris, Compte de: History of the Civil War in America. 

7. Pollard, E. A.: The Lost Cause. 

8. Southern Law Review, Vol. viii. 

9. Sumner, Charles: Speech in the U.S. Senate, January 
9, 1862. 

10. Sumner, Charles: Works of, Vol. vil. 

^ See London Times, Jan. 11, 1862." 



CHAPTER XVIII. 

EARL RUSSELL'S VIEW OF THE AMERICAN POSITION. 

On January lo, 1862, Lord Russell addressed a note 
to Lord Lyons stating that her majesty's government 
had carefully considered how far Mr. Seward's note and 
its concessions complied with the British demand. He 
then recited the fact that the Federal government had 
agreed to an unconditional surrender of the prisoners, 
that Captain Wilkes had acted entirely without instruc- 
tions, and that the secretary of state expressly forebore 
to justify the act complained of. His lordship also said 
that if the United States government had sanctioned the 
unauthorized act of Captain Wilkes, it would thereby 
have become responsible for "the original violence and 
insult" offered; but that Mr. Seward had stated that 
what had happened had been only "an inadvertency 
consisting in a departure by a naval officer, free from 
any wrongful motive, from a rule uncertainly established, 
and probably by the several parties concerned either im- 
perfectly understood or entirely unknown ; and that 
reparation was justly due. Earl Russell said that her 
majesty's government had carefully taken into consider- 
ation the surrender of the prisoners, the delivery of them 

(239) 



240 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

again into British hands, and also the explanations of 
Mr. Seward — all of which constituted the desired re- 
dress. His lordship said that her majesty's government 
differed, however, from many of the conclusions which 
Mr. Seward had arrived at in his discussion of the inter- 
national law points in the case, and that these differ- 
ences would be fully presented in a future dispatch. 

Accordingly, on January 23, 1862, Earl Russell ad- 
dressed a dispatch to Lord Lyons in which the differ- 
ences were fully discussed. The only ground upon 
which a foreign government could treat the matter, ac- 
cording to Lord Russell's view, was upon the supposi- 
tion that the captured persons were not rebels but only 
enemies of the United States at war with its government, 
hence the discussion was to be confined solely to the 
principles of international law involved. 

The first inquiry that arose was whether the commis- 
sioners and their supposed dispatches were contraband 
of war or not. "Upon this question," said his lord- 
ship, "Her majesty's government differ entirely from 
Mr. Seward. The general right and duty of a neutral 
power to maintain its own communications and friendly 
relations with both belligerents can not be disputed." 

In support of this proposition it was held that a neu- 
tral nation has certain duties to perform toward both 
parties at war, that it may have most direct and material 
interests in the performance of such duties on both sides, 
and especially was this true when its citizens, resident 
both there and at home, have valuable property in the 
territories of both belligerents. Such property may be 
exposed to acts of violence or confiscation, if the pro- 
ection of the neutral government be withheld, and this, 



LORD RUSSELL'S VIEWS. 241 

in his lordship's opinion, was "the case with respect to 
British subjects" in the civil war then existing in the 
United States. The opinion was expressed that a neu- 
tral had the right to maintain necessary relations with 
both belligerents. This being true it would follow that 
a neutral, carrying diplomatic persons or dispatches of 
one belligerent, would not be guilty of an act of hostil- 
ity toward the other party at war, and that this princi- 
ple applied with equal force to the diplomatic agents of 
an unrecognized power. Various texts and precedents 
>vere then quoted in support of the foregoing opinion, 
after which his lordship said: "It appears to her ma- 
jesty's government to be a necessary and certain deduc- 
tion from these principles that the conveyance of public 
agents of this character from Havana to St. Thomas, on 
their way to Great Britain and France, and of their cre- 
dentials and dispatches (if any) on board the Trent, 
was not and could not be a violation of the duties of 
neutrality on the part of that vessel, and, both for that 
reason and, also, because the destination of these per- 
sons and of their dispatches was bona Jide neutral, it is, 
in the judgment of her majesty's government, clear and 
certain that they were not contraband." 

The nature of contraband of war was then explained 
and it was held that articles of that nature must always 
have a hostile and not a neutral destination. "On 
what just principle," said Lord Russell, "can it be con- 
tended that a hostile destination is less necessary, or a 
neutral destination more noxious, for constituting a con- 
traband character in the case of public agents or dis- 
patches than in the case of arms and ammunition?" 
16 



242 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



Mr. Seward had endeavored to sustain his own conclu- 
sion by quoting from Sir William Scott whose opinion 
was based upon the doctrines of Vattel. His lordship 
held that Mr. Seward had wrongly interpreted the quo- 
tations. Reasons were then given for a different con- 
struction, and the conclusion reached that "no writer of 
authority has ever suggested that an ambassador pro- 
ceeding to a neutral state on board one of its merchant 
ships is contraband of war." 

The rule deduced from the texts and precedents as 
explained by Earl Russell was "that you may stop an 
enemy's ambassador in any place of which you are your- 
self the master, or in any other place where you have a 
right to exercise acts of hostility. Your own territory, 
or ships of your own country, are places of which you 
are yourself the master. The enemy's territory or the 
enemy's ships are places in which you have a right to 
exercise acts of hostility. Neutral vessels guilty of no 
violation of the laws of neutrality are places where you 
have no right to exercise acts of hostility." 

"It would be an inversion of the doctrine that ambas- 
sadors have peculiar privileges to argue that they are 
less protected than other men. The right conclusion is, 
that an ambassador sent to a neutral power is inviolable 
on the high seas, as well as in neutral waters, while un- 
der. the protection of the neutral flag." 

Mr. Seward had stated that the circumstance that the 
Trent was proceeding from one neutral port to another 
neutral port did not modify the belligerent right of cap- 
ture, as based upon British authorities. This was dis- 
puted by his lordship, who said: "It is undoubtedly the 
law as laid down by British authorities that if the real 



L ORD R USSELVS VIE WS. 



243 



destination of the vessel be hostile (that is, to the 
enemy, or the enemy's country), it can not be covered 
and rendered innocent by a fictitious destination to a 
neutral port. But if the real terminus of the voyage be 
bona Jide in a neutral territory, no English, nor, indeed, 
as her majesty's government believe, any American 
authority can be found which has ever given counte- 
nance to the doctrine that either men or dispatches can 
be subject, during such a voyage, and on board such a 
neutral vessel, to belligerent capture as contraband of 
war. Her majesty's government regard such a doc- 
trine as wholly irreconcilable with the true principles of 
maritime law, and certainly with those principles as 
they have been understood in the courts of this country." 

It was then observed that packet ships carrying mails, 
while not exempt from visit and search in time of war 
nor from the penalties of any violation of neutrality 
when proved guilty, were still entitled to the special 
favor and protection of their governments, and should 
not be detained or disturbed or interfered with unless 
there should be excellent reasons for doing so. 

Earl Russell held that, if Mr. Seward's doctrine were 
true, "any packet ship carrying a Confederate agent 
from Dover to Calais, or from Calais to Dover, might 
be captured and carried to New York. In case of a 
war between Austria and Italy, the conveyance of an 
Italian minister or agent might cause the capture of a 
neutral packet plying between Malta and Marseilles, or 
between Malta and Gibraltar, the condemnation of the 
ship at Trieste, and the confinement of the minister or 
agent in an Austrian prison. So in the late war be- 
tween Great Britain and France on the one hand, and 



244 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



Russia on the other, a Russian minister going from 
Hamburg to Washington in an American ship might have 
been brought to Portsmouth, the ship might have been 
condemned, and the minister sent to the Tower of London. 
So also a Confederate vessel-of-war might capture a 
Cunard steamer on its way from Halifax to Liverpool, 
on the ground of its carrying dispatches from Mr. 
Seward to Mr. Adams. In view, therefore, of the 
erroneous principles asserted by Mr. Seward, and the 
consequences they involve, her majesty's government 
think it necessary to declare that they would not ac- 
quiesce in the capture of any British merchant ship in 
circumstances similar to those of the Trent, and the 
fact of its being brought before a prize court, though it 
would alter the character, would not diminish the grav- 
ity of the offense against the law of nations which would 
thereby be committed." 

His lordship thought that the disposition of theques- 
tion concerning the contraband nature of the men and 
the dispatches rendered unnecessary any discussion of 
the other questions raised by Mr. Seward, although 
notice was taken of the latter's assertion that if the 
safety of the Union required the detention of the com- 
missioners, it would be the right and duty of the Fed- 
eral government to detain them, but happily the waning 
proportions of the insurrection, and the comparative 
unimportance of the captured persons themsejves for- 
bade a resort to that defense. To this a haughty reply 
was made, as follows: "Mr. Seward does not here 
assert any right founded on international law, however 
inconvenient or irritating to neutral nations ; he entirely 
loses sight of the vast difference which exists between 



LORD RUSSELVS VIEWS. 245 

the exercise of an extreme right and the commission of 
an unquestionable wrong. His frankness compels me 
to be equally open, and to inform him that Great Britain 
could not have submitted to the perpetration of that 
wrong, however flourishing might have been the insur- 
rection in the South, and however important the per- 
sons captured might have been." 

In conclusion his lordship expressed a hope that 
similar dangers, should they arise, might be settled by 
peaceful negotiations, and requested that "this dis- 
patch" be read to Mr. Seward and a copy of it fur- 
nished him. Such was the formal rejoinder of her 
majesty's government to Mr. Seward's letter conceding 
the British demand. It was not to be expected that 
silence would be maintained or that the doctrines of the 
American secretary of state would be acquiesced in. 
To pursue either of these courses would have been for 
the British government to concede too much, and in the 
estimation of itself, to lose dignity in the eye of the 
world. 

AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. British Annual Register, 1861. 

2. Dana's Wheaton's International Law, section 504, note. 

3. Magazine of American Historj', June, 1886. 

4. McPherson's Political History of the Rebellion. 

5. North American Review, Vol. xcv, pp. 35-50. 

6. Wharton's Digest of the International Law of the U. S. 
This is Senate Mis, Doc, No, 162, Part 3, 49 Cong,, ist Sess, 



CHAPTER XIX. 

INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE TRENT CASE. 

In any discussion of the Trent case from the stand- 
point of international law, all purely political phases of 
the matter should be omitted. That the captured per- 
sons were dangerous enemies of the United States, that 
they were going to Europe to secure aid in the destruc- 
tion of the American Union, that the British demand 
for their surrender was backed by extensive prepara- 
tions for war, that a refusal to give up the men meant a 
conflict with England and a permanently divided re- 
public — these are all matters not easy to leave out of 
consideration. They have no place, however, in this 
chapter, since they can have no bearing upon the princi- 
ples of international law which are applicable to this 
case. 

It may be safely assumed that the right of a belliger- 
ent to proceed against a neutral in any given case de- 
pends upon the legality of the act of the neutral which 
it is proposed to call in question. The law of nations 
forbids a neutral to perform for either belligerent any 
service which will aid in conducting hostilities. Among 
the acts thus prohibited maybe mentioned the transpor- 
tation of either officers or dispatches when they are of a 

(247) 



248 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

military character ; also soldiers, arms, ammunition and 
other things which are classed as contraband of war. 
Knowingly to violate this law renders a neutral ship lia- 
ble to capture and confiscation. 

If these premises be correctly stated, it follows that the 
legality of the course of the Trent will settle the ques- 
tion as to what Captain Wilkes had a right to do in this 
case. The first matter to be considered then is whether 
the law of nations was violated when the Confederate 
commissioners with their secretaries and dispatches were 
knowingly received on board the Trent at Havana and 
allowed to proceed toward their destination. If these 
men and their dispatches were contraband of war by 
the law of nations, it follows that the vessel which 
carried them was liable to seizure and condemnation by 
the Federal authorities. 

In his letter conceding the British demand Mr. Sew- 
ard discussed this matter and arrived at the conclusion 
that the commissioners and their dispatches were con- 
traband. He said: "All writers and judges pro- 
nounce naval or military persons in the service of the 
enemy contraband. Vattel says war allows us to cut 
off from an enemy all of his resources, and to hinder 
him from sending ministers to solicit assistance. And 
Sir William Scott says you may stop the ambassador 
of your enemy on his passage. Dispatches are not less 
clearly contraband, and the bearers or couriers who 
undertake to carry them fall under the same condemna- 
tion." Mr. Seward also held that "pretended minis- 
ters of a usurping power, not recognized as legal by 
either the belligerent or the neutral," were none the 
less contraband and, in support of his position, quoted 



MR. SEWARD'S OPINION EXAMINED. 



249 



from Sir William Scott, who had once expressed an 
opinion upon the matter, as follows: "It appears to, 
me on principle to be but reasonable that when it is of 
sufficient importance to the enemy that such persons 
shall be sent out on the public service at the public ex- 
pense, it should afford equal ground of forfeiture 
against the vessel that may be let out for a purpose so 
intimately connected with the hostile operations." 

Vattel, whom Mr. Seward quotes in support of his 
position that ambassadors of an enemy may be cut off, 
wrote at a time when many principles of international 
law were not fully settled. His doctrines were in ac- 
cordance with the illiberal ideas of international comity 
which prevailed in that age. The passage referred to 
by Mr. Seward reads as follows, when carefully trans- 
lated from the original French: "His (the enemy's) 
people may also be attacked and seized wherever we 
have a right to commit acts of hostility. Not only, 
therefore, may we justly refuse a passage to the minis- 
ters whom our enemies send to other sovereigns ; we 
may even arrest them if they attempt to pass privately 
and without permission through places belonging to our 
jurisdiction." 1 To illustrate his meaning more fully 

^ Vattel, Book iv, chapter 7, section 85. As further evidence 
that the older writers on international law did not hold to the 
doctrine that an ambassador may be arrested on neutral ter- 
ritory, Grotius may be quoted. He says: "Aliud sit si, quis 
extra fines suos, insidias ponat legatis alienis; eo enim jus gen- 
tium violarentur." De Jure Belli et Pacis, Lib. 11, cap. 18, sec. 5. 
Translated as follows bj Sir T. Twiss: "It is quite another 
thing, if any prince shall out of his own territory contrive to 
surprise the ambassadors of another state, for this would be a 
direct breach of the law of nations." 



250 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



Vattel then gives an instance of what he regards as a 
lawful arrest, viz. : that of Marshall Belle-Isle, a French 
minister who was arrested in 1744 while passing through 
Hanover. He was seized by the troops of George II, 
who was then at war with France. As George II of 
England was also ruler of Hanover, he had a right to 
make the seizure in his own territory. 

It is evident that Vattel means to limit the right to 
seize the ambassador of an anemy, and that in his opin- 
ion this right can be exercised only where one has a 
"right to commit acts of hostility." This can not be 
done on the deck of a neutral ship unless there is suf- 
ficient cause for such a proceeding. If the Trent had 
been conveying troops to the Confederates, or if she 
had escaped through a Federal blockading squadron, 
she would then have become liable to seizure, and acts 
of hostility could have been exercised against her by 
Captain Wilkes. Since she had been guilty of nothing 
of this character, it is evident that the only ground for 
proceeding against her was the assumption that the Con- 
federate ambassadors were on board her and that their 
presence there gave to her a hostile character. But the 
latter fact is the test of right — a thing which we are not 
warranted in assuming. A neutral vessel is not a place 
over which one can exercise acts of hostility, unless 
there be evidences of a breach of neutrality. It is not 
a place "over which one is master." The mere fact 
that ambassadors of a hostile power are on board a neu- 
tral vessel is not of itself evidence of a breach of neu- 
trality. If Captain Wilkes had made the arrest in one 
of the southern blockaded harbors, or if he had inter- 
cepted the Theodora and captured the commissioners, 



MR. SEWARD'S OPINION EXAMINED. 251 

the act would have been, in either case, entirely in 
accordance with Vattel's rule, but, as it was, there is 
certainly much room for doubt. The legal status of 
the commissioners, or the rights of a Federal naval 
officer toward them while on board a Confederate ves- 
sel or in a southern harbor, was quite different from 
their status on a neutral deck. 

When Sir William Scott said, as asserted by Mr. 
Seward, that you may stop the ambassador of your 
enemy on his passage, the opinion was only a quotation 
from Vattel and was prefaced by the assertion that "you 
may exercise your right of war against them (ambassa- 
dors) wherever the character of hostility exists." ^ The 
ambassador of an enemy may be captured, then, only 
in those places where you can exercise acts of hostility. 
Mr. Seward's isolated quotation conveys a meaning dif- 
ferent from that of the passage taken as a whole. 

From the case of the Orozembo^ (1807) Mr. Seward 
concludes that persons in the civil employ of a govern- 
ment may be captured on the passage, and that, when 
sent out at public expense, they may be seized, whether 
their government be a recognized one or not. 

The Orozembo was an American vessel which went 
from Rotterdam to Lisbon and there took in three 
Dutch military officers of distinction ; also two persons 
to be employed in a civil capacity at Batavia — the place 
to which the vessel was proceeding, although she falsely 
held out as her destination Macao, another and neutral 
port. It also appeared that she was under contract with 

* Case of the Caroline, 6 Robinson's Admiralty Reports, pp. 
467, 468. 

• See 6 Robinson's Adm. Rep., 430. 



252 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



the Dutch government to carry for a consideration such 
persons as might be designated, without regard to num- 
ber. She thus became a transport ship under the con- 
trol of the enemy, let to do hostile service. During the 
term of her contract she was subject to the orders of an 
enemy ; her voyage in this instance began at a hostile 
port ; it was to end at a port of the same enemy. An 
attempt was made to conceal these facts. 

Such were the circumstances in the case which led to 
the condemnation of the Orozembo. The conditions 
under which the voyage was made and the presence on 
board her of three distinguished military officers would 
have been sufficient cause for condemnation, without 
taking into account the fact that she carried two officers 
in the civil employ of Holland. After announcing the 
principle that "a vessel hired by the enemy for the con- 
veyance of military persons is to be considered a trans- 
port subject to condemnation," Sir William Scott says, 
"whether the principle would apply to them alone 
(civil officers) I do not feel it necessary to determine." 
He then uses the language quoted by Seward. The 
passage referred to by Mr. Seward is only a dictum — a 
personal opinion of the judge — and is not to be under- 
stood or construed as an established principle of public 
law. An able writer of international law says of this 
quotation: "Even as a dictum^ it does not touch the 
case of a neutral vessel not let out as a transport, and 
merely having civil officers of a belligerent government 
on board, without other circumstances tending to show 
the vessel herself to be in the enemy's service." ^ 

* See Wheaton's International Law, edited by Dana, note, 
page 641. 



MR. SEWARD'S OPINION EXAMINED. 



253 



It appears, then, from a careful consideration of the 
authorities relied upon by Mr. Seward to establish the 
contraband character of the men, that his conclusion is 
not warranted. 

He also held that the dispatches of the Confederate 
commissioners were contraband and their bearers liable 
to condemnation. No reason for this opinion was given 
save the relation of the supposed contents of the dis- 
patches to the errand of Messrs. Mason and Slidell 
abroad. The only knowledge of the nature or even the 
existence of these dispatches was based upon informa- 
tion of their arrival in Europe furnished by the United 
States consul at Paris. ^ In the case of the Rapid 
(1810), an American vessel proceeding from New York 
to Tonningen, both neutral ports, it was held that where 
a neutral vessel not in the employ of an enemy trans- 
ports noxious dispatches while pursuing her regular em- 
ployment, her guilt depends upon the act of her master 
or those in charge of her, in receiving such communica- 
tions. In such cases Sir William Scott laid down the 
rule that "the caution must be proportioned to the cir- 
cumstances under which such papers are received." 

* The commissioners had official dispatches in their possession 
while on board the Trent. Mr. Alfred Slidell, a son of one of 
the commissioners and a passenger on the Trent at the time she 
was stopped, said in answer to a recent letter of inquiry from 
the author: "At the time Messrs. Mason and Slidell were seized 
by Capt. Wilkes, they were, of course, in possession of their 
letters of credence, besides other official documents. As far as 
I can remember, no search was made, by the officers of the San 
Jacinto, for official documents, nor any attempt made to inter- 
fere with the members of the families of the four gentlemen 
seized." 



254 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



It was held that when each terminus of the voyage is 
a neutral port "there is less to excite his vigilance." ^ 
Even this rule is relaxed in the case of diplomatic dis- 
spatches.2 A more stringent rule would subject neutral 
vessels to a most irksome surveillance, and greatly dis- 
turb mail communications, since not even a single letter 
could be accepted with safety. 

The case of the Caroline has already been cited. 
This was the case of an American vessel which was 
captured while proceeding from New York to Bordeaux 
in 1808. She carried a dispatch from the French min- 
ister in the United States to his own government. Sir 
William Scott held in this instance that diplomatic dis- 
patches are not contraband of war, since they are not 
presumed to partake of a hostile nature. It is true that 
they may be so, but the remedy is not the capture of the 
ship. The redress must be political and diplomatic. 

The case of the Atalanta^ has been cited as one where 
diplomatic dispatches were regarded as contraband of 
war. There are, however, many points of difference 
between the case of this vessel and that of the Trent. 
The Atalanta was a neutral vessel which carried dis- 
patches of an official character. They were in charge 
of the supercargo who planned to conceal them, and 
actually did this when his vessel was boarded and 
searched by a British cruiser. The noxious papers were 
discovered only by accident. This vessel also carried a 
French artillery officer who was disguised as a planter, 

* See case of the Rapid, Edwards' Reports, p. 228. 
' See case of the Madison, Edwards' Reports, p. 224. 
' See 6 Robinson's Adm. Rep., 440-460. 



MR. SEWARD'S OPINION EXAMINED. 255 

and who was the real bearer of the dispatches. These 
facts having been proved, Sir William Scott held that 
the vessel was answerable for the acts of her super- 
cargo, who had refused to grant, in good faith, the 
right of search, and had fraudulently concealed the dis- 
patches which were on board. It was decided that, by 
such a course, the officer of the ship "lends himself to 
effect a communication the enemy may cut off ; under 
protection of an ostensible neutral character, he does in 
fact place himself in the service of the enemy's state." 
The many points of difference between this case, then, 
and the one under consideration are quite apparent. 

In Mr. Seward's letter conceding the demands of 
Great Britain, he held that the circumstance that the 
Trent was proceeding from one neutral port to another 
neutral port was not proof of her innocence, and that it 
in no way modified the right of the captor. He said 
that he read British authorities to this effect. Lord Rus- 
sell thought this a remarkable passage in Mr. Seward's 
letter, and held that the fact that both termini of the 
voyage were not only ostensibly but bona Jide neutral 
was conclusive evidence of the innocence of the vessel. 
There is certainly no good reason why this should be 
the rule in such cases, and if the matter is to be deter- 
mined by British precedent, Mr. Seward was correct in 
his assumption. The case of the Rapid (already re- 
ferred to) may be cited as one directly in point. In this 
instance the voyage began at a neutral port, and was to 
end at another neutral port. The Rapid was released, 
but this was done solely on the ground that her master 
had not been at fault in receiving the noxious papers for 



256 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

transmission. He had, in fact, exercised all of the legal 
caution that was necessary in receiving them on board 
his ship. He had no knowledge of their contents. If, 
in 1 8 10, British law regarded as innocent every vessel 
plying between neutral ports, this would have been con- 
clusive in favor of the Rapid, without any inquiry what- 
ever into the conduct of her master. The fact of neu- 
tral termini of her voyage would undoubtedly have 
been the ground of her release, if Sir William Scott 
had understood this to be British law at that time. Since 
he did not so decide, the only inference which can be 
drawn from his course is that he did not understand 
such to be the law. 

Dana, in discussing the probable decision of an 
American prize court, concerning this matter, says: 
"As the official character of these persons, the general 
nature of their mission, and the probable general char- 
acter of their papers, and the termini of their journey, 
were well known to the persons in charge of the Trent, 
and they took them on board knowingly and voluntarily 
to frank them under the neutral flag over a part of their 
hazardous passage, there can be no doubt that the fate 
of the Trent would have been the same, whether her 
termini were neutral or hostile ports. "^ Contrary 
opinions, however, are not difficult to find. An eminent 
American authority says: "The character of the vessel 
{i. e., the Trent) as a packet ship conveying mails and 
passengers from one neutral port to another, almost pre- 
cluded the possibility of guilt. Even if hostile military 
persons had been found on board, it might be a question 

* Dana's Wheaton, note, section 504. 



VARIOUS OPINIONS EXAMINED. 



257 



whether their presence would Involve the ship in guilt, 
as they were going from a neutral country to a neutral 
country."' 

As an example of an opinion in which this same 
doctrine is carried to the extreme, that of M. Haute- 
feuille may be mentioned. He sustains Lord Rus- 
sell's position and declares without reserve that the sail- 
ing of a neutral vessel between two neutral ports is ab- 
solute and conclusive evidence in her favor. 2 This, 
however, is only a personal opinion not based upon judi- 
cial precedent, and hence, not worthy of special con- 
sideration. 

The sounder rule of international law, as deduced 
from the practice of both English and American prize 
courts, seems to be that the fact of the sailing of a neu- 
tral vessel between two neutral ports is not to be re- 
garded as an indifferent matter in determining the ques- 
tion of her guilt or innocence. It is always an evidence 
in favor of the neutral, although not by any means a con- 
clusive one. 

The Queen's neutrality proclamation, issued at the 
beginning of the war, forbade her majesty's subjects 
from "carrying officers, soldiers, dispatches., arms, mili- 
tary stores," etc., for either of the contending parties. 
It has been held that this alone would have been suffi- 
cient to decide the case against the Trent. Such a view 
of the matter Is, however, not correct. The term ^'■dis- 

* Dr. Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International 
Law, section 199. 

* See Hautefeuille's Pamphlet, "Questions of Maritime Inter- 
national Law." 

17 



258 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

patches,^ ^ as used in the proclamation, evidently means 
those of a military nature only, since it is enumerated 
along with other words used to define operations of that 
kind. The language does not express or even imply 
any relation to communications of a diplomatic nature. 

It was not the design or intent of the proclamation to 
lay down any new international law, but only to warn 
British subjects against the things already forbidden by 
the law of nations and by the statutes of Great Britain. 
It was simply an application of these various laws to 
the existing status of the belligerents. 

Diplomatic persons are, by the law of nations, en- 
titled to the special favor and protection of govern- 
ments. Since Messrs. Mason and Slidell were the 
representatives of an unrecognized insurgent power, the 
question arises as to whether they were entitled to any 
of the immunities and privileges uniformly extended to 
diplomatic ministers. There is no judicial decision 
which bears even remotely upon a matter of this kind. 
On the one hand it may be said that the government 
represented by these men had received no sort of recog- 
nition except that of belligerency. Their mission was 
not the usual one of diplomatic representatives who 
conduct the friendly and established diplomacy of sov- 
ereign nations, but it was to obtain foreign aid for an 
insurrection in America, and to become recognized min- 
isters abroad, should the independence of the Con- 
federacy be established. 

On the other hand it may be argued that where an 
insurgent power has been recognized as a belligerent, 
this carries with it the right to maintain at least informal 
relations with foreign states whose subjects may have 



DIPLOMATIC STATUS OF INSURGENTS. 259 

extensive material interests in the insurgent state or be 
temporary residents of it. The interest and convenience 
of foreign nations require this. To cut off all diplo- 
matic communication, even of an informal character, in 
such cases, would be to declare a practical outlawry 
against a nation already in possession of the rights of 
belligerents. Such a course would also prevent any new 
nation from ever becoming recognized as sovereign and 
independent. Informal diplomatic relations must pre- 
cede formal ones, and if the former be entirely cut off, 
how can the latter be established at all.? Informal 
diplomatic relations were held between the representa- 
tives of the South American republics and the United 
States government, prior to the recognition of the in- 
dependence of the former. 1 If a diplomatic agent of 
one of these insurgent republics had embarked on a 
United States merchant vessel at some neutral foreign 
port, with the design of coming to New York, and if 
this vessel had been stopped by a Spanish man-of-war, 
and the diplomatic agent forcibly removed, or if the 
American ship had been captured for no other reason 
than the presence on board her of such an emissary, it 
is doubtful whether the United States government would 
have quietly acquiesced in either of these proceedings. 
If it be conceded that informal diplomatic relations 
may be held between an unrecognized government and 
a foreign state, this would seem to carry with it the 
right to whatever of immunity is necessary to make 
such relations effective. Whenever an international law 
court shall be called upon to decide this question, it will 

* See J. Q^ Adams's Memoirs, Vol. v, chapter 12. 



26o THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

have to be done upon principle and without the aid of a 
judicial precedent. 

In considering the question as to whether the Con- 
federate commissioners were contraband of war or not, 
Captain Wilkes's theory that they were "the embodi- 
ment of dispatches" or "living epistles," deserves a 
brief notice. It was only a cleverly devised fiction of 
public law, and of no value. It has never received any 
recognition whatever from official or authoritative 
sources. Dr. Woolsey says : "It is simply absurd to 
say that these men were living dispatches, "i Count de 
Gasparin says: "The doctrine of 77ian dispatches is the 
weak side of the American argument. In such a matter, 
it is not permissible to extend by force of reasoning, or 
even a fortiori^ the categories fixed by the law of 
nations. "2 

Captain Wilkes had an undoubted right to stop and 
search the Trent for contraband of war. Officially, it 
was neither denied nor complained of by the British 
government. Writers on international law are practic- 
ally unanimous in their support of the doctrine that a 
belligerent cruiser may search neutral ships for contra- 
band, in time of war. This is a right that is both just 
and necessary, since it is the only way by which the bel- 
ligerent may ascertain beyond doubt whether the neutral 
is performing contraband service for an enemy. 

In the beginning of this discussion it was stated that 
the right of Captain Wilkes to capture the Trent de- 
pended upon the legality of her act in carrying the men 
and their dispatches, and that this, in turn, depended 

* Introduction to the Study of International Law, section 199. 
*"L'Am6rique devant I'Europe," chapter on the Trent. 



THE SEIZURE UNSUSTAINED. 261 

upon their contraband character. When Mr. Seward 
assumed that they were contraband, the burden of proof 
rested upon him. He appealed to British authorities 
only in support of his position. If the present examination 
of these authorities has shown that Mr. Seward's position 
was untenable and that the men were not contraband of 
war, it follows that Captain Wilkes had no right to capture 
the Trent, unless there were other reasons for such a 
procedure. If no such right existed then, clearly, no 
right was waived — as claimed by Mr. Seward — when 
she was permitted to proceed upon her journey instead 
of being brought into port for adjudication. If the men 
and their dispatches were not contraband of war, there 
appears to be no valid reason for the capture. 

It can not be held that the United States had the right 
to seize them as an exercise of ocean police powers, 
such as England practiced a half century before when 
she took out of neutral ships men of pretended English 
birth. Any such position was disclaimed by Mr. Sew- 
ard, and it is a matter of history that the United States 
has always denied the existence of such a right. 

Neither can it be pretended that the seizure was justi- 
fiable because the men were rebels or political offend- 
ers, no matter what the relation of their government 
was to the other governments of the world. The United 
States has always maintained the right of asylum for 
this class of men, and the right of a foreign power to 
do this in the case of American offenders could not be 
consistently denied. A criminal or a traitor can not be 
taken from the protection of a neutral foreign flag ex- 
cept in accordance with the provisions of a treaty be- 



263 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

twecn the powers providing for the extradition of such 
offenders according to forms of law. 

If, independently of the fact that the commissioners 
and their dispatches were on board, there had existed 
any valid reason for seizing the Trent and bringing her 
into port, this course could have been pursued, and, as 
soon as she had entered American waters, these men, 
being citizens of the United States, would have been 
amenable to the laws of their country. Their arrest and 
imprisonment then would have been entirely legal. It 
would have been, in that case, only an incidental mat- 
ter which could be in no way connected with the cap- 
ture and detention of the vessel upon which they trav- 
eled. 

If the Trent had been brought into port, a prize court 
would have met with difficulties in adjusting the case. 
Maritime law deals only in rem., that is, with things or 
property, not with persons. The ship and her cargo 
would have been either condemned as prize or released 
with an award of damages to her owners. But what- 
ever the decision of the court concerning the vessel and 
her cargo, the status of Messrs. Mason and Slidell 
would have been precisely the same. Dana, in review- 
ing this matter, says that under these circumstances they 
"could not be condemned or released by the court. 
They would doubtless have been held as prisoners of war 
by the United States government. In the event of a de- 
cision favorable to the captors, the case of the persons 
would still be a diplomatic one." i 

If American doctrine had been consulted, Mr. Sew- 
ard could have found in it nothing to sustain his views 

^* Wheaton's International Law, section 504, note. 



AMERICAN PRECEDENTS. 263 

concerning the contraband character of the men and 
their dispatches. The United States government, from 
the earliest period of its history, had pursued a mari- 
time policy entirely different from that sustained by Mr. 
Seward in his dispatch conceding the British demand 
for the surrender of Messrs. Mason and Slidell. The 
doctrine, announced by the founders of the American 
republic in their earliest state papers and steadily ad- 
hered to thereafter, was not left to the uncertainties of 
maritime court decisions, but was put into the form of 
positive law and made a special part of the treaty stipu- 
lations with foreign countries. In the very first treaty 
ever made by the United States with a foreign power, 
namely, the one negotiated with France by Benjamin 
Franklin in 1778, it was provided that no class of per- 
sons should be taken out of a free ship except "soldiers 
in actual service of an enemy." This same doctrine 
was re-affirmed in an unbroken line of treaties — eighteen 
in number — negotiated with foreign countries prior to 
the period of the civil war. 

In all of these treaties it was expressly provided that 
nothing should be considered as contraband of war ex- 
cept the things therein specified and enumerated. Non- 
military dispatches were not enumerated in the list of 
contraband, and hence could not be classed as such. It 
is true that the language of these treaty stipulations had 
never been passed upon by any American courts of admi- 
ralty, but nothing of this kind was necessary, for the terms 
used were so definite and precise that no other construc- 
tion could possibly have been placed upon them. British 
prize courts passed upon the guilt or innocence of the 
American ships referred to in this chapter, because 



264 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

there was no treaty between the two countries by 
which contraband of war was defined in precise terms. 

Where no such treaties existed between these two 
countries, it can not be held that anything is positively 
proved by the argument here offered, but the conclusion 
to be drawn by analogy is self-evident. 

It would have been more consistent with the past 
record of American diplomacy, if the release of the 
Confederate commissioners had been made upon the 
ground that the law of nations, as understood and inter- 
preted by the United States government, does not per- 
mit a belligerent to take from a free neutral ship either 
non-military dispatches or any class of persons except 
officers or soldiers in the actual service of the enemy. 
It is to be regretted that the men were surrendered 
upon the ground that although they and their dispatches 
were contraband, yet the right to retain them had been 
forfeited when Captain Wilkes voluntarily released the 
Trent instead of bringing her into port for adjudication. 

The following general conclusions seem to be war- 
ranted from a careful examination of the Trent case : 

1. The commissioners were not contraband of war in 
any sense of that term. 

2. Their dispatches being of a non-military charac- 
ter were not contraband of war. 

3. A neutral power is entitled to hold necessary in- 
formal relations with an unrecognized belligerent. 

4. The Trent had in no way violated her duties as a 
neutral ship when she was stopped by the San Jacinto. 

5. Captain Wilkes had an undoubted right to stop 
and search the Trent for contraband of war. In the 
absence of anything of this character, only resistance to 



SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS. 265 

the right of search would have made the Trent liable to 
capture. As a matter of fact her captain did refuse 
all facilities for search and made it known that he 
yielded only to superior force. What view a prize 
court might have taken of this can be only a matter of 
conjecture. 

6. In any event Captain Wilkes had no right to seize 
the persons or dispatches of the Confederate commis- 
sioners while they were on board the Trent on the high 
seas. 

7. Viewed solely from the standpoint of international 
law, sound reasons were not given for the surrender of 
the commissioners by Secretary Seward. 

Mr. Blaine says: "It is not believed that the doc- 
trine announced by Mr. Seward can be maintained on 
sound principles of international law. The restoration 
of the envoys on any such apparently insufficient basis 
did not avoid the mortification of the surrender ; it only 
deprived us of the fuller credit and advantage which we 
might have secured from the act. It is to be regretted 
that we did not place the restoration of the prisoners 
upon franker and truer ground, viz., that their seizure 
was in violation of the principles which we would not 
abandon either for a temporary advantage or to save 
the wounding of our national pride." 1 

Viewed from any standpoint Mr. Seward's position 
is untenable. If it had prevailed and had been fully 
recognized as a doctrine of international law, a back- 
ward step in maritime affairs would have been taken. 
Instead of enlarged rights for neutrals and a greater 
freedom upon th* ocean, there would have been a re- 

* Twenty Years of Congress, Vol. i, p. 585. 



266 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

turn toward the narrow and illiberal maritime policy 
which prevailed during the Napoleonic wars. Reprisals 
would have been invited ; naval commanders every- 
where would have been transformed into admiralty 
judges ; and every neutral deck would have been liable 
to be changed into "a floating judgment seat." Ameri- 
can maritime policy and principle would have been re- 
versed. 

The right to capture the Confederate commissioners 
seemed very dear to the people of the North. By the 
surrender of the captured persons, all of the immediate 
results of the seizure were lost. Although the sacrifice 
seemed a grievous one, yet the apparently unfavorable out- 
come of the whole matter, from the standpoint of inter- 
national law, was a benefit not only to the United States 
but to the world. It was a vindication of the principle 
for which America had always contended. England 
having committed herself to the American doctrine, it 
became, in this unexpected manner, firmly and forever 
imbedded in the principles of international law. A 
triumph was thus realized, for there remained not a 
single nation in all the world to dispute this principle. 



AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. Adams, J. Q^: Memoirs, Vol. v. 

2. Admiralty Reports, Edwards's and Robinson's. 

3. American Law Review, Vol. v. 

4. Bernard, Montague: Neutrality of Great Britain during 

the American Civil War. 

5. Blaine, James G.: Twenty Years of Congress, Vol. I. 

6. Dana's Wheaton's International Law. 

7. Edinburgh Review, January, 1862. 



A UTHORJTIES AND REFERENCES. 267 

8. Grotius: De Jure Belli et Pads, 

9. Hall, W. E.: International Law. 

10. Hautefeuille, M.: Questions of Maritime International 

Law. 

11. Hunt's Merchant Magazine, Vol. XLVi. 

12. Marquardsen, Heinrich Dr.: Der Trent Fall. 

13. North American Review, January, 1862, and July, 1862. 

14. Nys, M.: La Guerre Maritime, p. 46, 

15. Quarterly Review, January, 1862. 

16. Seward, W. H.: Works of, Vol, V. 

17. Southern Law Review, Vol. viii. 

18. Sumner, Charles: Speech in U. S. Senate, Jan. 9, 1862. 

19. Westminster Review, January, 1862, 

20. Woolsey, T. D.: Introduction to the Study of Inter- 

national Law. 

21. Wharton, Francis: Digest of the International Law of 

the United States. 

22. Vattel, M,: The Law of Nations, Book iv. 



CHAPTER XX. 

REFLECTIONS ON THE COURSE OF THE BRITISH GOV- 
ERNMENT. 

After the lapse of a third of a century the course of 
the British government in the affair of the Trent may 
be considered calmly and without passion or prejudice. 
In the absence of such influences, it should be easy to 
draw correct conclusions concerning the motives which 
controlled the action of the English ministry on that 
occasion. The facts which have been presented in 
former chapters speak for themselves. Extended com- 
ment upon them is unnecessary. 

In view of all the circumstances of the case there can 
be but one conclusion possible, and that is one which is 
unfavorable to England. The action taken by her gov- 
ernment in that instance was unwarranted by the nature 
of tl^e case ; it was not consistent with either the pre- 
tended position of England as a leader of civilization or 
with the past record of that country as regards her 
treatment of neutrals ; and last but not least, her course 
was adopted and pursued with the intention of de- 
liberately menacing the United States of America at a 
time when they were already engaged in a deadly strug- 
gle, and least able to resent foreign insults. 

(269) 



270 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



It is true that no government can hope to maintain 
the respect of the civilized world, if it tamely submits 
to wanton outrage perpetrated against its flag. When 
premeditated insult is offered, the national honor should 
be vindicated, although it be necessary to do so by an 
appeal to arms, and the fortunes of even a doubtful 
war. These things have been urged in justification of 
the conduct of the British government in the affair of 
the Trent. 

It is not true that the act of Captain Wilkes was an 
"outrage on the British flag," as has been so often 
affirmed by apologists for the course pursued by Eng- 
land on that occasion. The seizure of the southern 
commissioners was not an act which can be said to pos- 
sess any of the essential qualities of outrage. It was 
done, as has already been stated in a preceding chapter, 
without any authority whatever from the Federal gov- 
ernment. Although the proceeding was irregular, and 
not sanctioned by the principles of international law, 
there existed on the part of Captain Wilkes not the 
slightest intention to offer an affront to the British flag. 
Filled with patriotic zeal to serve his own country he 
was guilty of having stopped a British mail packet on 
the high seas and taken from her four American citi- 
zens, insurgents, proceeding to Europe in the hope of 
securing assistance there to accomplish the ruin of their 
country. No harm was done or offered to the person 
or property of any British subject. It did not lie within 
the power of Captain Wilkes to insult the British nation 
unless his act had been previously ordered by his gov- 
ernment or afterward sanctioned by it. 

It often happens in war, and not infrequently in peace, 



BRITISH INJUSTICE TOWARD AMERICA. 271 

that an act not permitted by the law of nations will be 
done toward a neutral by some over-zealous commander 
of a single cruiser. In such a case, the government of 
the injured party, after having been officially informed 
of the matter, usually brings it to the notice of the 
offender's government and seeks redress through diplo- 
matic means upon the assumption that the act com- 
plained of was done without authority. This is the rec- 
ognized and proper method of adjusting such cases 
among friendly civilized nations. Such cases are con- 
stantly being settled in this friendly and pacific manner 
without even a hint or a thought of a resort to arms by 
either party. Quite a different course was pursued in 
England on this occasion. "Within a week the demand 
for reparation was on its way to America ; within a 
fortnight, several of the finest regiments in the Queen's 
army were on their way to Canada ; immense stores of 
war were embarked ; the materiel of a considerable 
army was in readiness ; a fleet of incomparable power 
was in commission which would have been tripled at the 
first moment of hostilities ; the sea-faring population 
joined the naval reserve with alacrity ; and throughout 
the nation one spirit prevails of absolute confidence in 
its rulers, and absolute determination to maintain its 
rights."! 

This would have been justifiable in case of a deliber- 
ate and premeditated insult for which the offending gov- 
ernment was undoubtedly responsible. In the case 
under consideration there was nothing in question ex- 
cept the isolated act of the commander of a single de- 
tached cruiser. Upon the mere hearing of this one such 

* Edinburgh Review, Vol, cxv, p, 284. 



272 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

act, the British government made an instant and per- 
emptory demand for reparation which was dictated by 
themselves and backed by more active preparations for war 
than had been made in that country since the Napoleonic 
era. * No one knew whether the act had been com- 
mitted in pursuance of instructions from the Federal 
government or not. There was to be no discussion of 
the case ; no consideration of what the American gov- 
ernment might have to say ; no arbitration or diplo- 
matic means of obtaining redress in accordance with 
the practice of friendly nations. The United States 
were given the alternative of acceding to the per- 
emptory demand of Great Britain or of engaging in a 
war with that country. 

The first communication to the Washington govern- 
ment was an ultimatum — a last and only condition, a 
beginning with the end. The natural beginning in such 
a case would have been to ask for an explanation of in- 
tentions, and to demand reparation of the wrong done, 
without at the same time preparing for war. In discus- 
sing the English ultimatum Count De Gasparin says: 
"Public opinion, moreover, was aroused in Europe 
with unforeseen rapidity; the precipitation of the meas- 
ure adopted at London was judged severely ; the clause 
concerning apology was also abandoned in fact. But it is 
no less incredible that it figured in the original programme. 
Little children are made to ask pardon, the humiliation 
of apology is inflicted on countries without regular gov- 
ernment, on Turks and savages ; between nations which 
respect each other mutually, it is always deemed suffi- 

» See Life of Thurlow Weed, Vol. i, p. 643. 



THE BRITISH UL TIM A TUM. 



273 



dent satisfaction to repair the wrong and deny the hos- 
tile intention."! 

The Morning Post and other London newspapers de- 
fended the ultimatum on the ground that the act of 
Captain Wilkes was the last of a series of hostile acts 
designed to bring about a war. It was said that the 
United States were seeking a pretext for declaring war 
against England, and that Mr. Seward desired to heal 
the domestic difficulty by proposing to reconcile all dif- 
ferences with the South and make a common assault on 
Canada. They said that if war must come it is best to 
choose one's own time instead of awaitingthe inevitable. 

These statements are too silly to deserve serious con- 
sideration. In refuting these absurdities, Count De 
Gasparin says: 2 "I have followed the progress of 
events in America as attentively as any one, I have read 
the American newspapers, I have studied documents, 
among others the famous circular of Mr. Seward ; I 
have seen there more than one sign of discontent with 
the unsympathizing attitude of England ; I have also 
seen there the symptoms of the somewhat natural fear 
which the intervention of Europe in Mexico excites in 
men attached to the Monroe doctrine ; but as to these 
incredible plans (annexing Canada, etc.), I have never 
discovered the slightest trace of them." It was only 
Englishmen who could discover such plans. 

An ultimatum to the Federal government — one pre- 
pared and forwarded without seeking explanations — 
was the panacea for English wounded honor in this in- 

* "L'Amferique devant I'Europe," chapter on the Trent. 
' See the last chapter of his "Un Grand Peuple qui se relive." 
18 



274 7'//'^ TRENT AFFAIR. 

stance. Only five years before, in the Paris congress, 
an Englishman, Lord Clarendon, had proposed a rule 
of arbitration that he said would be a "barrier to those 
conflicts which not infrequently break out only because 
of the impossibility of offering explanations or of 
coming to an understanding." 

This was a question introduced by the English gov- 
ernment. It was discussed with earnestness, and a 
final vote postponed until the Russian representative 
could obtain the views of his government by tele- 
graph. The unanimous declaration assented to by all 
the powers, including the United States, was as follows : 
"The plenipotentiaries do not hestitate to express the 
wish, in the name of their governments, that states, be- 
tween which serious dissensions may arise, shall have 
recourse to the good offices of a friendly power, as far 
as circumstances permit, before appealing to arms." 

If there has ever been a case where this rule, pro- 
posed and adopted at the suggestion of England, could 
be applied advantageously, it was certainly in the in- 
stance under consideration. A war was about to break 
out through " the impossibility of offering explanations, 
or of coming to an understanding." This proposition, 
so earnestly made and so cheerfully assented to only 
five years before, was utterly disregarded at the first 
opportunity to put it into practice. This was an incon- 
sistency, not creditable to English character. 

There was absolutely nothing in the affair which 
justified a menace of war, and, if the British govern- 
ment ever believed that such was the case, it was soon 
undeceived. It has already been stated in a previous 
chapter that on November 30, Mr. Seward took the 



PREPARATIONS FOR WAR UNNECESSARY. 



275 



precaution to write to Mr. Adams at London, and in- 
form him that the act of Captain Wilkes was entirely 
upon his own responsibility, and without instructions 
from the government ; that the United States was un- 
committed and ready to meet Great Britain half way in 
any sort of a friendly disposition of the matter. 

On December 19 Mr. Adams called upon Lord Rus- 
sell at the foreign office, and read the dispatch to him. 
This was an absolute assurance that any reasonable 
terms would be accepted, and that all warlike demonstra- 
tions were needless. This pacific dispatch from Mr. 
Seward, however, did not have the slightest effect upon 
the British government. All knowledge of the dispatch 
or even of the interview was carefully concealed from 
the British public lest this assurance — given in advance 
— of a willingness to settle the matter in a peaceable 
manner, would destroy the warlike enthusiasm which 
was then so nearly universal among the British people. 
The preparations for war continued with unabated vigor. 
The British government did not care to take into con- 
sideration anything just then that would interfere with 
the parade of its military power, which was being made 
in order to overawe the United States and secure the 
concession of the English demands. 

Mr. Adams regarded the contents of the dispatch as 
confidential and so took care that no one outside the 
legation should know of its existence or of the interview 
with Lord Russell. Finally certain London newspa- 
pers published rumors of the whole matter. On De- 
cember 2 I the Morning Post, the organ of the ministry, 
hastened to publish, in large type, the official contradic- 
tion of the news, and stated that no dispatch had been 



276 THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

received which had the slightest bearing on the Trent 
case. Only a few days later the Observer published a 
summary of all the events relating to the case, at the 
close of which was a fairly correct account of the sub- 
stance of Mr. Seward's dispatch of November 30. 
"After the appearance of that," says Mr. Adams, "I 
had no hesitation in disclosing to persons with whom I 
conversed my knowledge of its correctness. It was 
then with no little surprise that they perceived last week, 
when intelligence was received from America of the ex- 
istence of such a paper, a formal denial in the Post that 
any such paper had ever been communicated to the 
British government. No longer able to deny the exist- 
ence of it, the next step was to affirm that I must have 
suppressed it. And not satisfied with that, the same 
press went on to supply a motive for doing so, in the 
fact that certain American parties had about the same 
time appeared in the market buying up stock, which 
was the cause of the rise in the funds already alluded to. 
Of course the assumption was that I was engaged in a 
heavy stock jobbing operation for my own benefit and 
that of my friends." 1 

The Post evidently wanted to have the British public 
believe a falsehood as long as possible. Finally Lord 
Russell's account of the matter, as given in a w)te to 
Lord Lyons, was published and the case was clear to 
all. But the Post remained silent. It made no retrac- 
tion of its statements ; no justification for making them ; 
neither did it disclaim the authority upon which they 
were made. 
, There seemed to be an eagerness on the part of the 

j^* Mr. Adams to Mr. Seward, Jan. 17, 1862. 



BRITISH INCONSISTENCr. 



277 



British government to seize on the occasion and to 
grasp the pretext for making war. It was loth to give 
up this chance which had been so hastily accepted. 
Peace was not wanted, but war. A kindred people 
were already engaged in a struggle for their very exist- 
ence, yet, for a difference which it was easily possible to 
arrange by diplomatic means, this professed leader of 
civilization and boasted enemy of human slavery did all 
in her power to make a conflict inevitable and the 
triumph of an insurgent slave republic certain. A few 
almost unknown Englishmen presented an address to the 
prime minister at this time. It was an appeal from the 
Anti-Slavery Society. The case was well stated. They 
said: "Such an undertaking on the part of England 
would not only be most humiliating, but would lament- 
ably contradict her past efforts and former sacrifices for 
the liberty of slaves ; it would expose her protests to the 
reproach of hypocrisy from the rest of the world; it 
would destroy her claim and close her lips henceforth to 
every appeal addressed to the intelligence and con- 
science of other nations. The members of the society 
experience inexpressible horror and repugnance at the 
thought of seeing their country engaged in a war the 
virtual end of which would be the defense of slavery." 
The circumstances of this case permitted "recourse to 
the good offices of a friendly power" before rushing to 
arms. This would probably have been proposed by 
the United States, if any opportunity to do so had been 
permitted. It is known that this method would have 
been most satisfactory to President Lincoln. But the 
English view of the case was that a blow had been re- 
ceived and this was not a matter which admitted of 



278 



THE TRENT AFFAIR. 



arbitration. It must be settled by war unless the Brit- 
ish demands were instantly granted. It was not an 
ordinary infraction of international law ; it was an enor- 
mity, and therefore entirely proper that the first message 
sent to Lord Lyons should instruct him to demand his 
passports in seven days if the Federal government did 
not submit fully to the conditions dictated by England. 

Captain Wilkes's error was entirely excusable. It 
was in no respect like any of the genuine outrages 
which England has been guilty of in her dealings with 
America. In 1795 the British war ship Africa entered 
American waters with the avowed intention of seizing 
M. Fauchet, the French minister to the United States. 
He was traveling from New York to Newport in the 
packet Peggy, a neutral American vessel. Having re- 
ceived intimations of the intention of the commander of 
the Africa, M. Fauchet left the American vessel at 
Stonington, Conn. When the Peggy had arrived al- 
most at the harbor of Newport, and while within the 
maritime jurisdiction of the United States, she was 
boarded from the Africa, the trunks of the passengers 
were searched and great disappointment shown on ac- 
count of the absence of M. Fauchet. The British vice- 
consul at Newport aided in this matter. These facts 
show that the French minister to the United States 
escaped seizure, only because he had left the American 
packet a few hours before. 1 

For three quarters of a century England maintained 
and practiced the "right of search and seizure." "The 
victims were counted by thousands. Lord Castlereagh 
himself admitted, on the floor of the House of Com- 

* See Senate Executive Document, No, 4, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 



IMPRESSMENT OF AMERICAN SEAMEN. 279 

mons, that an inquiry instituted by the British govern- 
ment had discovered in the British fleet three thousand 
five hundred men claiming to be impressed Americans. 
At our department of state six thousand cases were re- 
corded, and it was estimated that at least as many more 
might have occurred, of which no information had been 
received. Thus according to this official admission of 
the British minister there was reason to believe that the 
quarter-deck of a British man-of-war had been made a 
floatingjudgment-seat three thousand five hundred times, 
while according to the records of our own state depart- 
ment, it had been made a floating judgment-seat six 
thousand times and upwards, and each time an Ameri- 
can citizen had been taken from the protection of his 
flag without any form of trial known to the law." 1 
The practice was pursued with the utmost arrogance 
and without discrimination among those who were lia- 
ble to seizure. On one occasion two nephews of 
Washington, returning from Europe, were seized on 
board an American vessel and placed under the ordi- 
nary discipline of a British man-of-war. 

In 1837 a body of British troops entered the territory 
of the United States, seized the American steamer Caro- 
line, which, it was claimed, had rendered some sort of 
service to the rebellious Canadians, set her on fire and 
allowed her to drift over the Falls of Niagara. But it 
is unnecessary to extend this list of outrages. There 
are enough of them to satisfy any one that the London 
Times was correct when it admitted that Great Britain 
was not "immaculate." 

In commenting upon this matter, Mr. Blaine says: 

* Sumner's speech on the Trent affair. 



28o THE TRENT AFFAIR. 

"Whatever wrong was inflicted on the British flag by 
the action of Captain Wilkes had been, time and again, 
inflicted on the American flag by officers of the English 
navy, without cause, without redress, without apology. 
* * * But in view of the past, and of the long 
series of graver outrages with which Great Britain had 
so wantonly insulted the American flag, she might have 
refrained from invoking the judgment of the civilized 
world against us, and especially might she have refrained 
from making, in the hour of our sore trial and our deep 
distress, a demand, which no British minister would 
address to this government in the day of its strength 
and its power." i 

In conclusion it is worthy of remark that, with unim- 
portant exceptions, the relations of the United States 
with the various countries of continental Europe have 
always been of the most friendly and agreeable charac- 
ter. In the revolution, France recognized the strug- 
gling Americans and furnished them timely and substan- 
tial aid. Russia has always been the steadfast friend of 
America and probably would have aided the United 
States in a third war against England in 1861. 

War in the early history of the United States, and, in 
later times, a succession of diplomatic disputes which 
have often threatened war, constitute much the larger 
portion of the record of Anglo-American international 
relations. This should be a matter pf sincere regret in 
both countries. President Buchanan stated the case well 
when he said, "No two nations have ever existed on 
the face of the earth which could do each other so much 
good or so much harm." 2 \^ jg for this reason that 

* Blaine's Twenty Years of Congress, Vol. i, pp. 586-7. 
*Ex. Doc, 2d Sess. 35th Cong., Vol. 11, p. 2. 



CONCLUSION. 281 

every friend of either country should desire that the 
next century of their relations may be one of continuous 
peace and good-will. 



AUTHORITIES AND REFERENCES. 

1. Blaine, James G.: Twenty Years of Congress. 

2. Dana's Wheaton's International Law, section 504, note. 

3. De Gasparin: L'Amerique devant I'Europe. 

4. De Gasparin: Un Grand Peuple qui se releve. 

5. Edinburg Review, Vol. cxv. 

6. Ex. Document, 2d Session 35th Congress, Vol. 11, 

7. Senate Ex. Documents: Vol. 1, 3d Session 37th Congress; 
No. 4, 37th Congress, 3d Session. 

8. Sumner, Charles: Speech in U. S. Senate, Jan. g, 1862. 



INDEX. 



The Numbers Refer to Pages. 

Adams, Charles Francis, U. S. minister to England, instructed 
to oppose recognition of Confederacy, 34; to oppose neutrality 
measures, 37; refused audience prior to recognition of Confed- 
erate belligerency, 36-7; conveys assurances of Mr. Seward's 
pacific intentions in Trent case to Lord Russell, 275. 

Albert, Prince, revises British demand for surrender of Mason 
and Slidell, 165-6. 

American doctrine in Trent case, 262-264. 

Atalanta, case of the, cited, 254. 

Austrian government, views of in Trent case, 201-203; Mr. 
Seward's answer to, 203-204. 

Belligerency, recognition of Confederate, discussed by parlia- 
ment, 38; what is meant by recognition of, 39-41. 

Benjamin, Judah P., advocates secession and resumption of al- 
legiance to British crown, 70. 

Bernard, Montague, defends British neutrality proclamation, 48. 

Black, J. S., secretary of state, sends circular letter to U. S. min- 
isters abroad, 31. 

Blaine, Jas. G., comments on Trent case, 180. 

Blair, Montgomery, denounces capture of Mason and Slidell, 126. 

Boundary disputes, 12. 

Bright, John, opposes position of English government in Trent 
case, 158-9. 

British demand for surrender of Mason and Slidell, first draft of, 
164-5; revised by Prince Albert and the Queen, 165-6; text 
of, 167-9; comments upon, 169-170; presented to Mr. Seward, 
172. 

(283) 



284 INDEX. 

British government, course of in'Trent case discussed, 269; ulti- 
matum of in Trent case considered, 272-4; inconsistency of, 
274; menaces of war by unnecessary, 274; receives through 
Mr. Adams assurances of Mr. Seward's pacific intentions, 275; 
treatment of same, 275-6; addressed on Trent case by Anti- 
slavery society, 277. 

Buchanan, James, comments of on British and American rela- 
tions, 13, 14, 280. 

Canada, troops pushed into by England, 60, 143-6; comments 
upon by Thurlow Weed, 144; by the London press, 144-5; 
preparations for war in, 158. 

Caroline, case of the, cited, 254, 279. 

Circular letter to U. S. ministers abroad by Mr. Black, 31; by 
Mr. Seward, 32; by Mr. Seward to governors of the northern 
states, 61-4; commented upon by the London and the Cana- 
dian press, 65-67. 

Commons, House of, motion to recognize Confederate independ- 
ence in, 35; Mr. Gregery supports same in London Times, 35. 

Derby, Earl of, consulted by British government in Trent case, 

H3- 

Dispatches of Messrs. Mason and Slidell, 112; contraband na- 
ture of, 253-6; the commissioners considered living dispatches 
by Capt. Wilkes, 113, 119; this doctrine not tenable, 260. 

European powers, real motives of in sustaining England in Trent 
case, 206-8. 

Everett, Edward, expresses opinion in Trent case, 128, 

Excitement in England over Trent affair, 140; reaches U. S., 

175- 
Fairfax, Lieut. D. M., receives instructions from Capt. Wilkes, 

101-102; part taken in seizure of envoys, 103-108; discusses 

Trent case with British Capt. Moir, 109. 
Fauchet, M., French Minister to U. S., attempted seizure of in 

American waters by a British man-of-war, 278. 
Foreign countries, responses of to Mr. Seward's circular letter, 33, 
Freeman, Edward A., English historian regards the American 

Union as at an end, 29. 
Garibaldi, wishes to volunteer in Federal army, 33. 
Gladstone, Wm. E., expresses sympathy with the South, 28; 

charges American people with instability and cowardice, 235-6. 



INDEX. 285 

Grotius cited, 249. 

International law in Trent case, 247-262. 

Irish people, sympathize with U. S. in Trent affair, 148. 

Iverson, Senator, predicts foreign aid for the Confederacy, 70. 

King, T. Butler, see Yancey. 

Lincoln, Abraham, views on capture of Mason and Slidell, 125-6; 
illustrates Trent case by stories, 185-6; proposed dispatch of 
to Great Britain relative to Trent case, 188-190. 

Liverpool, excited public meeting at on account of seizure of 
Mason and Slidell, 146-7. 

London, press of, comments on seizure of Mason and Slidell, 
148-152; a dissenting newspaper in, 159-160. 

Lovejoy, Representative, comments of upon surrender of Mason 
and Slidell, 229-231. 

Lyons, Lord, British minister to U. S., reports secession of 
southern states to his government, 17; expresses no opinion in 
Trent case, 131; conditional order to leave Washington in 
seven days, 171; to give information to British governors, 
171; to make verbal demand for surrender of Mason and Sli- 
dell, 172. 

Lytton, Sir Edward Bulwer, expresses sympathy for the Con- 
federacy, 27. 

Mann, Dudley, see Yancey. 

Mason, James Murray, sketch of, 80. 

Mason and Slidell, nature and objects of their mission abroad, 
79, 83, 84; Mr. Seward's letter for thwarting efforts of, 84-8; 
escape from Charleston, 91-2; comments of Richmond Exam- 
iner upon, 94-6; arrival and reception at Havana, 93-4; em- 
bark upon British steamer Trent, 94; seized by Capt. Wilkes, 
106-7; become prisoners at Fort Warren, Boston, iii; protest 
against seizure, iii; dispatches in possession of, 112; recep- 
tion of news of capture of in North, 11 7-1 19; rejoicing in 
North at capture of, 124; northern newspaper comments on 
capture of, 124, 127-9; attitude of Mr. Lincoln on capture of, 
125-6; capture of denounced by Mr. Blair, 126; comments on 
capture of, by Confederate press, 131; by Jefferson Davis, 
131-2; by Canadian press, 132-4; capture of anticipated in 
England, 163-4; considered by British cabinet, 164-5; belief 
in the North that they would not be surrendered, 176-7; sur- 



286 INDEX. 

render of a disappointment to the South, 233; opposed by 
Senator Hale, 177-9; by C. L. Vallandigham, 180; by people 
of the North, 226; by Northern newspapers, 180-2; com- 
mented upon by John W. Forney, 164-5; by Mr. Wright, of 
Pa., 228; by Mr. Thomas, of Mass., 227-8; by Mr. Lovejoy, 
of 111., 229-31; by the Canadian press, 233-4; by English 
press, 234-5; demand for surrender of, significance of, 186-7; 
caused rejoicing at the South, 185; surrender of discussed in 
cabinet meeting, 190-4; surrendered to Lord Lyons, 225; pro- 
ceed to Europe, 226; sink into insignificance when sur- 
rendered, 236; comments upon after difficulty is settled, by 
London Star, 236; by London Times, 236-7; diplomatic char- 
acter of, 258-9; not "living dispatches," 260; entitled to right 
of asylum, 261; status of in a maritime court, 262. 

McCarthy, Justin, defense of neutrality proclamation by, 47. 

Moir, captain of the Trent, behavior of when his vessel was 
boarded, 103, 108; discusses Trent affair with Lieut. Fairfax, 
109. 

Neutrality proclamation, British, issue of, 38; discussion of, 42- 
47; defense of by Justin McCarthy, 47; by Lord Stanley, 47; 
by Montague Bernard, 48; the defenses examined, 48-51; not 
violated by captain of Trent, 257-8. 

Newcastle, Duke of, 153. 

Orozembo, case of the, cited, 251-2. 

Pakington, Sir John, expresses sympathy for the South, 28. 

Palmerston, Lord, British premier, an enemy to the North, 28. 

Paris, declaration of, adopted, 53; refused by U. S., 54; discus- 
sion of by Sir H. S. Maine, 54; urged upon the Confederates 
by Lord Russell and Consul Bunch, 55; adopted by the Con- 
federate Congress, 56; indorsed by Lord Russell, 57; Mr. 
Bunch's course, a violation of U. S. law, 57; discussion of, 

58-9- 
Presidential messages dealing with difficulties between U. S. 

and Great Britain, 13. 
Prince of Wales visits America, 14; the queen thanks people 

of the U. S. for his reception, 15; reply of the president, 16; 

comments of the London press, 16-17. 
Prussia offers opinion in Trent case, 204-206. 
Q^een Victoria thanks people of U. S, for Prince of Wales's rc« 



INDEX. 287 

ception, 15; revises demand for surrender of Mason and Sli- 
dell, 165-6. 

Quarterlies, British, encourage secession, 23-26. 

Results of successful secession, 21-2. 

Richmond Examiner, comments of, upon the escape of Mason 
and Slidell, 94-6. 

Right of search, abandoned by Great Britain, 12; England criti- 
cised for practicing, 278-9. 

Rest, P. A., see Yancey. 

Russell, Lord John, threatens U. S., 18; expresses sympathy for 
the Confederacy, 27; indifferent to the causeof the Union, 33; 
receives first Confederate diplomatic agents, 73; views of 
American position in Trent case, 239-245; addresses demand 
for surrender of Mason and Slidell to Lord Lyons, 167-9; ad- 
dresses private notes at same time to Lord Lyons, 170-2. 

Russia, friendly to U. S., 208; sends fleet to America when war 
with England is probable, 209-10. 

San Jacinto, character of the, 97. 

Scott, Gen. Winfield, writes letter to Paris press on Trent affair, 
155-6; returns hastily to U. S., 156-7. 

Scott, Sir William, cited, 248, 251-2-3, 255. 

Seward, Wm. H., secretary of state, sends circular letter to U. S. 
ministers abroad, 32; to northern governors, 61-4; informs 
Minister Adams that seizure of Mason and Slidell was unau- 
thorized, 134-5; this dispatch promptly communicated to Lord 
Russell, 275; no attention paid to it, 275-7; abused by British 
press, 152; accused of insulting the Duke of Newcastle, 153; 
answer of to British demand for Mason and Slidell, 2x1-220; 
strength of this document, 221-2; its weakness, 222-3; posi- 
tion in Trent case untenable, 265-6; offers passage across 
Maine to British troops, 338. 

Shrewsbury, Earl of, expresses sympathy for the Confederacy,28. 

Slavery in America, a source of trouble to Great Britain, 22. 

Slidell, John, sketch of, 81; predicts foreign aid for the Confed- 
eracy, 70. 

Spence, James, a prominent Englishman, publishes a book to 
encourage Confederate cause, 25. 

Sumner, Charles, senator from Mass., confers with Mr. Lincoln 
and cabinet relative to surrender of Mason and Slidell, 125, 



288 INDEX. 

igo; speech in senate on same, 231-2; condemns England for 
practicing "search and seizure," 278-9. 

Thouvenel, M., offers opinion of French government on seizure 
of Mason and Slidell, 196-200; Mr. Seward replies, 200; Mr. 
Thouvenel's position examined, 200-Boi. 

Trent, character of the, 94; why she was not seized, 108; purser 
of publishes account of seizure of Mason and Slidell in London 
Times, 137-9; ^ff^i^" of the, creates great excitement in Eng- 
land, 140-1; neutral termini of discussed, 255-6-7; case of, 
summary of principles involved in, 264-5. 

Vallandigham, C. L., opposes surrender of Mason and Slidell, 180, 
227, 229. 

Vattel cited, by Mr. Seward: discussion of, 248, 249, 250. 

War preparations on account of Trent affair, in Canada, 158; in 
England, 141-142; necessary in U. S., discussion of by news- 
papers, 181-2. 

Weed, Thurlow, letter of in London Times on Trent affair, 153-4; 
reply of Times to same, 154-5; notices warlike preparations 
in England, 144. 

Wilkes, Capt. Charles, character of, 97-8; returns from Africa 
to West Indies, 98; learns of the Mason and Slidell mission, 
98-9; makes preparations to seize the commissioners, 99-100; 
instructions to Lieut. Fairfax, 101-2; intercepts the Trent and 
seizes the commissioners, 102-7; proceeds to Fortress Mon- 
roe, 109, thence to New York, 110, and finally to Boston, 109, 
111-112; reasons for not seizing the Trent, 112-115; made a 
hero of, 1 1 7-1 19; thanked by secretary of war, 120-1; act of, ap- 
proved by navy department, 121; resolutions of thanks to, by 
Congress, 122-3; ^^'^ right to stop and search Trent, 260-1. 

Williams, Commander Richard, behavior of while Mason and 
Slidell were being seized, 104-5; rnakes official report of Trent 
affair to British admiralty, 140, 164; makes ridiculous speech, 
157-8. 

Yancey, Rost, Mann, and King, Messrs., first Confederate 
agents in Europe, 71; sketch of these men, 71-72; comments 
of Jefferson Davis concerning their labors, 76; received by 
Lord Russell, 72-3; protest against their reception by Mr. 
Seward, 73-4; Mr. Yancey's speech before Fishmonger's Soci- 
ety, London, 74; Mr. King's pamphlet for foreign circulation, 
75-6. 



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